Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: John D. Hartigan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

    James B. McVay, of Tiedeman, Lynch, Kampfe & McVay, for appellant.

    Thomas A. Grennan and Daniel J. Fischer, of Gross & Welch, P.C., for appellee.

    Sievers, Inbody, and Moore, Judges.

    Inbody, Judge.

    Donald T. Rice, M.D., appeals from the Douglas County District Court's decision denying his petition and entering judgment in favor of Alegent Health Clinics. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

    In 1995, Rice was a physician engaged in a residency program at a hospital in Riverside, California, when he and his wife began a search for career opportunities for Rice. They were looking for a position in a rural setting, where Rice could practice his specialty as a family practitioner and where he would be eligible to participate in the federal loan repayment program in order to reduce his medical school debt. At that time, Rice had outstanding student loans of approximately $168,750.85.

    In early 1995, Rice received a postcard from a recruiting agency regarding a search for physicians at two Nebraska facilities, one located in Blair, Nebraska, and the other in Schuyler, Nebraska. The agency indicated that the Schuyler facility was a federal loan repayment site. Rice inquired about both positions and eventually came into contact with Jim Clough, the hospital administrator at Memorial Hospital in Schuyler. During this time, Immanuel Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska, purchased Memorial Hospital. Negotiations regarding Rice's employment with the hospital proceeded, and on June 23, 1995, the parties entered into a medical services employment agreement. This agreement, which incorporated various terms from an earlier letter of understanding between Rice and Clough, provided that the hospital would pay, inter alia, certain sums to assist in the retirement of Rice's student loans. It is this provision that is the subject of the current litigation.

    The hospital became associated with Alegent Health, and on January 1, 1998, Rice authorized his employment agreement to be assigned to Alegent Health Clinics, a corporate affiliate of Alegent Health. Neither party disputes that the operative employment agreement binds Alegent Health Clinics and Rice; therefore, all references to the applicable hospital authority will be to Alegent Health Clinics (Alegent). Rice resigned his position with Alegent on September 4, 1998, which resignation became effective on January 2, 1999.

    On August 29, 2000, Rice filed a second amended petition against Alegent setting forth three causes of action: a claim under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1228 et seq. (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002); a claim for breach of contract; and a claim for reformation of an employment agreement based upon mutual mistake. (Earlier petitions are not included in the transcript before this court.)

    Trial was held on May 8 and 9, 2001. The evidence at trial established that the specific language contained in paragraph 14 of the employment agreement stated that Rice would receive the following benefit: "Up to Twenty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($20,000.00) per year, not to exceed One Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($150,000.00) in total, to assist in retirement of student loans." Both sides agree that this provision was not illusory and that Alegent was committed to paying $20,000 per year, up to a total of $150,000, for purposes of Rice's student loan repayments. The language was couched in the aforementioned terms, in part, to protect Alegent against the payment of sums that might exceed Rice's student loan balance.

    The employment agreement does not contain any reference to either the federal or state loan repayment program, because at the time the agreement was entered into, it was uncertain whether Schuyler was a designated site to participate in the Nebraska loan repayment program or whether Schuyler might be designated as a federal site. Additionally, even if Schuyler was designated as a site eligible for either the federal or state program, it was uncertain whether Rice's participation in either program would be approved. Further, Rice testified that it was his understanding at the time he signed this agreement that he would be receiving $20,000 per year for retirement of his student loans.

    The evidence established that Alegent made this agreement, which was a deviation from its normal practice, because (1) Schuyler had been advertised as a federal loan repayment site, when in fact it was not, and (2) the parties had no guarantee that Schuyler could be designated as a federal loan repayment site or that Rice would be eligible to participate in either the federal or state loan repayment program to assist physicians in repaying student loans.

    At a later date, it was determined that Rice was eligible for the Nebraska loan repayment program, which provides incentive payments for physicians in order to recruit them to practice in rural communities. The program matched state funds with private funds paid by a local provider to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to help new physicians working in physician shortage areas to repay student loans. Under this program, the State agreed to match a local provider's contributions (in this case Alegent) up to $10,000 per year for 3 years. Alegent agreed to take part in the state program in order to maximize the total benefits to Rice. Thus, by Alegent's agreement to participate in this program, Rice was eligible to receive an additional $30,000 from the State over 3 years to repay his student loans. Further, if Rice's student loans were paid down so that they were less than the total $150,000 Alegent was obligated to pay pursuant to the employment agreement, Alegent would benefit if it did not have to expend the entire $150,000.

    Rice became board certified in family practice on July 1, 1996, and began employment at Alegent on August 1. Rice worked for Alegent for 29 months, until his resignation became effective on January 2, 1999. During this time, Alegent paid directly to Rice $10,000 per year, or $30,000 total, for student loan repayment, less the applicable taxes which were withheld. Additionally, Alegent paid to DHHS, on Rice's behalf, $9,167 in 1996, $10,000 in 1997, and $10,000 in 1998 in order to facilitate Rice's participation in the state loan repayment program. The record does not disclose why Alegent's 1996 payment to DHHS was $9,167 instead of $10,000; however, neither party has disputed this amount.

    The State of Nebraska, in turn, contributed $18,167 in matching funds during this time period. During this 3-year period, the State then paid to Rice the sum of $48,334, which amount included payments of $29,167 by Alegent to DHHS and $18,167 in the State's matching funds. The record does not disclose why the State paid only $18,167 in matching funds to Alegent's $29,167, but the adequacy of the amount was not disputed by the parties. In total, during this time, more than $78,000 was paid to Rice (by Alegent and the State) to be applied to his student loan obligations.

    In late June or early July 1995, Al Klaasmeyer replaced Clough as the hospital administrator. Rice testified that when he asked Klaasmeyer how participation in the state loan repayment program would affect the benefits he was entitled to under the employment agreement, Rice was told that "it was a separate agreement." Rice testified that in a meeting with Klaasmeyer in late winter or early spring of 1996, Klaasmeyer then told him that the $20,000 in student loan repayment moneys due under the employment agreement had to be paid directly to Rice.

    Several weeks later, in mid-March, during a second meeting, Klaasmeyer presented Rice with an addendum to Rice's employment agreement, which addendum provided that $10,000 per year for the first 3 years of Alegent's obligation pursuant to the employment agreement would be payable to DHHS in order to allow Rice to participate in the state loan repayment program. According to Rice's trial testimony, Rice refused to execute the addendum because it "was not within the spirit of what we had negotiated up to [that] point." Additionally, in an August 1, 1997, letter to Klaasmeyer's secretary, Rice stated, "Alegent has still not fulfilled its loan repayment obligation to me."

    Additional evidence established that on February 7, 1996, Marlene Janssen, program coordinator for DHHS' office of rural health (the department responsible for administration of the state loan repayment program), wrote a note stating, "Schuyler Hospital/Immanuel is paying additional loan repayment of $20,000/per yr. to Dr. Rice as per Mrs. Rice & Al Klaasmeyer." Janssen authored a letter, dated December 16, 1998, to the interim administrator of the hospital, which letter stated:

For the record, when Dr. Rice applied for loan repayment he indicated on his application that Immanuel (Memorial Hospital in Schuyler) would be paying him "$20,000 per year for a total of $150,000." At the time, I had some concerns about this amount of loan repayment and was informed by the hospital administrator that Immanuel would be paying additional loan repayment of $20,000 per year to Dr. Rice.

    On May 18, 2001, the district court filed an order finding in favor of Alegent. Specifically, the court found that Rice failed to meet his burden of persuasion in establishing that Alegent's payments were less than those called for under the employment agreement in three respects: (1) The language of the employment agreement provides that payments of up to $20,000 would be made "'to assist in retirement of student loans,'" not that payments would be paid directly to Rice; (2) Rice entered into the performance of his duties knowing Alegent's position that it would pay up to $20,000 per year for the retirement of Rice's student loans, and Rice did not give Alegent notice at any time during the period of his employment that he considered the hospital's loan reimbursement payments to be deficient or in breach of the employment agreement; and (3) the employment agreement and the state loan repayment program contract are in harmony with one another and the court's interpretation of the employment agreement. Rice has timely appealed to this court.

    Rice's assignments of error can be consolidated into the following issues: The district court erred in (1) finding that Rice waived Alegent's breach of the employment agreement by failing to provide notice to Alegent of an alleged breach at any time during the term of his employment and (2) considering and construing the employment agreement and the state loan repayment contract as one instrument allowing Alegent to make payments to DHHS in satisfaction of Alegent's obligations under the employment agreement.

    The interpretation and construction of a contract involve questions of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach its conclusions independent of the determinations made by the court below. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cheeper's Rent-A-Car, 259 Neb. 1003, 614 N.W.2d 302 (2000).

    In a bench trial of an action at law, the factual findings by the trial judge have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless they are clearly wrong. Strategic Staff Mgmt. v. Roseland, 260 Neb. 682, 619 N.W.2d 230 (2000).

    Rice's first assignment of error is that the district court erred in finding that Rice waived Alegent's alleged breach of the employment agreement by failing to provide notice to Alegent of an alleged breach at any time during the term of his employment. The district court's order set forth the following:

Dr. Rice entered into the performance of his duties as an employee at Alegent, knowing the hospital's position on the interpretation of the student loan provision. Dr. Rice did not give the hospital notice at any time during the period of his employment with Alegent, that he considered the hospital's loan reimbursement payments to be deficient or in breach of their Professional Medical Associate Agreement.

    The record reflects that Rice did in fact notify Alegent that he considered Alegent's loan reimbursement payments to be deficient or in breach of the employment agreement. In an August 1, 1997, letter to Klaasmeyer's secretary, Rice stated, "Alegent has still not fulfilled its loan repayment obligation to me." Thus, the district court erred in finding that Rice waived Alegent's alleged breach of the employment agreement.

Construction of Employment Agreement.

    Next, Rice contends that the district court erred in considering and construing the employment agreement and the state loan repayment contract as one instrument allowing Alegent to make payments to DHHS in satisfaction of Alegent's obligations under the employment agreement. Specifically, Rice contends that the plain language of paragraph 14 of the employment agreement required that payments by Alegent for student loan repayment assistance be made directly to Rice. Alegent, on the other hand, contends that the payments made to DHHS on Rice's behalf are applied toward Alegent's obligation under the employment agreement and that Alegent's obligation pursuant to the employment agreement has been fulfilled.

    The proper construction of a written contract and an examination of a contract for ambiguity are questions of law, which require an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from the conclusion reached by a trial court. See, Stephens v. Radium Petroleum Co., 250 Neb. 560, 550 N.W.2d 39 (1996); Barry v. Tanner, 250 Neb. 116, 547 N.W.2d 730 (1996); Knox v. Cook, 233 Neb. 387, 446 N.W.2d 1 (1989); City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 9 Neb. App. 465, 614 N.W.2d 359 (2000). An instrument is ambiguous if a word, phrase, or provision in the instrument has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings. Knox, supra; City of Lincoln, supra.

    The terms of a contract are to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning as ordinary, average, or reasonable persons would understand them. Rains v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 246 Neb. 746, 523 N.W.2d 506 (1994). A contract which is written in clear and unambiguous language is not subject to interpretation or construction; rather, the intent of the parties must be determined from the contents of the contract, and the contract must be enforced according to its terms. Id. However, the interpretation given to a contract by the parties themselves while engaged in their performance of it is one of the best indications of their true intent and should be given great, if not controlling, influence. Brockley v. Lozier Corp., 241 Neb. 449, 488 N.W.2d 556 (1992); Nowak v. Burke Energy Corp., 227 Neb. 463, 418 N.W.2d 236 (1988); Eisenhart v. Lobb, 11 Neb. App. 124, 647 N.W.2d 96 (2002).

    Further, the fact that parties to a document have or suggest opposing interpretations of the document does not necessarily, or by itself, compel the conclusion that the document is ambiguous. Callahan v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 145, 608 N.W.2d 592 (2000); Chrysler Corp. v. Lee Janssen Motor Co., 9 Neb. App. 721, 619 N.W.2d 78 (2000).

    In the instant case, paragraph 14 of the employment agreement, executed on June 23, 1995, sets forth that Alegent would provide, as a benefit to Rice, "[u]p to Twenty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($20,000.00) per year, not to exceed One Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($150,000.00) in total, to assist in retirement of student loans." Contrary to Rice's assertions, the agreement does not provide that these payments must be made directly to Rice.

    Further, "instruments made in reference to and as part of a transaction are to be considered and construed together. If the instruments are related to and were part of the same transaction, it is not important that they were made or dated at different times." Alder v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 241 Neb. 873, 876, 491 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1992). Accord Baker's Supermarkets v. Feldman, 243 Neb. 684, 502 N.W.2d 428 (1993). "Generally, a transaction consists of '"an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between themselves are altered. It is a broader term than 'contract.'"'" Streeks v. Diamond Hill Farms, 258 Neb. 581, 592, 605 N.W.2d 110, 119 (2000) (quoting Transamerica Commercial Finance v. Naef, 842 P.2d 539 (Wyo. 1992)). The term "transaction" has also been defined as "[a]ny activity involving two or more persons." Black's Law Dictionary 1503 (7th ed. 1999).

    The two contracts at issue both relate to the same transaction, i.e., the repayment of Rice's student loans. It is reasonable to read and construe the two contracts, which relate to the same subject matter, together.

    Finally, the loan repayment contract signed in July 1996 provided that Alegent was to provide $10,000 annually for 3 years and that the State would provide an equal match to the local funds. The evidence established that Alegent paid $9,167 to DHHS in 1996 (the adequacy of the amount was not disputed), $10,000 in 1997, and $10,000 in 1998. Alegent also paid directly to Rice $10,000 per year in 1996, 1997, and 1998 (less applicable taxes) for the purpose of assisting Rice in the retirement of his student loans. Thus, the evidence establishes that Alegent has fulfilled its obligations to Rice pursuant to the employment agreement.

    Although we have found that the district court erred in finding that Rice waived Alegent's alleged breach of the employment agreement, we have determined that the district court properly construed the employment agreement and the loan repayment contract together and found that Alegent has fulfilled its obligation to Rice pursuant to the employment agreement. Therefore, the decision of the district court is affirmed.