Greene v. Ablon (Summary)

COPYRIGHT

Greene v. Ablon, No. 09-10937-DJC (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2012)

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a clinical psychologist’s (defendant psychologist) motion for summary judgment with regard to conspiracy and copyright infringement allegations raised by another clinical psychologist (plaintiff psychologist) who had practiced with him and collaborated on books that they subsequently published.  The court also granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of an academic hospital that the plaintiff psychologist alleged had violated trademark laws.

In the case, the plaintiff psychologist became an instructor at the hospital and over a period of approximately 15 years, he entered into ten employment contracts with the hospital.  The last five of those contracts included an intellectual property policy (IP policy) that assigned ownership of intellectual property created or used during the course of employment to the hospital.  Upon commencement of employment at the hospital, the plaintiff psychologist began a collaborative relationship with the defendant psychologist that resulted in the incorporation of two different clinics that were affiliated with the hospital and another clinic that was unaffiliated.  Through all three of these venues, both psychologists practiced a clinical technique that the plaintiff psychologist created and then jointly refined with the defendant psychologist.  Along with their clinical practices, the psychologists wrote a book about their clinical technique.

After the plaintiff psychologist’s employment was terminated by the hospital, he sued the defendant psychologist under a series of allegations that included copyright and trademark infringement, and he sued the hospital for trademark infringement.

The defendant psychologist moved for summary judgment with regards to the copyright and trademark infringement and conspiracy allegations.  The court concluded that the concept of the clinical technique (as opposed to the specific expression of the technique) was not protected under copyright law and thus granted the defendant psychologist’s motion for summary judgment.  Furthermore, with regard to the copyright infringement claim, the court held that the writings by the psychologists were joint works and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant psychologist.  Finally, because both psychologists were employed by the same hospital, and the law provides that employees cannot conspire with their employing corporation, the court rejected the plaintiff psychologist’s allegation that the defendant psychologist had conspired with the hospital to violate the plaintiff psychologist’s copyrights.

Turning to the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the formal notice of employment that the hospital provided the plaintiff psychologist imported any referenced university policies into the plaintiff psychologist’s employment agreement.  Under this reasoning, the court concluded that the plaintiff psychologist had agreed to the hospital’s IP policy and that the hospital therefore owned the trademarks that the plaintiff psychologist sought to claim.  Accordingly, the court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment and held that the hospital was entitled to complete ownership of the contested trademarks.