Crestview Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. Coastal Anesthesia, P.A. — Nov. 2016 (Summary)

DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN; DEFAMATION

Crestview Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. Coastal Anesthesia, P.A.
No. 1D15-4392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016)

The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that a hospital was not liable for defamation against an anesthesiologist following his forced resignation.

An anesthesiologist, contracted by a company to work for a hospital, eventually resigned after the hospital CEO contacted the company and informed it that the hospital no longer wanted the anesthesiologist working for the hospital.  The physician allegedly cursed at nurses and hospital staff, and unnecessarily delayed the surgery of an elderly patient.  The hospital did not investigate the complaints or initiate a disciplinary or review process under the hospital bylaws or code of conduct.  The hospital immediately complained to the company which then set out to terminate the anesthesiologist.  The anesthesiologist ultimately resigned in lieu of termination.

The anesthesiologist filed suit alleging several claims.  His claim of defamation against both the hospital and the hospital CEO was the only one remaining at trial.  The anesthesiologist claimed the CEO’s claims against him were false and the hospital’s failure to investigate the claims amounted to the anesthesiologist being singled out and intentionally, maliciously defamed.

As described by the court, there is a general presumption that someone who broadcasts a false statement that harms another person’s reputation can be held liable for defamation, but that presumption does not apply when parties have a mutual interest in evaluating a person’s work.  When the CEO of the hospital contacted the company, he was evaluating the work and behavior of the anesthesiologist within the services he contracted with the company to receive.  By the court, under those circumstances, there is a presumption of good faith, even when the comments are critical.

In order to succeed on his defamation claim, and strip the hospital of its privilege of evaluation, the anesthesiologist had to prove express malice, or improper motives on behalf of the hospital and the hospital CEO.  The court ruled that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to decide the question of whether the hospital and the hospital CEO acted simply with improper motives, which resulted in the hospital losing its privilege of evaluation.  The jury should have been instructed that it had to find that the hospital or the hospital CEO acted with the primary motive of gratifying ill will, hostility, and their desire to harm the plaintiff.  Further, the jury stated that it found the defendants to have been motivated solely for the purpose of unreasonable financial gain.  The trial court erred in its jury instruction, and that error could not be found to be harmless given the jury’s verdict based upon a reason that did not meet the legal requirement.