Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher (Full Text – Dissenting Opinion)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
September 3, 2009 Session Heard at Knoxville

LEE MEDICAL, INC. v. PAULA BEECHER ET AL.

A ppea l by P erm iss ion from the C ourt o f A ppea ls , M idd le Sec tion
C ircu it C our t for W illiam son C oun ty
N o s . 08 -144 & 08 -146 Je ffrey S . B iv in s , Judge

N o . M 2008 -02496 -SC -S09 -CV – F iled M ay 24 , 2010

GARY R . W ADE, J ., d issen ting .

W h ile the m a jo rity’s narrow in terp re ta tion o f the s ta tu to ry pee r rev iew p riv ilege has
appea l, I canno t reconc ile its resu lt w ith the bas ic p rinc ip les o f s ta tu to ry con s truc tion . I m u s t,
the re fo re , respec tfu lly d issen t.

I
The cen tra l issue in th is case is w he the r the scope o f the pee r rev iew p riv ilege se t fo rth
in Tennessee C ode A nno ta ted sec tion 63 -6 -219 (e ) (Supp . 2009 ) is b road enough to p ro tec t
1
f rom d iscove ry the aud it o f T riS ta r H ea lth Sys tem ’s vascu la r access se rv ices a t its m em be r
ho sp ita ls . O f cou rse , ou r ro le in con stru ing s ta tu tes is to ascerta in and g iv e e f f e c t to th e

1

Subsection (e) states, in relevant part, as follows:

All information, interviews, incident or other reports, statements, memoranda or other data
furnished to any committee as defined in this section, and any findings, conclusions or
recommendations resulting from the proceedings of such committee are declared to be
privileged. All such information, in any form whatsoever, so furnished to, or generated by,
a medical peer review committee, shall be privileged. The records and proceedings of any
such committees are confidential and shall be used by such committee, and the members
thereof only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee, and shall not be public
records nor be available for court subpoena or for discovery proceedings. . . . Nothing
contained in this subsection (e) applies to records made in the regular course of business by
a hospital or other provider of health care and information, documents or records otherwise
available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in
any civil proceedings merely because they were presented during proceedings of such
committee.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(e) (emphasis added).

leg is la tive in ten t w ithou t undu ly res tric ting o r expand ing th e s ta tu te ’s in tended scope .
Ow en s v . S ta te , 908 S .W .2d 923 , 926 (T enn . 1995 ). To th is end , w e p resum e th a t ev e ry
w o rd in a s ta tu te has m ean ing and pu rpo se and shou ld be g iven fu l l e f f e c t if the obv iou s
in ten tion o f the G ene ra l A ssem b ly is no t v io la ted by so do ing . In re C .K .G ., 173 S .W .3d 714 ,
722 (T enn . 2005 ) . Fu rthe r , ou r du ty is to cons true a s ta tu te so tha t its com ponen t pa rts a re
con s is ten t and reasonab le , C ohen v . C ohen , 937 S .W .2d 823 , 827 (T enn . 1996 ), and “ tha t no
pa rt w ill be inope ra tive .” T idw e ll v . C o llin s , 522 S .W .2d 674 , 676 (T enn . 1975 ) .

The language in th e f irs t tw o sen tences o f sub sec tion (e) , w hen con side red in
con junc tion w ith the de f in ition o f “m ed ica l rev iew comm ittee” and “pee r rev iew comm ittee”
in sub sec tion (c ), is indeed qu ite b road . The m a jo rity asse rts , how eve r , tha t the b read th o f
2
the de f ined p riv ilege is in “s ign if ican t in te rna l con f lic t” w ith the excep tion to the p riv ilege
fo r “ reco rd s m ade in the regu la r cou rse o f bu s iness ,” w h ich appea rs in the las t sen tence o f
sub sec tion (e ) , and tha t th is con f lic t “canno t be reso lved by con s ide ring the tex t o f the s ta tu te
a lone .” To se ttle th is pu rpo rted am b igu ity, the m a jo rity has crea ted a nove l te rm , “pee r
rev iew p ro ce ed ing ,” w h ich is des igned to lim it the scope o f the p riv ilege to on ly tho se
comm itte e d e libe ra tion s tha t “ invo lve[ ] a phys ic ian ’s conduc t, com pe tence , o r ab ility to
p rac tice m ed ic ine .” The ra tiona le fo r th is app roach lies p rim arily in T ennesse e C ode
A nno ta ted sec tion 63 -6 -219 (b )(1 ) , w h ich m ak es up on ly a po rtion o f one o f the s ix
sub sec tion s w ith in the s ta tu te: “ [ I]t is the s ta ted po licy o f Tennessee to encou rage comm ittees
m ade up o f T ennessee ’s licen sed phys ic ian s to cand id ly, con sc ien tiou s ly, and ob je c tive ly
eva lua te and rev iew the ir pee rs ’ p ro fess iona l conduc t, com pe tence , and ab ility to p rac tice

2
As the majority observes, the terms “medical review committee” and “peer review committee” in
subsection (c) are interchangeable. They are defined as

any committee of a state or local professional association or society . . . or a committee of
any licensed health care institution, or the medical staff thereof, or a medical group practice,
or any committee of a medical care foundation or health maintenance organization, preferred
provider organization, individual practice association or similar entity, the function of
which, or one (1) of the functions of which, is to evaluate and improve the quality of health
care rendered by providers of health care service to provide intervention, support, or
rehabilitative referrals or services, or to determine that health care services rendered were
professionally indicated, or were performed in compliance with the applicable standard of
care, or that the cost of health care rendered was considered reasonable by the providers of
professional health care services in the area and includes a committee functioning as a
utilization review committee . . . or as a utilization and quality control peer review
organization . . . or a similar committee or a committee of similar purpose, to evaluate or
review the diagnosis or treatment or the performance or rendition of medical or hospital
services that are performed under public medical programs of either state or federal design.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(c).

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m ed ic ine . . . .”

W h ile the s ta tu te , as po in ted ou t by the m a jo rity, m ay inc lude ina rtfu l language , it is
unam b iguou s as to the scope o f the pee r rev iew p riv ilege . To the con tra ry, bo th the p la in
language o f the s ta tu te and its leg is la t ive h is to ry dem on s tra te tha t ou r G ene ra l A ssem b ly
in tended fo r the p riv ilege to app ly expan s ive ly. A lthough the re m ay appea r to be “ ten s ion”
w ith in sub sec tion (e ) be tw een the scope o f the p riv ilege and the regu la r cou rse o f bu s iness
excep tion , any lim ita tion s on the p riv ilege can be found w ith in the de f in ition o f “pee r rev iew
comm ittee” appea ring in sub sec tion (c) , obv ia ting the need to reso rt to the sub sec tion (b )(1 )
po licy s ta tem en t o r any ex te rna l sou rces .

II
The o rig ina l ve rs ion o f the s ta tu te p assed by the leg is la tu re in 1967 ex tended
immun ity to “ho sp ita l u tiliza tion rev iew comm ittees . . . re la ting to the ho sp ita liza tion o f
M ed ica re pa tien ts .” A c t o f M ay 25 , 1967 , ch . 348 , § 1 , 1967 T enn . Pub . A c ts 1066 , 1066 .
In 1975 , the G ene ra l A ssem b ly repea led and rep laced the 1967 ve rs ion . Th is am endm en t
inc luded a sec tion de f in ing “m ed ica l rev iew comm ittee” and es tab lished , fo r the f irs t tim e ,
3
a p riv ilege fo r a ll in fo rm a tion fu rn ish ed to o r f ind ing s m ade by the “m ed ica l rev iew
comm ittee” ; how eve r , the p riv ilege w as m ade sub jec t to an excep tion fo r “ reco rd s m ade in
4
th e regu la r cou rse o f bu s iness .” The sec tions appea ring in the 1975 am endm en t a re th e
5

3
As used in this section, the term “medical review committee” or “committee” shall mean any
committee of a state or local professional association or society, or a committee of any
licensed health care institution, or the medical staff thereof, or any committee of a medical
care foundation or health maintenance organization, the function of which, or one of the
functions of which is to evaluate and improve the quality rendered by providers of health
care service or to determine that health care services rendered were professionally indicated
or were performed in compliance with the applicable standard of care or that the cost of
health care rendered was considered reasonable by the providers of professional health care
services in the area. . . .

Act of May 2, 1975, ch. 117, § 1, 1975 Tenn. Pub. Acts 218, 218.

4
“All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or other data furnished to any
committee as defined in this section, and any findings, conclusions or recommendations resulting from the
proceedings of such committee are declared to be privileged. . . .” Act of May 2, 1975, ch. 117, § 1, 1975
Tenn. Pub. Acts 218, 219.

5
Nothing contained herein shall apply to records made in the regular course of business by
a hospital or other provider of health care and information, documents or records otherwise
(continued…)

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p rogen ito rs o f the cu rren t Tennessee C ode A nno ta ted sec tions 63 -6 -219 (c) and (e ) . It is m y
v iew , o f cou rse , tha t the p la in languag e o f th e 1975 enac tm en t ex tend s the scope o f the
p riv ilege beyond tho se p roceed ing s pe rta in ing to “a phys ic ian ’s conduc t, com pe ten c e , o r
ab ility to p rac tice m ed ic ine ,” T enn . C ode A nn . § 63 -6 -219 (b )(1 ) . Fo r exam p le , the G ene ra l
A ssem b ly ex tended the p riv ilege to “eva lua t[ ion s o f] and im p rove [m en ts to ] the qua lity
rende red by p rov ide rs o f hea lth ca re serv ice” and “de te rm in [a tion s] tha t hea lth ca re se rv ices
rende red w e re p ro fess iona lly ind ica ted o r w e re pe rfo rm ed in com p liance w ith the app licab le
s tanda rd o f care o r tha t the co s t o f hea l th c a re rende red w as con s ide red reasonab le by the
p rov ide rs o f p ro fess iona l hea lth ca re se rv ices in the area .” T enn . C ode A nn . § 63 -6 -219 (c ) .
W h ile p roceed ings invo lv ing phys ic ian s , the ir conduc t , and the ir capab ilities a re c lea rly
en titled to the p ro te c t ion s o f f e red by the p riv ilege , it is d if f icu lt to read the language f rom
sub sec tion (c ) as lim ited stric tly to the m o re na rrow app lica tion se t fo rth in subsec tion (b )(1 )
and re lied upon by the m a jo rity.

A s the m a jo rity concedes , sub sequen t am endm en ts to sub sec tion (c ) have served on ly
to b roaden the def in ition o f a “m ed ica l rev iew comm ittee” (w h ich now m ay a lso be
des igna ted a “pee r rev iew comm ittee” ) . M o reove r , a 1994 am endm en t to sub sec tion (e ) d id
no th ing to res tric t the scope o f the p r iv i leg e and se rved to reen fo rce the tie be tw een
sub sec tion s (c ) and (e ) . The s teady expan s ion o f the de f in ition o f “peer rev iew comm ittee”
6
in sub sec tion (c ) has done mo re than , in the w o rd s o f the m a jo rity, “crea te [ ] the im p ress ion
tha t the G ene ra l A ssem b ly likew ise in tended to expand the scope o f the p riv ilege in
[sub sec tion ] (e ) .” In s tead , because the scope o f the p riv ilege in sub sec tion (e ) and the
de f in ition o f “pee r rev iew comm ittee” in subsec tion (c ) have been inex tricab ly in te rtw ined
s ince 1975 , the b roaden ing o f the de f in ition o f “pee r rev iew comm ittee” has p la in ly inc reased
the scope o f the p riv ilege . W hen the s ta tu to ry language is c lear and unam b iguous , the cou rts
m u s t, o f cou rse , sim p ly app ly it. E as tm an C hem . C o . v . John son , 151 S .W .3d 503 , 507
(T enn . 2004 ) . N o re fe rence shou ld be m ade to the b roade r s ta tu to ry schem e , the leg is la tive
h is to ry, o r o the r sou rces to d iscern its m ean ing . See C o lon ia l P ipe line C o . v . M o rgan , 263
S .W .3d 827 , 836 (T enn . 2008 ).

5
(…continued)
available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in
any civil proceedings merely because they were presented during proceedings of such
committee.

Act of May 2, 1975, ch. 117, § 1, 1975 Tenn. Pub. Acts 218, 219.

6
“All such information, in any form whatsoever, so furnished to, or generated by, a medical review
committee shall be privileged communication subject to the laws pertaining to the attorney-client privilege.”
Act of Mar. 28, 1994, ch. 732, § 6, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 431, 432.

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D esp ite the sw eep ing d irec tive o f subsec tion (e ) tha t the pee r rev iew p riv ilege app lies
to “[a ]ll in fo rm a tion , [e tc .] fu rn ished to any comm i t te e as de f ined in th is sec tion , and any
f ind ings , [e tc .] resu lting f rom the p roceed ings o f such comm ittee” and “ [a ]ll such
in fo rm a tion , in any fo rm w ha tsoeve r , so fu rn ished to , o r gene ra ted by, a m ed ica l pee r rev iew
comm ittee ,” the m a jo rity ho ld s tha t the “ reco rd s m ade in th e regu lar cou rse o f bu s iness”
excep tion , found la te r in the sam e sub sec tion , c rea te s an am b igu ity. The m a jo rity reason s
tha t the sub sequen t ph rase “can reasonab ly be in terp re ted to m ean tha t any reco rd m ade in
th e regu la r cou rse o f a ho sp ita l’s bu s iness is no t p riv ileged , even if it w as subm i t ted to a
comm ittee inc luded in Tenn . Code A nn . § 63 -6 -219 (c ) .” I do no t b e liev e tha t such an
in terp re ta tion is pe rm iss ib le ; o the rw ise , the p riv ilege w ou ld be sw a llow ed by the excep tion .
In m y assessm en t, sub sec tion (e ) con tem p la tes a t leas t tw o m u tua lly exc lu sive types o f
ac tiv ities by a ho sp ita l: f irs t, tho se tha t take p lace in the regu la r cou rse o f bu s iness , and
second , tho se tha t take p lace unde r the m an tle o f one o f the comm ittees def ined in sub sec tion
(c ) . The la tte r ac tiv ity is p riv ileged , w h ile the fo rm e r is no t.

The m a jo rity exp resses conce rn th a t a ho sp ita l cou ld avo id a ll p roduc tion o f
docum en ts and reco rd s in c iv il p roceed ing s and thu s “sh ie ld essen tia lly eve ry dec is ion m ade
by a hosp ita l f rom app rop ria te ly m anaged d iscove ry in a c iv il case ” by s im p ly p lac ing a ll o f
its regu la r bus iness func tion s under the umb re lla o f a comm ittee tha t m ee ts the de f in ition se t
fo rth in sub sec tion (c ) . W he the r o r no t such a hypo the tica l abuse o f the pee r rev iew p riv ilege
cou ld occu r is no t the ques tion be fo re u s today. O u r du ty is to ascerta in the m ean ing o f the
s ta tu te . If the po licy p roves to be unw ise , any rem edy is fo r the G enera l A ssemb ly, and no t,
unde r these c ircum stances , fo r reso lu tion by the cou rts .

B ecau se the re is no rea l am b igu ity in the s ta tu to ry p rov is ion s , and becau se , as
acknow ledged by the m a jo rity, “ the tria l cou rt co rrec tly conc luded in its June 5 , 2008 o rde r
tha t the T riS ta r CNO C ounc il, the T riS ta r CFO C ounc il, and the H ende rsonv ille M ed ica l
C en te r’s Q ua lity M an ag em en t C omm ittee w e re pee r rev iew comm ittees as de f ined in
T enn [essee ] C ode A nn [o ta ted sec tion ] 63 -6 -219 (c ) ,” the ana lys is shou ld end the re and the
judgm en t o f the W illiam son C oun ty C ircu it C ou rt shou ld be a f f irm ed . I fee l ob liged ,
how eve r , to add ress the m e thod s o f cons truc tion used by the m a jo rity in its e f fo rt to reconc ile
the pe rce ived s ta tu to ry am b igu ity.

A s s ta ted , the m a jo rity p laces lim ita tion s on the p ro tec tion s p rov id ed by sub sec tion
(e ) by c rea ting the te rm “pee r rev iew p roceed ing ,” w h ich appears now he re in the s ta tu to ry
tex t. Fu rthe r , the m a jo rity has de f ined the te rm as a p roceed ing in w h ich a pee r rev iew
comm ittee , as de f ined unde r sub sec tion (c ) , is pe rfo rm ing a “pee r rev iew func tion” th a t
“ invo lves the eva lua tion and rev iew o f a physic ian ’s p ro fess iona l conduc t, com pe tence , and
ab ility to p rac tice m ed ic in e .” T h e p rim a ry ju s tif ica tion fo r so lim iting the pee r rev iew
p riv ilege is the po licy s ta tem en t se t fo rth in the 1992 am endm en t to the s ta tu te . In tha t 1992

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am endm en t, the G ene ra l A ssem b ly iden tif ied “ the s ta ted po licy o f T ennessee to encou rage
comm ittees m ade up o f T ennessee ’s licen sed phys ic ian s to . . . eva lua te and rev iew the ir
peers’ pro fess iona l conduc t, com pe tence , and ab ility to p rac tice m ed ic ine .” T enn . C ode Ann .
§ 63 -6 -219 (b )(1 ) (em phas is added ) . The m a jo rity’s v iew is tha t the 1992 leg is la tion , on ly
one o f e leven am endm en ts passed s ince 1967 , “p rov ides a s ign if ican t in te rp re ta tive c lue to
the p rope r app lica tion o f” the p r iv i leg e in sec tion 63 -6 -219 (e ) and tha t sub sec tion “ (b )(1 )
s ta tes . . . the pu rpo se o f the p riv ilege in [sec tion ] 63 -6 -219 (e ) .”

W he the r o r no t the G enera l A ssem b ly “ cho se the te rm ‘peer rev iew ’ ca re fu lly and
de libera te ly in 1992 ,” it d id no t, in m y v iew , app ly tha t term to the scope o f the p riv ilege in
sub sec tion (e ) . In fac t, subsec tion (b )(1 ) does no t m ake any re fe rence , exp lic it o r im p lic it,
to the p riv ileg e in sub sec tion (e) . I see subsec tion (b )(1 ) as m e re ly a s ta tem en t o f po licy,
p re fa to ry in na tu re , w h ich does no t supe rcede the p la in language o f sub sec tion s (c ) and (e ) ,
p rov id ing tha t the peer rev iew p riv ilege m ay, in ce rta in c ircum stances , app ly to in fo rm a tion
re la ting to m a tte rs invo lv ing hea lth ca re p rov ide rs o the r than phys ic ians . See W ade v .
7
M add ing , 28 S .W .2d 642 , 649 (T enn . 1930 ) (“ It is a reasonab le ru le o f con s truc tion tha t,
w hen the leg is la tive exp ress ion o f a gene ra l in ten t con f lic ts w ith a pa rticu la r in ten t
sub sequen t ly exp ressed , the la tte r w ill p reva il.” ); see a lso W illiam s v . G lickm an , 936 F .
Supp . 1 , 4 (D . D .C . 1996 ) (“ [T ]he C ou rt do e s no t have the au tho rity to rew rite a c lea r ,
spec if ic s ta tu to ry p rov is ion even if it be lieved tha t such a p rov is ion w as incon s is ten t w ith a
gene ra l s ta tem en t o f pu rpo se .” ) . I am unpe rsuaded tha t sub sec tion (b ) “s ta tes . . . the pu rpo se
o f the p riv ilege es tab lished in” sub sec tion (e ) , o r fo r tha t m a tte r tha t th e scope o f the
p riv ilege in sub sec tion (e ) is “ re f lec ted in” o r shou ld be de te rm ined “ [ i]n acco rdance w ith”
sub sec tion (b )(1 ) .8

The m a jo rity has looked to the comm on def in ition o f the w o rd “peers” and de te rm ined
tha t it m u st re fe r on ly to licen sed phys ic ian s based upon the leg is la tive po licy s ta tem en t in
sec tion 63 -6 -219 (b )(1 ) and the popu la r n am e con ferred on the s ta tu te by the 1992
Am endm en t, “T enn e s se e P ee r R ev iew L aw o f 1967 ,” as cod if ied in sec tion 63 -6 -219 (a ) .
N eve rthe less , as the m a jo ri ty con cedes , sec tion 63 -6 -219 (d )(1 ) “p la in ly env is ion s tha t
pe rson s o ther than licen sed phys ic ian s m ay se rve on these comm ittees .” A s the G ene ra l

7
The statement from subsection (b)(1), to which the majority affords so much weight, is followed
by a second sentence: “Tennessee further recognizes that confidentiality is essential both to effective
functioning of these peer review committees and to continued improvement in the care and treatment of
patients.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(b)(1). A broader construction of the peer review privilege – one that
is in line with the plain language of sections 63-6-219(c) and (e) – is fully consistent with this statement of
policy.

8
The majority also discusses the references to physicians in the general immunity provisions of
section 63-6-219(d). These appear to me to be terms of example, rather than terms of limitation.

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A ssem b ly has no t lim ited pa rtic ipa tion in a “pee r rev iew comm ittee” to licen sed phys ic ian s ,
it s tand s to reason tha t the s ta tu to ry p riv ilege ex tend s to “pee rs” o the r than physic ian s . 9

III
I f th e m a jo rity w e re seek ing to lim it the scope o f the peer rev iew p riv ilege in
sub sec tion (e ) , it seem s to m e tha t such lim ita tion s m u s t be found , if a t a ll, in the com pan ion
sec tion o f the pee r rev iew s ta tu te – the de f in ition o f “pee r rev iew comm ittee” in sub sec tion
(c ) . “Pee r rev iew comm ittee” is de f ined in te rm s o f th ree d is tinc t types ,

[ (1 )] any comm ittee o f a s ta te o r loca l p ro fess iona l assoc ia tion o r soc ie ty . . .
o r
[ (2 )] a comm ittee o f any licen sed hea lth ca re in s titu tion , o r the m ed ica l s ta f f
the reo f , o r a m ed ica l g roup p rac tice , o r
[ (3 )] any comm ittee o f a m ed ic a l ca re founda tion o r hea lth m a in tenance
o rgan iza tion , p re fe rred p rov ide r o rgan iza tion , ind iv idua l p rac tice assoc ia tion
o r s im ila r en tity[ ,]

and a lso in te rm s o f th ree d isc re te func tion s

[ (1 )] to eva lua te and im p rove the qua lity o f hea lth care rende red by p rov ide rs
o f hea lth care se rv ic e to p rov ide in te rven tion , suppo rt, o r rehab ilita tive
re fe rra ls o r se rv ices , o r
[ (2 )] to de te rm ine tha t hea lth care serv ices rende red w e re p ro fess iona lly
ind ica ted , o r w e re pe rfo rm ed in com p liance w ith the app licab le s tandard o f
ca re , o r tha t the cos t o f hea lth ca re rende red w as con s ide red reasonab le by the
p rov ide rs o f p ro fess iona l hea lth ca re se rv ices in the area . . . [o r]
[ (3 )] a comm ittee func tion ing as a u tiliza tion rev iew comm ittee . . . o r as a
u tiliza tion and qua lity con tro l p ee r rev iew o rgan iza tion . . . o r a s im ila r
comm it te e o r a comm ittee o f s im ila r pu rpo se , to eva lua te o r rev iew the
d iagno s is o r trea tm en t o r the pe rfo rm ance o r rend ition o f m ed ica l o r ho sp ita l
se rv ices tha t a re pe rfo rm ed unde r pub lic m ed ica l p rog ram s o f e ithe r s ta te o r
fede ra l des ign [ .]

9
The majority observes that the codification of the peer review law in Chapter 6 of Title 63 of the
Tennessee Code Annotated, which pertains to the practice of medicine and surgery, suggests that the peer
review privilege should be limited only to physicians. I agree that the placement of a statement in a particular
title of the code may, depending on the circumstances, be a significant indicator of the legislature’s intent.
See Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 910 (Tenn. 2009). I find nothing, however, about the placement of the
peer review statute in Chapter 6 of Title 63 that would preclude the privilege therein from applying to all of
the health care functions of peer review committees that are enumerated in the statute.

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T enn . C ode A nn . § 63 -6 -219 (c ) . O ne cou ld reasonab ly su rm ise tha t by inc lud ing seve ra l
enum e ra ted func tion s o f a “pee r rev iew comm ittee” w ith in sub sec tion (c ), the leg is la tu re
in tended to lim it the app lica tion o f the p riv ilege on ly to tho se s itua t ion s in w h ich the pee r
rev iew comm ittee is pe rfo rm ing one o f tho se func tion s . L im iting the scope o f the p riv ilege
to reco rds conc e rn ing one o f the func tion s se t fo rth in subsec tion (c ) w ou ld p lace a c lea r
boundary on the scope o f the p riv ilege and se rve to a llev ia te the m a jo rity’s conce rn tha t the
p riv ilege “know s no reasonab le bound s .” W h ile such an in te rp re ta tion w ou ld no t na rrow the
scope o f the p riv ilege as fa r as the m a jo rity’s no tion o f “pee r rev iew p roceed ing s ,” a read ing
o f tha t na tu re w ou ld en joy the advan tage o f be ing g rounded in the sta tu to ry tex t.

In summ a ry, if the G ene ra l A ssem b ly had in tended in 1992 , o r a t any o the r tim e in the
las t fo rty-th ree yea rs , to lim it the scope o f the p riv ilege in sub sec tion (e ) to “ the eva lua tion
and rev iew o f a phys ic ian ’s conduc t, compe tence , and ab ility to p rac tice m ed ic ine ,” it cou ld
have done so in a s im p le , s tra igh tfo rw a rd w ay. It has no t cho sen tha t pa th . To the con tra ry,
ou r G ene ra l A ssem b ly has con tinued to expand bo th the d e f in i t ion o f “pee r rev iew
comm ittee” in sec tion 63 -6 -219 (c ) and the scope o f the pee r rev iew p riv ilege in sec tion 63 -6 –
219 (e ) . T he app roach o f the m a jo rity, w h ile con sis ten t w ith trad itiona l (and adm irab le )
p rinc ip les o f open d iscove ry in c iv il cases , is a t odd s w ith bo th the p la in , o rd ina ry language
in the body o f the s ta tu te and the p rog ress ion o f the leg is la tive am endm en ts s ince 1975 . Fo r
these reason s , I m u s t d issen t. I w ou ld , the re fo re , a ff irm the judgm en t o f the tria l cou rt and
ho ld tha t the pee r rev iew p riv ilege in T ennessee C ode A nno ta ted sec tion 63 -6 -219 (e) app lies
to the reco rd s and docum en ts sough t in the pend ing litiga tion .

I am au tho rized to s ta te tha t C h ie f Jus tice H o lde r jo in s in th is d issen ting op in ion .

_________________________________
GARY R . WADE , JUST ICE

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