Machamer v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JANICE MACHAMER : CIVIL ACTION:
v. :
:
HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 98-6109
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Norma L. Shapiro, S.J. May 8, 2000
Janice Machamer (“Machamer”), a nursing assistant, alleges
her employer, the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania
(“HUP”), violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
12101 et seq. (“ADA”), when it refused to accommodate her
disability by transferring her to the night shift. HUP, moving
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c), claims that Machamer did not suffer from a disability, is
not a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA, and
that it had no knowledge of Machamer’s alleged disability so it
had no duty to provide any accommodation. There are no genuine
issues of material fact regarding these claims; HUP’s motion for
summary judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Machamer was hired by HUP as a nursing assistant on December
12, 1995. On March 25, 1996, during her probationary period,(1)
Machamer sustained a back injury while lifting a patient from a
bed. Machamer took a leave of absence, during which time she
received workers’ compensation benefits and underwent treatment
for her injury from various practitioners in the University of
Pennsylvania Health System. After examining Machamer in November
and December, 1996, Dr. William Ball and Dr. David Lenrow found
that Machamer could not perform her functions as a nursing
assistant without reasonable accommodation. On December 18,
1996, Dr. Marilyn Howarth examined Machamer and found that she
was able to return to work with no restrictions.
Machamer resumed her nursing assistant position on December
30, 1996, and was notified that she would be placed on the day
shift to receive training and mentoring necessary for her to
complete successfully her post-hiring probationary period
(extended from May 11, 1996 because of her work related injury).
During that shift, Machamer experienced back pain, was referred
to Occupational Medicine, examined by Dr. Howarth, and released
to return to full duty. Machamer proceeded to work several day
shifts until she was terminated on January 8, 1997; HUP believed
two incidents on December 30 and December 31, 1996 threatened the
well-being of patients under Machamer’s care. See 5/27/99 Nancy
Rodenhausen Affidavit, p. 2. On September 8, 1997, Machamer
filed a petition for reinstatement of workers’ compensation
benefits; this petition was denied. See 5/27/99 Rosemary Osman-Koss Affidavit, p. 2.
HUP argues that summary judgment in its favor should be
granted because Machamer was not disabled when she returned to
work, was not a “qualified individual with a disability” under
the ADA, and was terminated for her failure to provide competent
care to her patients. Machamer claims that she was disabled, she
was terminated because of her disability, and she could have
continued to work with a reasonable accommodation for her
disability, i.e., transfer to the night shift.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may be awarded “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial
burden of demonstrating the absence of facts supporting the non-moving party’s claim by pointing to the pleadings, depositions or
other items mentioned in Rule 56(c); the non-moving party must
then introduce specific evidence of a genuine issue for trial.
See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). “When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
[Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the
adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
A genuine issue of material fact exists only when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In making this determination, the
court must draw all justifiable inferences in the non-movant’s
favor. See id. at 255.
The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 12112(a).
A “qualified individual with a disability” is defined by the
ADA as a person “with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”
42 U.S.C. 12111(8). A “disability” is defined as: “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such
an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
ADA, the plaintiff must show: “(1) [s]he is a disabled person
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified
to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) [s]he has
suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
discrimination.” See Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, 134 F.3d 576,
580 (3d Cir. 1998).
As the party moving for summary judgment, HUP has pointed to
affidavits and depositions that illustrate the absence of facts
supporting Machamer’s claim. HUP refutes Machamer’s claim of
disability by demonstrating that Dr. Howarth examined Machamer
and released her to work as a nursing assistant without
restriction and without requiring any accommodation. See 5/28/99
Dr. Marilyn Howarth deposition, p. 2. HUP contests Machamer’s
qualification to perform the essential functions of the job, with
or without reasonable accommodations, because in Machamer’s
deposition she stated that she could not have performed her job
on the night shift and HUP could have provided no accommodations
enabling her to perform that job. See 5/10/99 Janice Machamer
deposition, p. 258-59. Finally, HUP contends that Machamer’s
termination did not result from discrimination, but that Machamer
was terminated because she had, on two occasions, provided sub-standard patient care. On December 30 and December 31, 1996,
Machamer: 1) inappropriately left a confused patient’s bed in the
high position with the side rails down; and 2) improperly
manipulated a patient’s peritoneal dialysis bag that caused an
adverse outcome for the patient. See 5/27/99 Nancy Rodenhausen
affidavit, p. 3; see also Def. Pre-trial Mem. p.3. HUP having
met its burden, Machamer must establish specific material facts
at issue in the record to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
Machamer has not met her burden for any of the elements
required to establish her prima facie case. In determining
whether Machamer was “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA
after her return to work in December, 1996, this court is to
“determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case
basis.” See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, __U.S. __, 119
S.Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999). To prove that she is “disabled,”
Machamer must demonstrate that she has, or has a record of, a
physical impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity and that she had this limitation during the time she
claims she was denied reasonable accommodation. See Taylor v.
Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 308 (3d Cir. 1999).
The issue is Machamer’s ability to work as a nursing
assistant on her return in December, 1996. Working has been
identified as a major life activity. See Walton v. Mental Health
Assoc., 168 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 1999). If Machamer’s ability
to work was substantially limited by a physical impairment at the
time she requested accommodation, she meets the “disability”
requirement.
Although the ADA does not define “substantially limits,” the
Supreme Court has stated that “substantially” suggests that the
limitation must be “considerable or specified to a large degree.”
See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., __ U.S. __, 119 S.Ct. 2139,
2150 (1999), but it need not be the equivalent of an “utter
inabilit[y].” See Albertsons, 119 S.Ct. 2162 at 2168.
Machamer claims that there were conflicting medical opinions
regarding her condition, but has not provided any evidence on the
record of such a conflict. The alleged opinions of Dr. Lenrow
and Dr. Ball, if verified, would have created this conflict, but
stating the opinion of her physician in the complaint or motion
is not enough to meet her burden for opposing a summary judgment
motion. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c).
Machamer also claims that, even if she were not disabled at
the time, she had a “record of such impairment” and, therefore,
qualified as disabled. A “record of such impairment” means a
“history” of the condition such as a chronic reoccurrence of an
ailment. See School Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 281 (1987). Machamer has not “by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in [Rule 56], set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue” of the existence of such a history.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In fact, Machamer stated in her
deposition that she had never had a back injury prior to her
injury on March 25, 1996. See 5/10/99 Janice Machamer
deposition, p. 168. Machamer has not met her burden of
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
on the record.
Machamer has also not met her burden of demonstrating that
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding her
qualifications to perform the essential functions of her job,
with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer.
Machamer argues she was qualified if given an accommodation by
placement on the less burdensome night shift and that she did
work several day shifts. In her deposition, Machamer stated that
there were no positions in the hospital that she could have
performed between December 30, 1996 and January 8, 1997. See
4/28/99 Janice Machamer deposition, pp. 167-68, 250-51, 258-61.(2)
HUP demonstrated that her performance during that period was sub-standard, and Machamer has produced no evidence to counter this
allegation.
Machamer has not demonstrated there are genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether the adverse employment decision
she suffered was a result of disability discrimination. HUP
offered a nursing manager’s affidavit that Machamer was
terminated because of two incidents in which Machamer’s actions
threatened the well-being of patients under her care. Machamer
provided no evidence challenging this or establishing the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding her
termination.
CONCLUSION
As the adverse party to the motion for summary judgment,
Machamer may not merely rest upon the pleadings, as she did, but
must provide admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Machamer has failed to meet her burden
and, because HUP established it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, summary judgment will be granted in favor of HUP.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JANICE MACHAMER : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY :
OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 98-6109
ORDER
AND NOW, this ___th day of May, 2000, upon consideration of
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s response
in opposition, after argument on June 24, 1999 at which counsel
for all parties were heard, in accordance with the attached
memorandum,
It is ORDERED that:
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is entered for the defendant and against the plaintiff.
_____________________________
Norma L. Shapiro, S.J.
1. Her ninety day probationary period had been extended from March 11,
1996 to May 11, 1996 because of absenteeism and failure to meet work
performance goals; more time was required to evaluate her performance.
2. Plaintiff’s counsel argues that “[p]laintiff’s deposition testimony on
the [sic] Hospital relies merely points to Plaintiff’s confusion about the
legal niceties of ADA law.” The “legal niceties” of ADA law are irrelevant to
what Machamer thought.