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Rifai v. CMS Med. Care Corp. — Sept. 2017 (Summary)

Rifai v. CMS Med. Care Corp. — Sept. 2017 (Summary)

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS — When Is a Threat a Threat?

Rifai v. CMS Med. Care Corp.
Civil Action No. 15-1395 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017)

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a medical group’s request for summary judgment in a breach of contract and discrimination lawsuit brought by a physician the group had terminated. A few months into the employment relationship, the group gave the physician 120 days’ notice of the intent to terminate the agreement. Subsequently, the physician sent an e-mail to his colleagues which referred to employees as “prisoners” and the group president as the “warden torturing everyone and holding everyone hostage to his ego,” concluding the e-mail with “May God bless the employees of, the people of this county and have mercy on our souls.” The president felt threatened by the e-mail and immediately terminated the doctor’s contract in accordance with the zero tolerance workplace violence policy prohibiting conduct that “creates a reasonable fear of injury.”

The physician sued the medical group and the hospital where he practiced, alleging national origin, religious, and disability discrimination.  The court granted the hospital’s motion to dismiss, holding that the hospital had not functioned with the medical group as a “single employer” and finding instead that the employment contract was between the physician and the medical group.

With regard to the group, while the court dismissed the ADA claims, it denied the group’s request for summary judgment on the national origin and religious discrimination claims after determining that the Syrian and Muslim physician had provided sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case, namely that the group had hired a doctor who was a non-Syrian and a non Muslim to replace him. In its discussion of the burden shifting that occurs under such discrimination claims, the court ultimately determined that the e-mail the physician sent was a weak and implausible reason for firing the physician, and therefore determined a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the e-mail was an explicit threat or a pretext for discrimination.

The court also denied the medical group’s request for summary judgment as to the breach of employment contract claim. It again found that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contract permitted the medical group to terminate the doctor for sending the e-mail. Specifically, “for cause” termination, as stated in the contract, did not list threatening e-mails as a reason for immediate termination and the court determined it was a question of material fact as to whether the e-mail constituted a violation of the workplace violence policy, as well as whether the e-mail was a threat at all.

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