Brown v. Gupta — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

OSTENSIBLE AGENCY

Brown v. Gupta
Docket No. 322676 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015)

The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed and remanded a lower court’s order which denied a hospital’s motion for summary disposition. Following colon resection surgery, a patient experienced great pain and underwent exploratory surgery which revealed that she had a perforated colon. The patient suffered from other complications and sued the surgeon who performed the surgery; the patient also sued the hospital.

The hospital argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary disposition because it was not liable for the physician’s negligence under the theory of ostensible agency. The court was persuaded that the surgeon was an independent contractor who merely used the hospital’s facilities to render treatment to his patients. In dismissing the complaint against the hospital, the court found that there was inadequate evidence that the hospital took any action or made any representation that led the patient to reasonably believe that the surgeon was an agent of the hospital.

Sara v. Saint Joseph Healthcare Sys., Inc. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

BYLAWS AS A CONTRACT

Sara v. Saint Joseph Healthcare Sys., Inc.
No. 2013-CA-001909-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015)

A nephrologist filed an action against a hospital, his former employer, after the Credentials Committee blocked his application to renew his staff privileges. The committee cited allegations against the physician, including violation of patient care policies, lapses in recordkeeping, and breaches of the hospital’s standard of conduct.

The physician pursued a review of the action through a Credentials Committee hearing, a Medical Governing Council review and the Hospital’s appeal board. The end result upheld the Credentials Committee’s recommendations.

The physician filed this legal action on two principal grounds. He first argued that because the hospital had to report the action against him to the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, this resulted in a delegation of the hospital’s investigatory and fact-finding functions, making the hospital a de facto state agency whose procedures were subject to the requirements of Kentucky statutes. Secondly, the physician argued that the hospital’s medical staff bylaws constituted a contract between the physician and hospital, and that the hospital breached that contract. The physician argued that the hospital wrongfully terminated his staff privileges in violation of the requirements of the bylaws.

This court held that the hospital did not function as a state agency based on the definition of agency in the applicable statute. As for the contractual argument, the court held that the bylaws did not constitute a contractual agreement in the instant case. The court held that the trial court properly dismissed Dr. Sara’s claims based upon breach of contract arising from the hospital’s bylaws.

Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

AGE DISCRIMINATION

Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh
No. 15-1526 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2015)

After a neonatal nurse practitioner was terminated by the hospital that employed her, the nurse alleged that she was discriminated against based on her age. She brought an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

The court found that the plaintiff met a number of the necessary elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination: she was over 40 years old, had suffered an adverse employment decision, and was qualified for the position. However, the fourth required element was not met: the position that the nurse vacated was not filled until a year after her demotion. Additionally, the court found that the nurse failed to establish that the disciplinary events her employer cited as cause for her termination were mere pretext. The court held in favor of the employer on both claims.

Golden v. Sound Inpatient Physicians Med. Grp., Inc. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

UNLAWFUL COMPETITIVE BUSINESS ACTIONS

Golden v. Sound Inpatient Physicians Med. Grp., Inc.
No. 14-cv-00497-TLN-EFB (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015)

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted in part and denied in part a medical group’s motion to strike and dismiss. The plaintiff physician, a hospitalist, entered into individual contracts with physicians on Dameron Hospital’s medical staff to provide inpatient care to their patients. This was after the hospital had chosen the rival, defendant medical group to provide hospitalist services.

The medical group sought to convince the particular medical staff physicians to change their designations for hospitalist care (between the physician and the medical group), and to convince all staff physicians to send their inpatients to the medical group for hospitalist care. To do this, the medical group sent letters to physicians stating that the plaintiff physician did not practice at the hospital anymore, even though, in fact, she did. The group also sent a nurse to visit physicians’ offices to inform them that the plaintiff physician no longer practiced at the hospital. Lastly, the group had emergency room staff informed that they were no longer to check to see if the plaintiff physician had been designated as the hospitalist of choice as all patients had now been assigned to the group.

The physician claimed that under the California Business and Professional Code the medical group was in violation of misleading advertising and unlawful/fraudulent business acts. The court granted a motion to dismiss for the misleading advertising claim. The court found that the group was not engaged in advertising per se, and that the group’s actions did not meet the state law requirement that the public be harmed by the actions involved. However, the court did not grant the motion to dismiss for the claim of unlawful business actions because the physician plaintiff had made sufficient factual allegations which created a plausible claim for relief.

Shore v. Children’s Mercy Hosp. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Shore v. Children’s Mercy Hosp.
WD 78530 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2015)

The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment order in favor of a hospital against racial discrimination and retaliation claims brought under the Missouri Human Rights Act. The court found that the physician failed to show that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether (i) the physician’s race (Caucasian) was a contributing factor to his employment termination, and (ii) the physician was fired for engaging in protected activity, namely complaining that his supervisor was discriminating against him.

The Court of Appeals stated the plaintiff physician’s own testimony showed that his physician supervisor, Dr. Woods, an African-American, had been friendly with him during his first five years of employment. Dr. Woods had invited the physician to play tennis, attend social events, join his fantasy football league, and serve as a mentor for junior physicians. The physician acknowledged that his relationship with Dr. Woods did not change until after he had complained for months about having to move his office to another building, and, even more so, had made a comment about treating sickle cell patients that Dr. Woods found to be offensive and racist in nature. The court noted that the physician was fired after numerous complaints brought by nurses and others regarding alleged inappropriate conduct by the physician, including the use of offensive language.

In light of these facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of summary judgment with regard to the physician’s racial discrimination claim because the physician did not show a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether he was discriminated against because he was Caucasian. With regard to the physician’s retaliation claim, the Court of Appeals rejected the physician’s argument that he was retaliated against because he had complained to human resources that he believed Dr. Woods’ thought he was racist. The Court of Appeals noted those complaints took place two years prior to the physician being fired. Since those complaints were made, the physician had been the subject of numerous complaints brought by nurses and others for offensive and rude behavior. The Court of Appeals found the trial court did not err in finding the physician’s termination was related to continuing problems with his performance rather than complaints he made against his supervisor.

Sampson v. Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

NEGLIGENCE AND EMTALA

Sampson v. Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr.
Case No. 15-cv-00160-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015)

The District Court for the Northern District of California denied an air ambulance medical service and a medical center’s motion to dismiss claims brought by the parents of a deceased patient. The case involved an initial, unsuccessful air ambulance landing at the patient’s accident site, the later involvement of the air ambulance personnel in the ground ambulance transport, and questions as to whether the patient had been stabilized under the requirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act for the final ground ambulance transport.

The patient had received multiple fractures, blunt chest trauma and head trauma in an automobile accident. After an unsuccessful landing at the accident site by the air ambulance medical services, the patient was rushed to the medical center by ground ambulance. The patient was allegedly found to be suffering from a heightened pulse and low blood pressure. An ED physician from the medical center confirmed the patient’s injuries via X-ray, and found that the decedent was suffering from a hemothorax of the left lung. The physician ordered the patient to be transferred to another hospital 60 miles south of the medical center, but without first being intubated and placed on a portable ventilator prior to departure. Although the patient was transported by ground ambulance, the air medical service personnel accompanied him for this ground transfer as the air ambulance had later landed at the medical center. Within minutes of leaving the medical center, the patient’s pulse weakened and he was diverted to another hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

The District Court denied the air ambulance medical service’s motion to dismiss the parent’s claim of gross negligence, holding that the air ambulance medical service personnel’s failure to intubate the patient or give him a blood transfusion prior to transporting the patient by ground presented sufficient alleged facts to state a claim for gross negligence against the air ambulance medical service. The District Court also held that sufficient claims had been made such that there should be discovery concerning the parents’ assertion that the air transport may have been turned away because the air ambulance medical service did not believe the patient’s insurance would cover the air transfer. The District Court found the parents had alleged sufficient facts to support this argument, such as the existence of conflicting reports as to why the air transport was waived off, conditions at the accident site, and other possible locations for a landing.

With regard to the medical center, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss the claim of medical negligence. The court found that because the ED physician who treated the patient was employed by a corporation with an exclusive contract to provide emergency services to the medical center, a sufficient fact question existed as to whether that physician was an agent of the medical center. The District Court also denied the medical center’s motion to dismiss the EMTALA claim, holding that sufficient allegations had been made that the patient should have been intubated and given a blood transfusion prior to transfer in violation of EMTALA.

Figueroa v. Hynes — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

PEER REVIEW PROTECTION

Figueroa v. Hynes
Case Nos. 5D14-3457 and 5D15-174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015)

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a meeting held by a Medical Executive Committee (“MEC”) was protected by the peer review privilege, while a related general staff meeting was not protected.

In this case, two trauma surgeons’ admitting privileges were summarily suspended; the surgeons, in turn, obtained a temporary injunction halting the suspensions. The suspensions were reviewed by the MEC at a meeting which the surgeons attended.

In their lawsuit, the surgeons argued that the MEC meeting should not be afforded peer review protections because there were significant departures from the bylaws. The court upheld the trial judge’s determination that the MEC meeting qualified as peer review, as the trial judge made that determination upon a number of factors, including the bylaws issues. However, the court held that the general staff meeting did not constitute peer review.

Lammers v. Sossan — Oct. 2015 (No Summary)

Holliday v. Waccamaw Cmty. Hosp. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING

Holliday v. Waccamaw Cmty. Hosp.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000331 (S.C. Dec. 2, 2015)

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed and remanded the dismissal of a deceased patient’s negligent credentialing claim against a hospital with regard to a physician’s drug problems, reappointment to the medical staff and alleged medical malpractice, holding the alleged medical negligence at the core of the negligent credentialing claim took place before the effective date of a state law granting the hospital immunity for such actions.

Morman v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Morman v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp.
No. 14-8090 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015)

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a female orthopedic surgeon’s equal protection claims against a hospital, Board members, and CEO with regard to alleged gender discrimination, holding the surgeon was not similarly situated to her male peers. The female surgeon was found to be hired solely for her skill and experience, whereas the three male surgeons were hired in conjunction with a multi-million dollar purchase of the male surgeons’ orthopedic business, including equipment, a building, and practice. Furthermore, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the Board members and CEO were entitled to qualified immunity, stating the female surgeon had failed to identify a single case supporting her position that the law required her to be treated similarly to differently situated employees.