Sampson v. Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

NEGLIGENCE AND EMTALA

Sampson v. Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr.
Case No. 15-cv-00160-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015)

The District Court for the Northern District of California denied an air ambulance medical service and a medical center’s motion to dismiss claims brought by the parents of a deceased patient. The case involved an initial, unsuccessful air ambulance landing at the patient’s accident site, the later involvement of the air ambulance personnel in the ground ambulance transport, and questions as to whether the patient had been stabilized under the requirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act for the final ground ambulance transport.

The patient had received multiple fractures, blunt chest trauma and head trauma in an automobile accident. After an unsuccessful landing at the accident site by the air ambulance medical services, the patient was rushed to the medical center by ground ambulance. The patient was allegedly found to be suffering from a heightened pulse and low blood pressure. An ED physician from the medical center confirmed the patient’s injuries via X-ray, and found that the decedent was suffering from a hemothorax of the left lung. The physician ordered the patient to be transferred to another hospital 60 miles south of the medical center, but without first being intubated and placed on a portable ventilator prior to departure. Although the patient was transported by ground ambulance, the air medical service personnel accompanied him for this ground transfer as the air ambulance had later landed at the medical center. Within minutes of leaving the medical center, the patient’s pulse weakened and he was diverted to another hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

The District Court denied the air ambulance medical service’s motion to dismiss the parent’s claim of gross negligence, holding that the air ambulance medical service personnel’s failure to intubate the patient or give him a blood transfusion prior to transporting the patient by ground presented sufficient alleged facts to state a claim for gross negligence against the air ambulance medical service. The District Court also held that sufficient claims had been made such that there should be discovery concerning the parents’ assertion that the air transport may have been turned away because the air ambulance medical service did not believe the patient’s insurance would cover the air transfer. The District Court found the parents had alleged sufficient facts to support this argument, such as the existence of conflicting reports as to why the air transport was waived off, conditions at the accident site, and other possible locations for a landing.

With regard to the medical center, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss the claim of medical negligence. The court found that because the ED physician who treated the patient was employed by a corporation with an exclusive contract to provide emergency services to the medical center, a sufficient fact question existed as to whether that physician was an agent of the medical center. The District Court also denied the medical center’s motion to dismiss the EMTALA claim, holding that sufficient allegations had been made that the patient should have been intubated and given a blood transfusion prior to transfer in violation of EMTALA.

Figueroa v. Hynes — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

PEER REVIEW PROTECTION

Figueroa v. Hynes
Case Nos. 5D14-3457 and 5D15-174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015)

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a meeting held by a Medical Executive Committee (“MEC”) was protected by the peer review privilege, while a related general staff meeting was not protected.

In this case, two trauma surgeons’ admitting privileges were summarily suspended; the surgeons, in turn, obtained a temporary injunction halting the suspensions. The suspensions were reviewed by the MEC at a meeting which the surgeons attended.

In their lawsuit, the surgeons argued that the MEC meeting should not be afforded peer review protections because there were significant departures from the bylaws. The court upheld the trial judge’s determination that the MEC meeting qualified as peer review, as the trial judge made that determination upon a number of factors, including the bylaws issues. However, the court held that the general staff meeting did not constitute peer review.

Lammers v. Sossan — Oct. 2015 (No Summary)

Holliday v. Waccamaw Cmty. Hosp. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING

Holliday v. Waccamaw Cmty. Hosp.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000331 (S.C. Dec. 2, 2015)

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed and remanded the dismissal of a deceased patient’s negligent credentialing claim against a hospital with regard to a physician’s drug problems, reappointment to the medical staff and alleged medical malpractice, holding the alleged medical negligence at the core of the negligent credentialing claim took place before the effective date of a state law granting the hospital immunity for such actions.

Morman v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Morman v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp.
No. 14-8090 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015)

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a female orthopedic surgeon’s equal protection claims against a hospital, Board members, and CEO with regard to alleged gender discrimination, holding the surgeon was not similarly situated to her male peers. The female surgeon was found to be hired solely for her skill and experience, whereas the three male surgeons were hired in conjunction with a multi-million dollar purchase of the male surgeons’ orthopedic business, including equipment, a building, and practice. Furthermore, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the Board members and CEO were entitled to qualified immunity, stating the female surgeon had failed to identify a single case supporting her position that the law required her to be treated similarly to differently situated employees.

Stewart v. Am. Ass’n of Physician Specialists, Inc. — Nov. 2015 (Summary)

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Stewart v. Am. Ass’n of Physician Specialists, Inc.
Case No. 5:13-cv-01670-ODW (DTBx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2015)

The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted in part and denied in part a professional organization’s motion for summary judgment while denying a physician’s motion for summary judgment over claims arising from the termination of the physician’s membership from the organization.

The physician was notified that the organization would be holding a meeting of its Disciplinary Committee to consider charges against her of conduct injurious to the best interests of the organization. The physician did not attend the meeting, but sent a letter to each member of the organization’s Board refuting the charges. The physician also alleged that there was a conflict of interest due to the composition of the Disciplinary Committee, which would prevent a fair hearing from occurring. Ultimately, the Board voted to terminate the physician’s membership from the organization.

The physician alleged that the organization breached its contract with her, violated several civil rights laws, engaged in fraud, and defamed her, among other causes of action. The organization argued that the business judgment rule protected its decision to terminate the physician’s membership because the decision was based on the information available at the time, and was made in good faith. The court declined to grant summary judgment based on the business judgment rule because the physician’s allegations created enough of a factual dispute. Thus, the physician’s allegations of fraud, bad faith, and conflicts of interest were allowed to proceed. The court dismissed the physician’s civil rights claims under Title VII and the Fair Employment and Housing Act, but allowed her gender discrimination claims to go forward.

Powell v. City of Ocean City — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

IMMUNITY

Powell v. City of Ocean City
Civil Action No. 14-4365 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2015)

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied motions for summary judgment and to dismiss made on behalf of a defendant hospital and nurses against claims brought by a former patient.

The patient was arrested and detained for driving under the influence. After being unable to produce a reading on a breathalyzer and produce a sufficient urine specimen, the patient was brought to the hospital to undergo a blood test. The patient alleged that the defendant police officer was present during and participated in her catheterization without proper sterilization or dress, which resulted in her contracting MRSA. The hospital argued immunity under a New Jersey statute that shields medical personnel and facilities involved in obtaining bodily substances specimens from both civil and criminal liability under certain circumstances. However, the specimens must be obtained in a medically acceptable manner.

The court was unpersuaded that the motions should be granted because there were still questions of fact as to whether the catheterization was necessary and whether the catheterization was performed in a medically acceptable manner.

Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health Sys. — Dec. 2015 (Summary)

HCQIA IMMUNITY

Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health Sys.
Case No. 3:15-cv-05579-RJB (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2015)

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied a health system’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by a physician who alleged he experienced loss of income and employment benefits after the health system denied his application for privileges and revoked his temporary privileges, as a result of it discovering his bipolar disorder and the fact that he had commenced a wrongful termination action against his former employer.

The physician alleged that an employee from the health system told him his mental illness was a “red flag” and the appellate review board “denied and resisted” giving the physician a chance to complete a proctorship to alleviate the health system’s concerns. Further, an employee from the health system allegedly informed the physician’s prospective employer that they “should watch what type of people” they bring to work at the hospital. Finally, the physician alleged the health system made a false report to the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) indicating the physician “fail[e]d to demonstrate the scope and adequacy of his experience or his current clinical skill and competence.” The physician filed suit, claiming defamation and violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, and Section 1981.

With regard to the physician’s defamation claim, the district court rejected the health system’s argument of immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, noting that if the health system only had reports from coworkers indicating the physician was competent (as the physician alleged), a reasonable inference could be made that the health system knew its NPDB report was “false” because it did not substantiate any of the information the health system had in its possession.

With regard to the WLAD and Rehabilitation Act claims, the district court found the physician alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against the health system for disability discrimination, holding that bipolar disorder is considered a disability under both statutes, and the comments made by employees of the health system supported the argument that the physician was denied privileges because of his disability. The district court also upheld the physician’s Title VI claim, holding that the health system’s receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds to employ physicians established that the health system was a recipient of federal funds and, therefore, subject to Title VI.

The district court did grant the health system’s motion to dismiss the physician’s anti-retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), holding that the court had no knowledge of any authority expanding FCA liability to a third party who was not involved with the whistleblowing activity. Additionally, the district court held the physician did not describe how the rejection of privileges was related to his whistleblowing activity against a former employer, and did not follow the unique procedure for FCA claims.

Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe — Nov. 2015 (Summary)

HIPAA BREACH

Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe
Case No. 4:12-CV-37/4:15CV105 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015)

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of a hospital that sued its former Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) and her husband, the former Information Systems Administrator, claiming that the couple breached their fiduciary duties, breached their contracts with the hospital, and violated several federal, privacy and computer usage laws when they downloaded hospital files in the weeks and months leading up to their departure from the organization.

The hospital became aware of the downloads because the COO told the Human Resources Manager, after tendering her resignation, that she “knew where too many bodies were buried” – leading the hospital to conduct a security investigation. The report showed that in the prior months, the COO and her husband downloaded a slew of hospital documents into the cloud and onto their personal electronic devices, including protected health information, trade secrets, and peer review privileged documents.

Within months of completing its investigation, the hospital filed suit against the former COO and her husband. Less than a month prior to trial, the couple filed for bankruptcy – causing the hospital’s lawsuit to be put on hold. In turn, the hospital filed a second lawsuit, seeking to have the hospital’s claims against the COO and Information Systems Administrator, along with all attorneys’ fees and costs, declared non-dischargeable in bankruptcy on the basis that they fall within the exception in the bankruptcy code that excepts from discharge debts “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.”

As the litigation continued, the two lawsuits were merged and the hospital filed for summary judgment on all claims. In the present opinion, the court grants summary judgment for the hospital – not only finding the COO and Information Systems Administrator liable for the underlying claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of federal law, but also finding that the damages chargeable against them are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Notably, the court held that the damages include over $1 million in attorneys’ fees and over $218,000 in forensic investigation costs.

Concord Med. Grp., Inc. v. Dallam-Hartley Cntys. Hosp. Dist. — Nov. 2015 (Summary)

BREACH OF CONTRACT – RESTRICTIVE COVENANT

Concord Med. Grp., Inc. v. Dallam-Hartley Cntys. Hosp. Dist.
No. 07-14-00297-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2015)

The Court of Appeals of Texas reversed summary judgment that had been granted to a hospital in a lawsuit brought by its previous ED group. The contract between the hospital and the ED group contained a provision restricting the hospital’s ability to allow the group’s physicians to work with the hospital independent of the medical group. Nevertheless, when that contract ended, the hospital allowed physicians who had worked under that contract to continue to work at the hospital pursuant to a different contract executed between the hospital and another group. The ED group alleged that this constituted breach of contract.

In overturning summary judgment for the hospital, the court rejected the hospital’s emphasis on whether the doctors were employed by the hospital – noting that the language of the contract demonstrated that it applied not only to employment of the physicians, but also to any “work” performed in the hospital.