Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION/WRONGFUL TERMINATION

Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., No. 2:13-cv-36-FtM-29DNF (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014)

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted an ER staffing group’s motion to dismiss a female, African-American physician’s claims of racial discrimination, gender discrimination, retaliation, trade libel, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, finding that the physician failed to adequately allege her claims. The physician alleged that she was not treated equally to her male, Caucasian counterpart and that certain officers of the health group had issues with her because of her race and gender, falsely claiming that she was not acting in compliance with her role. Eventually, the group terminated the physician’s employment, giving her the required 60 days’ notice, but then informing her that her last shift would occur before the 60 days were over.

The court found that the physician had failed to state a claim of negligence.  She could not adequately allege – as required by Florida law to state a claim of negligence – that she was permitted to recover on the theory of supervisory authority, that the breach of the agreement created a foreseeable zone of risk, and that there was a misrepresentation of material fact or that she justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation.

The court also found that the physician failed to state a plausible claim for breach of contract because the agreement rendered her unable to rely on the general principles governing a claim for breach of contract as it imposes duties and obligations on the physician.  The court reasoned that she could assert a breach of contract claim under the doctrine of prevention of performance; however, the physician failed to allege that the group attempted to avoid liability under the agreement or perform any of its obligations under the agreement.  Finally, the court found that the physician failed to allege a breach of the contract because she simply alleged that the health group failed to comply in good faith with the agreement, which is not a plausible claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Bastidas v. Good Samaritan Hosp. (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION/DUE PROCESS

Bastidas v. Good Samaritan Hosp., No. C 13-04388 SI (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a hospital’s motion to dismiss the claims of discrimination and denial of due process made by a former doctor.  The plaintiff, a doctor specializing in surgical oncology, was appointed to the medical staff of the defendant hospital.  While performing a Whipple procedure at the hospital, the doctor allegedly removed a patient’s kidney and damaged the patient’s mesenteric artery, and the patient died. The doctor’s privileges to perform the Whipple procedure were suspended.  The Medical Executive Committee, determining that the doctor’s actions fell below the standard of care, later affirmed the existing suspension and expanded it to include other pancreatic procedures.  After numerous hearings, the hospital’s Judicial Review Committee found the suspension of the doctor’s privileges to be “reasonable and warranted.”  The doctor sued the hospital, claiming that the defendant engaged in racial discrimination and violated his right to due process.

The court held that the doctor did not allege sufficient facts to suggest that his suspension was racially motivated.  The cause of action was therefore dismissed, though the doctor was given leave to amend.

With respect to the doctor’s due process claim, the court ruled that he was unable to show why the private hospital was to be treated as a state actor.  The doctor argued that the hospital’s compliance with a statutorily-created system of physician peer review made the defendant a state actor, and therefore liable for denial of due process.  The court disagreed, finding that “private hospitals are not transformed into state actors by virtue of their compliance with California’s statutory scheme.”  Because the doctor failed to show that the private hospital was actually a public entity, the court dismissed the cause of action entirely.

Howell v. Holland (Summary)

PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE

Howell v. Holland, No. 4:13-cv-0295-RBH-TER (D. S.C. Mar. 10, 2014)

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied a plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery.  Plaintiff, James Howell, alleged numerous state law claims and a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Dr. Holland and McLeod Regional Medical Center.  Plaintiff requested any and all documents regarding any investigations performed by the Medical Staff Executive Committee, and the Quality Outcomes Committee, as well as any “Improve the Process” forms concerning Dr. Holland.  Defendants claimed that the documents are privileged under the South Carolina peer review statutes, which protect documents generated by peer review committees, as well as committees formed to maintain professional standards.  The court agreed with the defendants and held that the requested documents are protected from disclosure.

Hutchson v. Burgess Health Ctr. (Summary)

WRONGFUL TERMINATION

Hutchson v. Burgess Health Ctr., No. 13-0716 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2014)

The Court of Appeals of Iowa affirmed a lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a hospital and denial of a nurse anesthetist’s motion of summary judgment on the nurse anesthetist’s breach-of-contract claim. Following concerns over the anesthetist’s care of patients, a hospital peer review committee held that another anesthetist must observe him. Upon refusing to be observed, the anesthetist’s employment was terminated.

The court held that the hospital “legally and properly” terminated the anesthetist’s employment when he refused to be observed per the peer review committee’s directions.  The court agreed with the lower court that the anesthetist’s refusal violated his employment contract, which allowed for immediate termination.

Adams v. Yale New Haven Hosp. — Mar. 2014 (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Adams v. Yale New Haven Hosp.
No. 12-4279-cv (2^nd Cir. Mar. 12, 2014)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a former physician associate’s claims of racial discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The plaintiff, an African-American male, worked as a physician associate in the hospital’s Surgery Department, but transferred to another department to avoid having to periodically be on call.  Several weeks later, a new administrative position was created within the Surgery Department and offered to the remaining physician associate who negotiated an arrangement where she would not have to take call.  The plaintiff then filed charges against the hospital, alleging that he was not offered the leadership position due to discrimination.

The court held that the plaintiff was not qualified for the position because he no longer worked in the Surgery Department.  His discrimination claim therefore failed.  In regard to claims of retaliation, the court affirmed that the plaintiff’s voluntary transfer did not constitute any adverse action on behalf of the hospital.

Murphy v. Shasta Cmty. Health Ctr. (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Murphy v. Shasta Cmty. Health Ctr., No. 2:13–CV–0412–CMK (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014)

A former employee (“plaintiff”) of Shasta Community Health Center (“defendant”) sued, among others, defendant’s chief operating officer (“Glasco”) for retaliatory harassment under Title VII and retaliatory termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted defendants’ motion to dismiss both claims against Glasco.  The court ruled that Title VII does not impose individual liability on employees, including supervisors.  The court also held that FEHA does not create an individual cause of action against supervisors who engage in retaliatory or discriminatory conduct.  Although supervisors can be held individually liable for harassment, they cannot be individually liable for discrimination or retaliation because those claims involve management and personnel decisions that are necessary to the supervisory role.  Plaintiff tried to characterize her FEHA claim as one of harassment, but the court found that because the claim concerned employment-related decisions and failed to mention derogatory remarks, physical interference with movement or similar conduct, it was not actionable under the FEHA.

 

Liu v. County of Cook (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Liu v. County of Cook, No. 10-C-6544 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants (the county and three surgeons who held leadership positions), dismissing over a dozen claims brought by a former surgeon. After being discharged from her position as a surgeon, the plaintiff, a woman of Chinese descent, brought claims including racial discrimination, sexual discrimination, and retaliation. The surgeon had been warned and reprimanded numerous times for her repeated failure to operate on patients with appendicitis, yet had failed to modify her practices. After a patient almost died, the Surgical Oversight Committee suspended the surgeon’s privileges and sent her case to a peer review, which recommended the suspension remain in effect. The surgeon’s application for reappointment was denied due to her previous failure to adhere to standards of patient care. The defendants maintained that their actions were based solely on the surgeon’s failure to operate on appendicitis patients, and not on any form of discrimination.

The court held that evidence put forth by the plaintiff was insufficient to show direct discrimination, and insufficient to conclude that the defendants’ explanation was a dishonest pretext for any form of discrimination. Rather, discipline for workplace infractions is not inherently offensive, and any kind of subsequent hostile environment was not based on her sex, race, or national origin. Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence that the defendants’ actions were retaliation for her complaints about discrimination.

Shervin v. Partner Healthcare System, Inc., (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Shervin v. Partner Healthcare System, Inc., No. 10-cv-10601 (D. Mass. Mar. 7, 2014)

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied in part and allowed in part a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a health care system, a physician organization, Harvard medical school and the president and Fellows.  Plaintiff, a resident surgeon, brought suit against her two supervisors and their employers, defendants, for gender discrimination under federal and state law and for tortious interference under state law. During her residency, she was placed on disciplinary probation, which she alleged was due to her not fitting into her gender stereotype.  After the residency and fellowship, defendants “revoked” their employment offer to plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleges (1) she was discriminated against, (2) she was retaliated against due to her complaints of gender discrimination, and (3) defendants tortiously interfered with her employment opportunities due to the complaints.

The district court held that the plaintiff was aware that placing her on probation was a distinct adverse employment action, and her federal and state law claims of gender discrimination were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court held that a jury could reasonably find that not offering future employment was retaliatory because defendants’ conduct could causally be connected to plaintiff’s complaints. Lastly, the district court held that due to contradicting evidence, a jury must make the determination of whether defendants tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s employment offer. However, one of the defendants, Partners Healthcare System, succeeded in showing that it was immune from the state law claim because it is a charitable organization and the cause of action arose from regularly conducted business activities.

DeCecco v. UPMC (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

DeCecco v. UPMC, No. 12-272 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2014)

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part a health care provider’s motions for summary judgment with respect to a 59-year-old former employee’s claims of retaliation and age discrimination, finding that there remained genuine issues of material fact over the real reason the employee was fired.

The employee was fired after 41 years of working for the health care provider, during which time she consistently received good performance evaluations. She alleged that the health care provider fired her due to her age, violating the ADEA. The health care provider claimed that it has a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason – as required by the ADEA – for firing the employee, because the employee made “grievous and egregious errors” in responding to a Department of Health investigation, endangering the health care provider of losing its Medicare funding, and in turn, causing a lack of faith in the employee’s abilities. The court found that the health care provider had introduced a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing the employee. However, the employee had presented sufficient evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the actual reason why she was fired.

Finally, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the employee’s retaliation claim because she signed the separation agreement and received a severance benefit, reasoning that the employee was not denied anything she was owed.

Fisher v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (Summary)

ANTITRUST

Fisher v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., No. 13-2752 (7^th Cir. Mar. 11, 2014)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a physician’s claims that a health care provider engaged in anticompetitive practices by eliminating independent physicians from its medical staff, thereby violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The physician had been working for the health care provider for nearly a decade, when the provider changed its policy and required all medical staff, including independent physicians, to be on call 24/7. The provider informed the physician that unless he agreed to the 24/7 call coverage, he would not be able to renew his medical staff privileges. The physician sued the provider after it refused to renew his medical staff privileges, claiming that his exclusion was part of the provider’s anticompetitive conspiracy to exclude independent physicians from the hospital.

The court found that the physician, as an independent contractor, is not the person that can most efficiently bring this claim to fruition, and thereby lacked antitrust standing. The court further found that the physician could not establish that antitrust laws recognize the injury that arises from the loss of medical services provided by independent physicians. The court finally reasoned that the physician’s argument is tenuous because he has staffing privileges at other medical facilities in the area.