Murphy v. Shasta Cmty. Health Ctr. (Summary)

Murphy v. Shasta Cmty. Health Ctr. (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Murphy v. Shasta Cmty. Health Ctr., No. 2:13–CV–0412–CMK (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014)

A former employee (“plaintiff”) of Shasta Community Health Center (“defendant”) sued, among others, defendant’s chief operating officer (“Glasco”) for retaliatory harassment under Title VII and retaliatory termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted defendants’ motion to dismiss both claims against Glasco.  The court ruled that Title VII does not impose individual liability on employees, including supervisors.  The court also held that FEHA does not create an individual cause of action against supervisors who engage in retaliatory or discriminatory conduct.  Although supervisors can be held individually liable for harassment, they cannot be individually liable for discrimination or retaliation because those claims involve management and personnel decisions that are necessary to the supervisory role.  Plaintiff tried to characterize her FEHA claim as one of harassment, but the court found that because the claim concerned employment-related decisions and failed to mention derogatory remarks, physical interference with movement or similar conduct, it was not actionable under the FEHA.fulltext

 

Liu v. County of Cook (Summary)

Liu v. County of Cook (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Liu v. County of Cook, No. 10-C-6544 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014)

fulltextThe United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants (the county and three surgeons who held leadership positions), dismissing over a dozen claims brought by a former surgeon. After being discharged from her position as a surgeon, the plaintiff, a woman of Chinese descent, brought claims including racial discrimination, sexual discrimination, and retaliation. The surgeon had been warned and reprimanded numerous times for her repeated failure to operate on patients with appendicitis, yet had failed to modify her practices. After a patient almost died, the Surgical Oversight Committee suspended the surgeon’s privileges and sent her case to a peer review, which recommended the suspension remain in effect. The surgeon’s application for reappointment was denied due to her previous failure to adhere to standards of patient care. The defendants maintained that their actions were based solely on the surgeon’s failure to operate on appendicitis patients, and not on any form of discrimination.

The court held that evidence put forth by the plaintiff was insufficient to show direct discrimination, and insufficient to conclude that the defendants’ explanation was a dishonest pretext for any form of discrimination. Rather, discipline for workplace infractions is not inherently offensive, and any kind of subsequent hostile environment was not based on her sex, race, or national origin. Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence that the defendants’ actions were retaliation for her complaints about discrimination.

Shervin v. Partner Healthcare System, Inc., (Summary)

Shervin v. Partner Healthcare System, Inc., (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Shervin v. Partner Healthcare System, Inc., No. 10-cv-10601 (D. Mass. Mar. 7, 2014)

fulltextThe United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied in part and allowed in part a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a health care system, a physician organization, Harvard medical school and the president and Fellows.  Plaintiff, a resident surgeon, brought suit against her two supervisors and their employers, defendants, for gender discrimination under federal and state law and for tortious interference under state law. During her residency, she was placed on disciplinary probation, which she alleged was due to her not fitting into her gender stereotype.  After the residency and fellowship, defendants “revoked” their employment offer to plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleges (1) she was discriminated against, (2) she was retaliated against due to her complaints of gender discrimination, and (3) defendants tortiously interfered with her employment opportunities due to the complaints.

The district court held that the plaintiff was aware that placing her on probation was a distinct adverse employment action, and her federal and state law claims of gender discrimination were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court held that a jury could reasonably find that not offering future employment was retaliatory because defendants’ conduct could causally be connected to plaintiff’s complaints. Lastly, the district court held that due to contradicting evidence, a jury must make the determination of whether defendants tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s employment offer. However, one of the defendants, Partners Healthcare System, succeeded in showing that it was immune from the state law claim because it is a charitable organization and the cause of action arose from regularly conducted business activities.

DeCecco v. UPMC (Summary)

DeCecco v. UPMC (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

DeCecco v. UPMC, No. 12-272 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2014)

fulltextThe United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part a health care provider’s motions for summary judgment with respect to a 59-year-old former employee’s claims of retaliation and age discrimination, finding that there remained genuine issues of material fact over the real reason the employee was fired.

The employee was fired after 41 years of working for the health care provider, during which time she consistently received good performance evaluations. She alleged that the health care provider fired her due to her age, violating the ADEA. The health care provider claimed that it has a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason – as required by the ADEA – for firing the employee, because the employee made “grievous and egregious errors” in responding to a Department of Health investigation, endangering the health care provider of losing its Medicare funding, and in turn, causing a lack of faith in the employee’s abilities. The court found that the health care provider had introduced a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing the employee. However, the employee had presented sufficient evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the actual reason why she was fired.

Finally, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the employee’s retaliation claim because she signed the separation agreement and received a severance benefit, reasoning that the employee was not denied anything she was owed.

Fisher v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (Summary)

Fisher v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (Summary)

ANTITRUST

Fisher v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., No. 13-2752 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2014)

fulltextThe United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a physician’s claims that a health care provider engaged in anticompetitive practices by eliminating independent physicians from its medical staff, thereby violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The physician had been working for the health care provider for nearly a decade, when the provider changed its policy and required all medical staff, including independent physicians, to be on call 24/7. The provider informed the physician that unless he agreed to the 24/7 call coverage, he would not be able to renew his medical staff privileges. The physician sued the provider after it refused to renew his medical staff privileges, claiming that his exclusion was part of the provider’s anticompetitive conspiracy to exclude independent physicians from the hospital.

The court found that the physician, as an independent contractor, is not the person that can most efficiently bring this claim to fruition, and thereby lacked antitrust standing. The court further found that the physician could not establish that antitrust laws recognize the injury that arises from the loss of medical services provided by independent physicians. The court finally reasoned that the physician’s argument is tenuous because he has staffing privileges at other medical facilities in the area.

Estate of McCall v. United States (Summary)

Estate of McCall v. United States (Summary)

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAP ON DAMAGES

Estate of McCall v. United States, No. SC11-1148 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2014)

fulltextThe Florida Supreme Court ruled that a cap on noneconomic damages in a wrongful death lawsuit is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution. Michelle McCall was a 20-year-old pregnant Air Force dependent suffering from severe preeclampsia. Labor was induced by the United States Air Force family practice department, and McCall lost a significant amount of blood during delivery. After the baby was born, McCall’s blood pressure began to drop to a dangerously low level, where it remained for over two hours. When the surgeon arrived later to help remove the placenta, he was not informed that McCall had lost a significant amount of blood, or that her blood pressure was severely low and continuing to drop. McCall went into shock and cardiac arrest as a result of this blood loss, and never regained consciousness. The United States was found liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the district court found the noneconomic damages to total $2 million. However, the petitioners’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic wages was limited to an aggregated $1 million, per the state’s statutory cap.

The Supreme Court found no rational basis for a cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages, and stated that such a cap imposed “unfair and illogical burdens on injured parties when an act of medical negligence gives rise to multiple claimants.” As such, the court found the cap to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. The court also rejected the state’s attempt to justify the cap based on claims of a medical malpractice insurance crisis, in which increased insurance premiums have allegedly resulted in physicians leaving the state. The court found inconclusive evidence regarding the existence of this crisis, and further held that there was no rational basis between the cap and any legitimate state purpose.

Fahlen v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps (Summary)

Fahlen v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps (Summary)

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

Fahlen v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps., No. S205568 (Cal. Feb. 20, 2014)

The Supreme Court of California affirmed that a physician did not need to set aside a hospital’s decision to terminate staff privileges, through a mandamus action, before filing suit under the state’s whistleblower law.  The court held that the statute forbidding retaliation or discrimination against whistleblowers in no way conditions its protection on a successful mandamus challenge to the hospital’s actions.  To rule otherwise, the court held, would be to undermine the purpose of the protection and to disregard the legislature’s intent. fulltext

At the heart of the case is a physician who was employed by a medical group and was granted clinical privileges to practice at a hospital.  In both 2004 and 2006, the physician twice argued with nurses because they allegedly failed to follow his treatment instructions.  From 2007 to 2008, the physician had six additional clashes with nurses who he claimed had been insubordinate and had provided substandard care.  On several occasions, the physician had reported his concerns to the hospital.

In 2008 the hospital contacted the director of the medical group to discuss the physician’s “disruptive interactions” with staff.  Shortly thereafter, the medical group terminated the physician’s employment.  Admittedly, this was the action the hospital had hoped would occur.  Instead of resigning his appointment and privileges and leaving the area, however, the physician notified the hospital of his intent to continue to practice.  Thereafter, an investigation was commenced and a report was made and approved by the Medical Executive Committee recommending against the renewal of the physician’s privileges.  The physician challenged this recommendation through the hearing process.

Some ten months and 13 sessions later, the judicial review committee reversed the recommendation of the Medical Executive Committee.  The Board sent the matter back to the judicial review committee with a series of detailed questions asking whether each incident occurred and seeking clarification about the evidence that was considered with respect to each incident.  Concluding that it was unreasonable, the judicial review committee refused to abide by the Board’s request.

Thereafter, the Board rejected the conclusion of the judicial review committee finding that it was “unlinked to any factual support in the hearing record” and that from its review of the record, the physician’s conduct “was inappropriate and not acceptable, [and was] directly related to the quality of medical care at the hospital.”

The physician opted not to seek mandamus to reverse the Board’s decision.  Instead, he sued the hospital seeking reinstatement and damages, claiming that the hospital’s action to terminate his privileges had been in retaliation for his complaints about substandard care.  The ruling of the California Supreme Court paved the way for the physician to proceed with this action.

Franz v. Ashland Hosp. Corp (Summary)

Franz v. Ashland Hosp. Corp (Summary)

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING

Franz v. Ashland Hosp. Corp.No. 2009–CA–002269–MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014)

Following injuries sustained by a patient during CABG surgery, and the patient’s death 16 months later, a suit was brought against a number of physicians, including the surgeon who performed the CABG, and the hospital where the surgery was performed.  In the medical malpractice case, the jury found that the surgeon had not failed to meet the standard of care.  Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment to the hospital.  The trial court had also dismissed a claim for medical battery against the surgeon before the trial.fulltext

The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the claim for medical battery against the surgeon and the dismissal of the claims against the hospital.  Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that the claim for medical battery failed because the patient had not proven a complete lack of consent (i.e., she consented to the CABG surgery and she consented for the surgeon to perform the surgery).  In this case, the claim for battery was based on the fact that the surgeon’s privileges at the hospital were expired when the procedure was performed.  The court of appeals refused to create a “new route for a lack of consent claim” based on a lack of privileges.

The court of appeals also upheld the dismissal of the claims against the hospital.  The court found that, absent liability on the part of the surgeon, the hospital could not be liable to the patient, even though it had failed to follow its own rules, protocols, and policies.  According to the court, there was no causal connection between the patient’s injury and the hospital’s misstep in failing to follow its own rules.

The court of appeals also upheld the trial court’s order which precluded testimony pertaining to the surgeon’s “so-called mental illness.”  Since the standard of care for physicians is an objective standard, evidence of a physician’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant.  As the court noted, “despite a physician’s ‘less than optimal mental and emotional condition,’ if the physician’s ‘actual treatment of a patient reflects the appropriate degree of care,’ he or she ‘cannot be held liable in negligence.’”

Lopez v. Contra Costa Reg’l Med.l Ctr (Summary)

Lopez v. Contra Costa Reg’l Med.l Ctr (Summary)

EMTALA

Lopez v. Contra Costa Reg’l Med.l Ctr., No. C 12-03726 LB (N.D. Cal.  Feb. 28, 2014)

The family of a mother who passed away following the birth of her third child, from complications related to the pregnancy, brought a claim against the hospital for malpractice and for violating the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”).  With respect to the EMTALA claim, the family asserted that the hospital had admitted the mother to its facility to stabilize her emergency condition, but did so in bad faith.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment to the hospital because the records clearly showed that the mother had been admitted to the hospital for treatment, not to be stabilized.  The court concluded that EMTALA does not have a “good faith” requirement with respect to the provision of medical treatment after admission. fulltext

According to the court, the family had not shown that the mother had been admitted to the hospital to be stabilized for transfer.  Rather, the hospital had sufficiently established that the mother was admitted for the delivery of her child as well as for the postpartum complications she suffered.  Therefore, EMTALA was not implicated.

Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare (Summary)

Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare (Summary)

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/APOLOGY LAW

Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, No. 20120352-CA (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2014)

The Court of Appeals of Utah affirmed a jury verdict in favor of a hospital in a patient’s medical malpractice case, finding that the hospital’s breach of the standard of care was not the cause of the patient’s injury.

The patient had visited the emergency room, seeking treatment for an allergic reaction to Tylenol 3.  A physician had prescribed three medications, epinephrine to be administered subcutaneously and the other two medications to be administered intravenously.  However, a nurse administered all three medications intravenously.

The patient experienced negative side effects from the epinephrine, crying out in pain, vomiting, experiencing heart palpitations, and more.  Later, the physician spoke with the patient about the erroneous epinephrine administration, acknowledging that a mistake had been made.  Hospital administrators and risk managers also met with the patient fulltextand acknowledged the error.  The patient remained in the hospital for about a week.

Subsequently, the patient filed suit against the hospital, claiming that the intravenous administration of epinephrine caused her to suffer anoxic brain damage, cardiac damage, thoracic outlet syndrome, headaches, depression, anxiety, cognitive defects, and neck, shoulder and back pain.  The hospital agreed that the incorrect administration of epinephrine was a breach of the standard of care.  However, the hospital asserted that the breach was not a “direct, proximate, or contributing cause of any damages allegedly sustained” by the patient.

Following a trial in which multiple experts testified on behalf of both sides, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the hospital, finding that the hospital’s breach of the standard of care did not cause the patient’s injuries.  The patient appealed, challenging a number of the trial court rulings, including the exclusion of evidence pertaining to comments made by the physician, nurse, and administrator following the medication error.

The appellate court found that most of the statements which had been excluded were, in fact, inadmissible under the state apology rule, which covered statements of apology, sympathy, condolence, or general sense of benevolence.  However, the appellate court found that other statements, including “we messed up” and “there’s been an incident, accident,” could be viewed as statements of fault or complication and were not covered by the apology statute.  Although the statements of fault were erroneously excluded, the appellate court found that the patient was not prejudiced by this exclusion and the jury verdict was upheld.