Torres v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp. (Summary)

EMTALA

Torres v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp., No. C 12-6364 PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed several claims, including a claim under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), brought on behalf of a patient who died after presenting with alcohol withdrawal to a hospital’s emergency room.

While in the hospital’s emergency room, the patient was diagnosed with alcohol withdrawal, given one milligram of Lorazepam, instructed to go to a clinic the next day, and then discharged.  Instead of leaving the hospital, the patient went to the hospital’s cafeteria.  He was later forced to leave.  The next morning he was found in the hospital’s parking lot moaning and in distress.  The hospital’s nursing supervisor allegedly told the hospital’s staff that the patient was “not our problem” and instructed the staff to call 911.  The patient died in the hospital parking lot later that same morning.

The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the hospital failed to provide a medical screening examination under EMTALA by providing a “cursory lung exam” and that the hospital failed to stabilize the patient by only administering one milligram of Lorazepam.  The plaintiffs also argued that the hospital had a duty to perform a second screening on the patient when he remained on the hospital premises.  The hospital moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.  The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations regarding a failure to provide a medical screening examination under EMTALA were “wholly conclusory.” The allegations that one milligram of Lorazepam was insufficient to stabilize the decedent’s alcohol withdrawal were, likewise, conclusory and devoid of any factual support.  With respect to the allegations that the hospital had a duty to provide a second screening, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to provide any support for this theory, nor did they indicate when the duty was triggered.

U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc. (Summary)

FALSE CLAIMS ACT

U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 12-20314 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a complaint under the False Claims Act filed by a former employee of a health care vendor was deficient under an “implied false certification” theory because it failed to adequately allege that a contractual merchantability provision was a condition of payment.  The court found that the former employee’s allegations that merchantability was a “standard condition” of the vendor’s contracts with the government were deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 9(b).

The court noted that such conclusory allegations did not identify the contractual provisions regarding merchantability, nor did they identify how the vendor’s products deviated from the government’s specifications.  Also, the court did not address the former employee’s “worthless goods” theory because her complaint failed to plead it with the requisite particularity by not stating that any pump sold to the government over nine years was ever found to be deficient or worthless.

Genova v. Banner Health (Summary)

EMTALA

Genova v. Banner Health, No. 12-1314 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a physician could not state a claim under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) against a hospital after his services were discontinued following his complaints about overcrowding in the hospital’s emergency room.  The court noted that although EMTALA allows suits by individuals directly harmed by or retaliated against for reporting a failure of the hospital to stabilize, examine, or transfer a patient, the doctor instead complained about the hospital’s emergency room taking too many patients, the complete inverse of an EMTALA violation.

The physician’s argument that he was entitled to bring suit because he reported an impending EMTALA violation failed, as the statute only allows suits pertaining to existing violations and patient dumping, not alleged patient “hoarding.” Finally, the physician waived any right to his state claims in contract and tort because he had signed a separate agreement with the hospital releasing those claims.

Love v. The Permanente Med. Grp. (Summary)

PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE

Love v. The Permanente Med. Grp., No. C-12-05679 DMR (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a chemical dependency therapist’s motion to compel a hospital to respond to discovery requests because federal privilege law, not the California peer review privilege, applied to the therapist’s request for documents relating to her credentials and privileges.  Also, documents regarding the therapist’s supervisor were not confidential and all documents relating to the therapist’s performance in the hospital were relevant to her claim that she was terminated without just cause in breach of her collective bargaining agreement.

Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc. (Summary)

COMMERCIAL DISPARAGEMENT

Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., Civ. Action No. 4:13-cv-1054 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted an Illinois nonprofit corporation’s motion to dismiss an association member’s claims of tortious interference with prospective business relations and economic advantage and breach of the corporation’s bylaws, finding that the member failed to allege falsity or malice, elements which are necessary to satisfy a commercial disparagement claim, when the corporation published the member’s notice of censure for violating the corporation’s Rules on Expert Opinion Services on its website.

Also, the court dismissed the member’s breach of contract claim because, based on Texas law, judicial intervention was inappropriate when dealing with the internal affairs of a private association and members of the association subject themselves, within legal limits, to the association’s power to administer and make rules.

Follow-up opinion: 

Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1054 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014), in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

Malempati v. Indep. Inpatient Physicians, Inc. (Summary)

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Malempati v. Indep. Inpatient Physicians, Inc., No. 12AP-565 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2013)

The Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled that a private practice was not entitled to damages based on its counterclaim asserting unjust enrichment against a former employee.  The court found that the private practice, through its owner, made a promise to pay the employee bonus payments contingent upon the employee obtaining tail coverage that benefitted the practice.  The court also found that the former employee reasonably and foreseeably relied on the practice’s promise to pay her the bonus payments.  Further, the court found that the former employee was injured as a result of the practice’s failure to perform its promise to pay the bonus payments.  The court concluded that the practice did not establish the elements of unjust enrichment.

Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Med. Ctr. (Summary)

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Med. Ctr., No. 11-CV-0444 (E.D. N.Y. Aug. 14, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied a hospital’s motion for summary judgment on a gender discrimination claim filed by a formerly employed male MRI technician.  The court found that because the female nurse who accused the technician of sexual harassment was engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct herself and violated the medical center’s Sexual Harassment Policy, but was not disciplined, a jury could find gender discrimination.

However, the court dismissed the technician’s hostile work environment claim, finding that the technician could not establish that the inappropriate sexual conduct in the environment was gender-based. As for the technician’s retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and New York State Human Rights Law, although the technician was terminated soon after he filed his own sexual harassment claim against the female nurse, he may still have been terminated after the medical center’s investigation into the complaint against him for alleged sexual harassment.

Casillas-Sanchez v. Ryder Mem’l Hosp., Inc. (Summary)

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Casillas-Sanchez v. Ryder Mem’l Hosp., Inc., Civil No. 11-2092 (FAB) (D. P.R. Aug. 15, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ruled that a hospital could be vicariously liable for the alleged negligence and malpractice of a non-employed emergency department physician.

The court noted that Puerto Rico law holds hospitals liable for a doctor’s negligence when the patient seeks treatment from the hospital rather than the individual physician, regardless of the doctor’s employment relationship with the hospital.  The court found that the decedent had entrusted her health to the hospital, not the doctor, and the hospital provided the negligent doctor as a treating physician.  Thus, the hospital may be held jointly and severally liable for the doctor’s negligence even though the doctor was not an employee of the hospital, but rather had privileges to practice there.

Shurb v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston-School of Med. (Summary)

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION – MEDICAL SCHOOL

Shurb v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston-School of Med., No. 4:13-CV-271 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part a state university medical school’s motion to dismiss discrimination claims brought by a medical student who suffered from obsessive-compulsive disorder, major depressive disorder, severe anxiety, panic attacks, and a history of migraines.  The medical student alleged several violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

The court dismissed all the state tort and breach of contract claims, holding that the medical school was immune from liability based on the Eleventh Amendment.  The court allowed the ADA claim to continue, stating that the student properly demonstrated that he had a disability that required accommodation and that some professors refused to grant those accommodations.

The district court also allowed the due process claims to stand, holding that the student supported his claims that he was subject to a number of unreasonable conditions upon his return to medical school following a medical leave of absence, including the demand that he provide full access to his medical records and psychiatrists’ notes. The court allowed the student’s request for reinstatement to the medical school to stand, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred only monetary damages.

Pisharodi v. Andrews (Summary)

MEDICAL STAFF HEARING – INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Pisharodi v. Andrews, No. 13-13-00027-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 2013)

The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the denial of a physician’s request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and temporary injunction against a hospital CEO individually and in her professional capacity, finding that the physician failed to provide any evidence of a probable, imminent and irreparable injury if the relief was not granted while he awaited a hearing regarding discipline, suspension, or termination.

The physician had asked the hospital’s medical executive committee to review the care provided by another physician at the hospital; however, as a result of that review, the medical executive committee made an adverse recommendation involving the plaintiff’s appointment and privileges.  The physician requested a fair hearing and then less than two weeks prior to the start of the hearing, sought an injunction in order to prepare.  While the lower court initially granted the TRO, it was later dissolved, which the appellate court found to be appropriate.