Molina v. Pocono Med. Ctr. (Summary)

ADA

Molina v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:11-2276 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied a medical center’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that there were unresolved factual issues concerning an employed nurse’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

The nurse was diagnosed with an autoimmune deficiency which caused her to frequently fall ill, including contracting pneumonia 16 times in a three-year period.  Because of this, the nurse took either vacation or medical leave a number of times throughout her employment.  During a period of Family Medical Leave Act leave after the nurse contracted MRSA pneumonia, the nurse’s treating physician wrote a note that she could return to work with certain accommodations, such as not being exposed to infected patients.  The nurse’s immediate supervisor refused to allow her to return to work as a nurse.  The nurse sued, claiming violations of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

The medical center filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the nurse was precluded from pursuing claims because in her application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”), she indicated that she was “unable to work.”  The medical center also argued that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not allowing the nurse to return to work.  The court disagreed, holding that the nurse’s SSDI claim did not preclude her ADA claim because the SSDI claim, as opposed to the ADA claim, did not take into account the possibility of a reasonable accommodation.

Further, the medical center’s unsupported assertions that it “clearly was not safe for [the nurse] to return to work” did not qualify as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action in the face of the nurse’s “ample evidence that she can perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodations.”

U.S. ex rel. Singh v. Bradford Regional Med. Ctr. –Aug. 2013 (Summary)

FALSE CLAIMS ACT

U.S. ex rel. Singh v. Bradford Regional Med. Ctr.
No. 04-186 Erie (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the United States’ claims of payment by mistake and unjust enrichment against a physician group which was involved in an equipment sublease with a hospital.  The government based its claims on allegations that the sublease violated the Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute.

The court granted the physician group’s motion to dismiss, “because the United States has failed to allege or show that the [physician group] received any direct or [in]direct mistaken payments from the government.”  Since this alone was grounds for dismissal, the court did not reach the physician group’s contention that the government’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  However, the court did give the government an opportunity to amend its complaint.

Gronemeyer v. Crossroads Cmty. Hosp. (Summary)

FALSE CLAIMS ACT – RETALIATION

Gronemeyer v. Crossroads Cmty. Hosp., No. 3:10-cv-00571-WDS-DGW (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted a hospital’s motion to dismiss a previously employed pathologist’s claim of retaliation in violation of the False Claims Act.

As a part of her employment, the pathologist served on the hospital’s Utilization Management Committee, Infection Control Committee, Medical Executive Committee, and Quality Improvement Committee.  Her responsibilities included reviewing records, approving transfusions, and conducting assessments of the medical necessity for transfusions.  While performing these duties, the pathologist allegedly discovered that the hospital was billing for unnecessary transfusions.  She claimed that the hospital terminated her in violation of the False Claims Act anti-retaliation provisions for reporting this to her superiors.

In ruling on the hospital’s motion to dismiss, the court found that the pathologist, as a “fraud-alert” employee, or one whose position involved investigating fraud, was held to a heightened notice standard.  Specifically, for the hospital to be on notice that the pathologist was engaged in protected conduct under the False Claims Act, the pathologist had to use words such as “illegal” or “unlawful” when reporting the allegations to her superiors.  This she did not do.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the pathologist’s retaliation claim.

Godbey v. Iredell Mem’l Hosp., Inc. (Summary)

ADA/REHABILITATION ACT

Godbey v. Iredell Mem’l Hosp., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-00004-RLV-DSC (W.D. N.C. Aug. 19, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted a hospital’s motion for summary judgment in a disability discrimination action brought by a hearing-impaired patient claiming that the hospital violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act.  The patient sought care at the hospital several times, informed the staff that he was deaf, and on at least one occasion requested an interpreter.  The patient never indicated that communicative attempts by the hospital staff, including written notes and engaging interpreters, were insufficient.  Nonetheless, he sued, claiming that the hospital’s “denial of interpretive services constituted intentional discrimination…in violation of the [Rehabilitation Act] and the ADA.”

The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.  The court held that monetary damages under the Rehabilitation Act were not warranted.  The hospital’s failure to provide an American Sign Language-fluent interpreter did not by itself suffice to maintain the patient’s claim of intentional discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act in the absence of evidence that the other accommodations the hospital made fell short of providing effective communication with the patient.  Injunctive relief under the ADA was, similarly, inappropriate, since the hospital subsequently amended its policy to have qualified interpreters more readily available to prevent a reoccurrence of the alleged violation of the ADA.

Eiland v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp. (Summary)

ADEA

Eiland v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., No. 4:12-CV-00192 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted a hospital’s motion for summary judgment in a suit brought by a formerly employed nurse, asserting a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).

The hospital terminated the nurse’s employment because of a “lengthy disciplinary record…for poor performance and being rude to patients.”  The hospital disciplined the nurse during her employment for, among other things, failing to remove an IV before a patient left the emergency room and failing to administer a medication prescribed by a physician for a life-threatening condition.  The hospital filed a motion to dismiss the nurse’s ADEA claim.  The court granted the motion.  In doing so, the court determined that the hospital had offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the nurse (the nurse’s lengthy disciplinary record) and the hospital’s proffered reason for termination was not a pretext for age discrimination.

Torres v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp. (Summary)

EMTALA

Torres v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp., No. C 12-6364 PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed several claims, including a claim under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), brought on behalf of a patient who died after presenting with alcohol withdrawal to a hospital’s emergency room.

While in the hospital’s emergency room, the patient was diagnosed with alcohol withdrawal, given one milligram of Lorazepam, instructed to go to a clinic the next day, and then discharged.  Instead of leaving the hospital, the patient went to the hospital’s cafeteria.  He was later forced to leave.  The next morning he was found in the hospital’s parking lot moaning and in distress.  The hospital’s nursing supervisor allegedly told the hospital’s staff that the patient was “not our problem” and instructed the staff to call 911.  The patient died in the hospital parking lot later that same morning.

The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the hospital failed to provide a medical screening examination under EMTALA by providing a “cursory lung exam” and that the hospital failed to stabilize the patient by only administering one milligram of Lorazepam.  The plaintiffs also argued that the hospital had a duty to perform a second screening on the patient when he remained on the hospital premises.  The hospital moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.  The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations regarding a failure to provide a medical screening examination under EMTALA were “wholly conclusory.” The allegations that one milligram of Lorazepam was insufficient to stabilize the decedent’s alcohol withdrawal were, likewise, conclusory and devoid of any factual support.  With respect to the allegations that the hospital had a duty to provide a second screening, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to provide any support for this theory, nor did they indicate when the duty was triggered.

U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc. (Summary)

FALSE CLAIMS ACT

U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 12-20314 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a complaint under the False Claims Act filed by a former employee of a health care vendor was deficient under an “implied false certification” theory because it failed to adequately allege that a contractual merchantability provision was a condition of payment.  The court found that the former employee’s allegations that merchantability was a “standard condition” of the vendor’s contracts with the government were deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 9(b).

The court noted that such conclusory allegations did not identify the contractual provisions regarding merchantability, nor did they identify how the vendor’s products deviated from the government’s specifications.  Also, the court did not address the former employee’s “worthless goods” theory because her complaint failed to plead it with the requisite particularity by not stating that any pump sold to the government over nine years was ever found to be deficient or worthless.

Genova v. Banner Health (Summary)

EMTALA

Genova v. Banner Health, No. 12-1314 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a physician could not state a claim under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) against a hospital after his services were discontinued following his complaints about overcrowding in the hospital’s emergency room.  The court noted that although EMTALA allows suits by individuals directly harmed by or retaliated against for reporting a failure of the hospital to stabilize, examine, or transfer a patient, the doctor instead complained about the hospital’s emergency room taking too many patients, the complete inverse of an EMTALA violation.

The physician’s argument that he was entitled to bring suit because he reported an impending EMTALA violation failed, as the statute only allows suits pertaining to existing violations and patient dumping, not alleged patient “hoarding.” Finally, the physician waived any right to his state claims in contract and tort because he had signed a separate agreement with the hospital releasing those claims.

Love v. The Permanente Med. Grp. (Summary)

PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE

Love v. The Permanente Med. Grp., No. C-12-05679 DMR (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a chemical dependency therapist’s motion to compel a hospital to respond to discovery requests because federal privilege law, not the California peer review privilege, applied to the therapist’s request for documents relating to her credentials and privileges.  Also, documents regarding the therapist’s supervisor were not confidential and all documents relating to the therapist’s performance in the hospital were relevant to her claim that she was terminated without just cause in breach of her collective bargaining agreement.

Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc. (Summary)

COMMERCIAL DISPARAGEMENT

Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., Civ. Action No. 4:13-cv-1054 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted an Illinois nonprofit corporation’s motion to dismiss an association member’s claims of tortious interference with prospective business relations and economic advantage and breach of the corporation’s bylaws, finding that the member failed to allege falsity or malice, elements which are necessary to satisfy a commercial disparagement claim, when the corporation published the member’s notice of censure for violating the corporation’s Rules on Expert Opinion Services on its website.

Also, the court dismissed the member’s breach of contract claim because, based on Texas law, judicial intervention was inappropriate when dealing with the internal affairs of a private association and members of the association subject themselves, within legal limits, to the association’s power to administer and make rules.

Follow-up opinion: 

Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1054 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014), in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.