Schmitt v. Meritcare Health Sys. (Summary)

DEFAMATION

Schmitt v. Meritcare Health Sys., No. 20130013 (N.D. July 22, 2013)

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed a lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a hospital, holding that the physician’s allegations that the hospital’s responses to a credentialing questionnaire were defamatory failed to state a claim. The court found that the hospital could not be held liable for the statements it made in the questionnaire, which the physician admitted were “technically true,” and did not fit within any of the defamatory meanings under state law. The court also rejected the physician’s claim that the hospital and an unrelated clinic conspired to prevent him from obtaining privileges at other hospitals.

Connors v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr. (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Connors v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., Nos. 2:10-cv-94, 2:12-cv-51 (D. Vt. July 11, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied, in part, a medical center’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a psychiatry resident had stated a claim under the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (“VFEPA”).

The resident had advised the medical center, at the time of her initial appointment, that she had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), and requested reasonable accommodations.  Although the medical center granted her request, the resident alleged that during one of her off-site rotations the accommodations were not actually provided and as a result her symptoms emerged.

The resident was placed on a leave.  She agreed to a remediation plan which she completed.  When the resident subsequently returned to the off-site rotation, it was alleged that the accommodations were not made available to her.  Concerns about the resident’s performance were raised again.  She was allowed to complete her current year of training, but her contract for the upcoming year was not extended.

The program director provided the resident with a favorable reference and she completed her training at another program.  Subsequently, she sued alleging disability discrimination and illegal retaliation under VFEPA, breach of contract, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The court found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the medical center terminated the resident’s employment because she suffered from ADHD.  “Whether [the medical center’s] reasons for terminating her residency were a pretext for discrimination on the basis of disability cannot be resolved at summary judgment.”  Similarly, the court found that there was at least minimal evidence of a causal connection between the program director’s desire to terminate the resident’s participation in the residency program and his hostility toward her claim of disability, so the claim for retaliation would have to be decided by a jury.

Brough-Stevenson v. Cmty. Emergency Med. Assocs. (Summary)

DEFAMATION

Brough-Stevenson v. Cmty. Emergency Med. Assocs., F063875 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2013)

The Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of California affirmed the lower court’s holding in favor of an emergency room physician agreeing that the statements made by hospital administrators to the physician’s employer, Emergency Medical Associates (“Group”), about the physician were not protected under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.  The hospital and the Group argued that the statements at issue were made in the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest.  Specifically, they argued that the statements made about the physician related to her willingness and ability to effectively serve as an ED physician and that this affected the quality and accessibility of health care.  The court disagreed.

Instead, the court found that the statements were more in the nature of a private workplace dispute because the statements dealt primarily with the physician’s personality and profitability.  The court was not persuaded that concerns about the physician’s lack of efficiency, or that she was difficult to work with, were matters of public interest sufficient to trigger the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute.  In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on statements made by the hospital that the physician was competent and qualified.  The decision to deny the motion to strike the physician’s complaint was upheld.

Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l. Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall (Summary)

BYLAWS/CONTRACT

Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l. Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall, No. A12-2117 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2013)

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of the medical center, finding that the medical staff was not a separate legal entity and therefore lacked the capacity to sue or be sued.  The appeals court also found that the medical staff bylaws did not create a contractual relationship between the medical staff and the medical center.

The medical staff brought an action seeking to have the court declare that a medical staff has standing and capacity to sue.  The appeals court, in agreement with the trial court, found that under Minnesota law unincorporated associations, like the medical staff, do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.  The medical staff also sought to enjoin the medical center from repealing the existing bylaws and imposing new bylaws, claiming that the bylaws constitute an enforceable contract.  However, the appeals court held that the medical center retained authority to unilaterally modify the bylaws and that the bylaws are not a contract.

Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp. — July 2013 (Summary)

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp.
No. CIV 12-1012 (D. S.D. July 2, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota ruled that a pathologist was an independent contractor, not an employee, and granted summary judgment to the hospital defendant on the pathologist’s claims that his employment was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Family Medical Leave Act.

Neely v. Wilson (Summary)

DEFAMATION

Neely v. Wilson, No. 11-0228 (Tex. June 28, 2013)

The Supreme Court of Texas reversed summary judgment in favor of a media company on a physician’s claim that a broadcast regarding disciplinary action taken by the state Medical Board against him was defamatory.  The supreme court ruled that there was a fact issue regarding the truth or falsity of the gist of the broadcast that the physician was disciplined for operating on patients while taking or using dangerous drugs or controlled substances, precluding summary judgment.  The court sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co. (Summary)

RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co., No. 12-3062 (DSD/JJK) (D. Minn. July 2, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that a hospitalist who was terminated after three months pled sufficient facts to withstand the hospital defendant’s motion to dismiss his claims of retaliatory discharge in violation of the False Claims Act, EMTALA and the Minnesota Whistleblower’s Act.  The court dismissed the hospitalist’s breach of contract claim based on language in the hospital’s Integrity and Compliance Policy, ruling that it was no more than a general statement of policy and did not meet the contractual requirements for an offer.  The court also dismissed the hospitalist’s claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Hamdan v. Ind. Univ. Health N. (Summary)

HCQIA IMMUNITY/PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY

Hamdan v. Ind. Univ. Health N., No. 1:13-cv-195-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied a hospital’s motion to dismiss a doctor’s claims asserting violation of a contractual relationship and defamation.  The court held that whether the bylaws created a contractual relationship is a fact question that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.  Likewise, the court rejected the defendants’ claims that they were entitled to dismissal based on HCQIA immunity, the Indiana peer review statute immunity or qualified immunity, noting that immunity does not extend under any of those to persons with knowledge of falsity or malice and a lack of good faith, all of which the physician alleged.

Liberty Univ. v. Lew (Summary)

PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

Liberty Univ. v. Lew, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. July 11, 2013)

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s challenge to the “individual mandate” and the “employer mandate” in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, upholding the constitutionality of both mandates.

Shekhawat v. Jones (Summary)

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Shekhawat v. Jones, No. S12G0552 (Ga. July 11, 2013)

The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether physicians who were employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia were entitled to official immunity in a malpractice lawsuit.  Because the court found that the physicians were acting within the scope of their employment while rendering the medical care that was the subject of the malpractice suit, the court held that the physicians were entitled to official immunity.  The court explained that, under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, ‘where a state employee commits a tort while acting within the scope of his employment with the State, the State through the employing government agency may be held liable, but the individual state employee may not.”