Connors v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr. (Summary)

DISCRIMINATION

Connors v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., Nos. 2:10-cv-94, 2:12-cv-51 (D. Vt. July 11, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied, in part, a medical center’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a psychiatry resident had stated a claim under the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (“VFEPA”).

The resident had advised the medical center, at the time of her initial appointment, that she had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), and requested reasonable accommodations.  Although the medical center granted her request, the resident alleged that during one of her off-site rotations the accommodations were not actually provided and as a result her symptoms emerged.

The resident was placed on a leave.  She agreed to a remediation plan which she completed.  When the resident subsequently returned to the off-site rotation, it was alleged that the accommodations were not made available to her.  Concerns about the resident’s performance were raised again.  She was allowed to complete her current year of training, but her contract for the upcoming year was not extended.

The program director provided the resident with a favorable reference and she completed her training at another program.  Subsequently, she sued alleging disability discrimination and illegal retaliation under VFEPA, breach of contract, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The court found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the medical center terminated the resident’s employment because she suffered from ADHD.  “Whether [the medical center’s] reasons for terminating her residency were a pretext for discrimination on the basis of disability cannot be resolved at summary judgment.”  Similarly, the court found that there was at least minimal evidence of a causal connection between the program director’s desire to terminate the resident’s participation in the residency program and his hostility toward her claim of disability, so the claim for retaliation would have to be decided by a jury.

Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l. Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall (Summary)

BYLAWS/CONTRACT

Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l. Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall, No. A12-2117 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2013)

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of the medical center, finding that the medical staff was not a separate legal entity and therefore lacked the capacity to sue or be sued.  The appeals court also found that the medical staff bylaws did not create a contractual relationship between the medical staff and the medical center.

The medical staff brought an action seeking to have the court declare that a medical staff has standing and capacity to sue.  The appeals court, in agreement with the trial court, found that under Minnesota law unincorporated associations, like the medical staff, do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.  The medical staff also sought to enjoin the medical center from repealing the existing bylaws and imposing new bylaws, claiming that the bylaws constitute an enforceable contract.  However, the appeals court held that the medical center retained authority to unilaterally modify the bylaws and that the bylaws are not a contract.

Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp. — July 2013 (Summary)

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp.
No. CIV 12-1012 (D. S.D. July 2, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota ruled that a pathologist was an independent contractor, not an employee, and granted summary judgment to the hospital defendant on the pathologist’s claims that his employment was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Family Medical Leave Act.

Neely v. Wilson (Summary)

DEFAMATION

Neely v. Wilson, No. 11-0228 (Tex. June 28, 2013)

The Supreme Court of Texas reversed summary judgment in favor of a media company on a physician’s claim that a broadcast regarding disciplinary action taken by the state Medical Board against him was defamatory.  The supreme court ruled that there was a fact issue regarding the truth or falsity of the gist of the broadcast that the physician was disciplined for operating on patients while taking or using dangerous drugs or controlled substances, precluding summary judgment.  The court sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co. (Summary)

RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co., No. 12-3062 (DSD/JJK) (D. Minn. July 2, 2013)

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that a hospitalist who was terminated after three months pled sufficient facts to withstand the hospital defendant’s motion to dismiss his claims of retaliatory discharge in violation of the False Claims Act, EMTALA and the Minnesota Whistleblower’s Act.  The court dismissed the hospitalist’s breach of contract claim based on language in the hospital’s Integrity and Compliance Policy, ruling that it was no more than a general statement of policy and did not meet the contractual requirements for an offer.  The court also dismissed the hospitalist’s claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Hamdan v. Ind. Univ. Health N. (Summary)

HCQIA IMMUNITY/PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY

Hamdan v. Ind. Univ. Health N., No. 1:13-cv-195-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied a hospital’s motion to dismiss a doctor’s claims asserting violation of a contractual relationship and defamation.  The court held that whether the bylaws created a contractual relationship is a fact question that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.  Likewise, the court rejected the defendants’ claims that they were entitled to dismissal based on HCQIA immunity, the Indiana peer review statute immunity or qualified immunity, noting that immunity does not extend under any of those to persons with knowledge of falsity or malice and a lack of good faith, all of which the physician alleged.

Liberty Univ. v. Lew (Summary)

PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

Liberty Univ. v. Lew, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. July 11, 2013)

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s challenge to the “individual mandate” and the “employer mandate” in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, upholding the constitutionality of both mandates.

Shekhawat v. Jones (Summary)

OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Shekhawat v. Jones, No. S12G0552 (Ga. July 11, 2013)

The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether physicians who were employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia were entitled to official immunity in a malpractice lawsuit.  Because the court found that the physicians were acting within the scope of their employment while rendering the medical care that was the subject of the malpractice suit, the court held that the physicians were entitled to official immunity.  The court explained that, under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, ‘where a state employee commits a tort while acting within the scope of his employment with the State, the State through the employing government agency may be held liable, but the individual state employee may not.”

Oladeinde v. Cameron Mem’l Cmty. Hosp. (Summary)

DUE PROCESS/STATE ACTION

Oladeinde v. Cameron Mem’l Cmty. Hosp., No. 1:12-CV-359-TLS (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2013)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted a hospital’s motion for partial dismissal of a physician’s claim that the hospital discriminated against him based on race and violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the fact that the hospital was not a state actor and did not engage in state action.  The court also denied the plaintiff’s request that the court hold the hospital in contempt for “indirectly” violating a TRO by providing employment information to nine hospitals where the plaintiff had sought employment, noting that the plaintiff had specifically consented to the release of the information.

Bower v. Henry Cnty. Hosp. (Summary)

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Bower v. Henry Cnty. Hosp., No. 13-12-46 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 2013)

The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed summary judgment in favor of a hospital that was sued by a physician for gender discrimination under Ohio law.  The appeals court agreed with the lower court’s conclusion based on an examination of ten factors derived from case law that an employer-employee relationship did not exist between the hospital and physician. The court found that the hospital had very little control over the manner in which the doctor practiced medicine, and a physician corporation paid her salary, withheld her taxes, and provided her employment benefits, all of which supported a finding that the doctor was not the hospital’s employee.