Mayo Collaborative Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r of Rev.

State Taxation

Mayo Collaborative Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r of Rev., No. A04-2190
(Minn. June 30, 2005)

A medical reference laboratory challenged the constitutionality
of a state tax on the gross revenues of health care providers. In order to
avoid "pyramiding" tax
liability, the state statute provided a resale exemption that permitted providers
to exclude revenues for services that would be taxed again after being resold
by other in-state providers. The laboratory argued that the tax imposed an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce because it allowed an exemption for intrastate
transactions but not for interstate transactions. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
disagreed, finding the statute did not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce. The court also found the tax revenue exemption was consistent with
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

 

Mattice v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend

Mattice v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend,
No. 3:98-CV-0303RM (N.D. Ind. Jan. 19, 2000)

Plaintiff, an anesthesiologist
at defendant hospital, was hospitalized and treated for a panic disorder and
major depression. He took a four-month medical leave of absence and then returned
to work without restrictions. In 1996 the plaintiff was suspended after a patient
died in the operating room while the plaintiff was supervising the anesthesia.
Following a peer review hearing, the Board agreed to lift the suspension conditioned
on monitoring and testing relating to the plaintiff’s mental health history.
Plaintiff claimed that these requirements made it impossible for him to resume
his duties and filed suit alleging disability discrimination in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

 

The court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim stating that in
order to state a claim, the plaintiff’s complaint
must contain “more than a mere assertion that
an employer regards an employee as substantially
limited in a major life activity. . . . To be
substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, one must be precluded from more than one
type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job
of choice.” The court held that the plaintiff’s
complaint was deficient because he failed to allege
that the hospital believed that he was
“substantially limited” in a major life
activity, that is, unable to work in a broad class
of jobs.

Maviglia v. West Bloomfield Nursing & Convalescent Ctr.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

GERMAINE J. MAVIGLIA,

v

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 2004

No. 248796
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-041739-NH

WEST BLOOMFIELD NURSING &
CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC.,
BEAUMONT NURSING HOME SERVICES,
INC., and WEST BLOOMFIELD NURSING &
CONVALESCENT CENTER JOINT VENTURE,

Before: Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants-Appellants.

Defendants appeal by leave granted the order granting plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery of incident reports at defendants’ nursing home. In the course of this negligence
action, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request for discovery of incident reports related to her
residency at the nursing home. We hold that because the incident reports are data collected for
the purposes of professional review, they should not be subject to discovery in a
negligence/malpractice case. Accordingly, we reverse. This appeal is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute. In re Lieberman, 250 Mich App
381, 386; 646 NW2d 149 (2002). MCL 333.20175(8) provides:

The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or
committees assigned a professional review function in a health facility or agency,
or an institution of higher education in this state that has colleges of osteopathic
and human medicine, are confidential, shall be used only for the purposes
provided in this article, are not public records, and are not subject to court
subpoena.

And MCL 333.21515, which is applicable to hospitals, similarly provides:

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The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or
committees assigned a review function described in this article are confidential
and shall be used only for the purposes provided in this article, shall not be public
records, and shall not be available for court subpoena.

In Lieberman, supra at 387, this Court explained the purpose and intent of §21515 as follows:

The clear language of § 21515 provides: (1) peer review information is
confidential, (2) peer review information is to be used “only for the purposes
provided in this article,” (3) peer review information is not to be a public record,
and (4) peer review information is not subject to subpoena. Section 21515
demonstrates that the Legislature has imposed a comprehensive ban on the
disclosure of any information collected by, or records of the proceedings of,
committees assigned a professional review function in hospitals and health
facilities. If the specific mention of a court subpoena meant that the privilege
existed only as a defense against a subpoena, the statute’s general language
stating that peer review materials are confidential would become nearly
meaningless. Although the statute does not refer to search warrants, it would be
inconsistent with the stated purposes of the privilege to find that peer review
information could be obtained pursuant to an investigatory search warrant. The
protection against discovery through subpoena would effectively evaporate if an
investigator needed only to obtain a search warrant instead.

Underscoring the high level of confidentiality attendant to peer review
documents is the statutory admonishment that such information is to be used only
for the reasons set forth in the legislative article including that privilege.
[Emphasis in original.]

Plaintiff’s reliance on Centennial Healthcare Mgt Corp v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry

Services, 254 Mich App 275, 290; 657 NW2d 746 (2002), is misplaced. In that case, this Court
found that the incident reports, accident reports, and other records prepared in compliance with
the administrative rules, which contained only factual information rather than the assessments of
the peer review committee, were not within the scope of the privilege. The Centennial Court
explained:

Certainly, in the abstract, a peer review committee cannot properly review
performance in a facility without hard facts at its disposal. However, it is not the
facts themselves that are at the heart of the peer review process. Rather, it is what
is done with those facts that is essential to the internal review process, i.e., a
candid assessment of what those facts indicate, and the best way to improve the
situation represented by those facts. Simply put, the logic of the principle of
confidentiality in the peer review context does not require construing the limits of
the privilege to cover any and all factual material that is assembled at the direction
of a peer review committee. [Id. at 290.]

We agree with defendants that this reasoning should be limited to the context of where the state
agency responsible for regulating nursing homes requires the collection of incident and accident
information:

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In the context of the circumstances in the case at bar, it is true that
Westgate’s peer review committee could not effectively do its work without
collecting basic information about the various incidents and accidents that occur
at a nursing home. However, it is not the existence of the facts of an incident or
accident that must be kept confidential in order for the committee to effectuate its
purpose; it is how the committee discusses, deliberates, evaluates, and judges
those facts that the privilege is designed to protect. We conclude that in order to
effectuate other purposes outlined in the Public Health Code–especially those
involving licensing–the statutory peer review privilege outlined in subsection
21075(8) is not undermined by administrative rules requiring a nursing home to
keep and make available for review and copying incident reports and accident
records that contain basic factual material but do not require the reporting of the
internal deliberative process of a peer review committee. [Id. at 291].

The Centennial Court’s decision and reasoning is not applicable where, as here, the party

seeking disclosure of the information is a private litigant. MCL 333.20175(8) clearly bars
release of the “records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or committees
assigned a professional review function in a health facility.” The accompanying regulation, 1979
AACS, R 325.21101, also relied on by plaintiff, provides that accident records and incident
reports shall be kept in the home and shall be available to the director or his or her authorized
representative for review and copying if necessary. But the rule only authorizes copying of the
reports by the director or an authorized representative. It does not indicate that the reports
should be available for copying by anyone else.

Reversed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski

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Maysville Anesthesia Serv. v. Meadowview Reg’l Med. Ctr.

EXCLUSIVE CONTRACT

Maysville Anesthesia Serv. v.
Meadowview Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. Civ.A. 03-79-DLB (E.D.Ky. Mar. 31, 2006)

The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held that
a Hospital acted properly when it terminated an anesthesia services contract.
In cooperation with the Hospital, an anesthesiologist and a certified registered
nurse anesthetist (CRNA) created a professional service corporation. The
Hospital then executed an exclusive anesthesia services agreement with that
corporation. The relationship between the anesthesiologist and CRNA deteriorated
and the corporation allegedly failed to provide the Hospital adequate coverage
for all of its operating rooms. After the Hospital exercised its right to
terminate the agreement, the anesthesiologist brought numerous claims against
the Hospital and the CRNA, alleging, among other things, breach of contract
and civil conspiracy. The district court granted the Hospital’s motion for
summary judgment on all claims, finding that the Hospital acted in accordance
with the terms of the anesthesia services agreement.

 

Matus v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville (Summary)

Matus v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,  No. M2002-01407-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2003)

The parents of an infant who died during childbirth sued the hospital under the doctrine of respondeat superior, claiming that the hospital was liable for the negligence of its employed nurses. Shortly before trial, the parents settled their case against the nurses, but were permitted by the trial court to amend their complaint to name an additional nurse as a defendant. At trial, the hospital was found partially liable for the death of the infant. The hospital appealed, arguing that the parents should not have been permitted to amend their complaint on the eve of trial. The Court of Appeals for Tennessee ruled in favor of the parents, finding that the hospital had failed to identify any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s ruling, and had failed to ask that the trial be delayed
so that it could respond to the addition of the new defendant.

Maviglia v. West Bloomfield Nursing & Convalescent Ctr.

PEER REVIEW CONFIDENTIALITY

Maviglia v. West Bloomfield
Nursing & Convalescent Ctr., Inc., No. 248796
(Mich. App. Nov. 9, 2004)

The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed a trial court’s decision
granting a nursing home resident’s request for incident reports from
the nursing home and held that the legislative intent behind Michigan law bars
release of records, data, and knowledge collected for, or by, individuals or
committees assigned a professional review function in a health facility. It
held that incident reports collected for such professional review activities
are not subject to discovery in a negligence/malpractice action.

Mazurkiewicz v. Doylestown Hosp.

EMTALA

Mazurkiewicz v. Doylestown Hosp.,
No. 01-CV-5418 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2004)

The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed
an EMTALA claim filed by a patient against a hospital.

The patient presented to the hospital’s emergency room and
was admitted for airway observation after a CT scan and fine needle aspiration
were performed in an effort to rule out a pharyngeal abscess. After being discharged
from the hospital five days later, the patient went to a different hospital
where an abscess was diagnosed and surgically drained.

After considering EMTALA’s statutory language, legislative
history, and interpretation by the First and Sixth Circuits, the court held
that admission of a patient to the hospital is a valid defense to an EMTALA
claim so long as the admission is not used as a subterfuge to avoid responsibility
under EMTALA.

 

Maury County v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization (Summary)

Maury County v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, No. M2002-00501-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2003)

A large, nonprofit hospital located in one county purchased a smaller, for-profit specialty hospital located in another county in its region. The purpose of the purchase was to allow the nonprofit hospital to continue to offer both primary and specialty care in the region. The nonprofit hospital applied to have the for-profit hospital, now owned by a nonprofit, exempted from property tax. Tax exemption was denied by several venues, based on the fact that the specialty hospital was located outside of the county in which the nonprofit hospital sat. The nonprofit appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that because the mission of the Hospital included the public purpose of providing medical care to the region, and not just the county in which the hospital sat, the hospital was exempt from ad valorem property tax.

Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Ass’n of Pittsburgh

Discrimination

Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Ass’n of Pittsburgh,
No. 2:04 CV 1880 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 21, 2005)

A physician brought suit against an
emergency medical association, a hospital, and her former supervisor, alleging
age and gender discrimination as well as various state tort claims. The physician’s
discrimination claims arose from alleged discrimination throughout her employment
that included a denial of a promotion in 1997, denial of a request for a
raise, unfair pay practices, and termination. In addressing the physician’s
federal claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the court stated
the rule that an individual is only allowed 300 days from the date of the alleged
discrimination to file a charge of employment discrimination, unless the individual
can show that the discriminatory act was part of an ongoing practice or pattern
of discrimination. Furthermore, individual acts such as termination and failure
to promote constitute severable unlawful employment purposes. Therefore, the
court held that the physician could not now bring suit for the 1997 failure
to promote because it was a separate action and the 300-day window had expired.
However, the district court held that the physician’s discriminatory claims
in regard to the unfair payment practices should survive summary judgment,
as they do evidence an ongoing practice of discrimination. Furthermore, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary
judgment on the physician’s claim that the hospital had violated the Equal
Pay Act because the physician had been denied a $5,000 yearly bonus paid to
all but one other physician even though her performance records showed equal
skill, effort, and care in regard to patients.

 

 

Mazurkiewicz v. Doylestown Hosp.,

Mazurkiewicz v. Doylestown Hosp.,
No. 01-CV-5418 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2002)

The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined
to dismiss a claim by a man who was discharged from a hospital before his condition
had stabilized, allegedly in violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"). He was admitted to the hospital for several
days after being seen in the emergency department, but his actual condition
was not diagnosed accurately until after his discharge, when he went to another
hospital’s emergency room. The court held that it could not dismiss the EMTALA
portion of the complaint because it was "possible" for the patient
to show that the first hospital "actually diagnosed him with the
emergency medical condition." The claim against the individual doctor,
an ENT specialist, was dismissed, as EMTALA does not provide a civil action
against a doctor.