Bitner v. Pekin Memorial Hospital
Bitner v. Pekin Memorial Hospital, No. 3-00-0180
3rd District, 22 December 2000
CHRISTOPHER BITNER and TARA BITNER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PEKIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee. | Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit Tazewell 99–L–150 Honorable Robert A. Barnes, Judge, Presiding |
JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs Christopher and Tara Bitner challenge the trial court’s dismissal
of a complaint they filed against defendant Pekin Memorial Hospital (Pekin
Memorial or the hospital) under the AIDS Confidentiality Act (Act)(410 ILCS
305/1 et seq. (West 1998)). We affirm and hold that the Act does
not create a cause of action for a law enforcement officer who seeks disclosure
of a suspect’s human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) test results.
Christopher Bitner is a City of Pekin police officer. On January 24, 1999,
during the course of an arrest, he was involved in a fracas in which both he and
a suspect, whom he was attempting to subdue, were cut and bleeding. Bitner and
the suspect were taken to Pekin Memorial for HIV tests. Bitner requested that
the hospital release the results of the suspect’s HIV test to him, his
department or his doctor. After repeatedly refusing, Pekin Memorial complied
with Bitner’s request on February 24, 1999. The results of the suspect’s test
were negative.
Plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint against the hospital, alleging
intentional and, in the alternative, reckless and/or negligent violation of the
Act. The complaint also alleged intentional and, in the alternative, negligent
infliction of emotional distress based upon the alleged violation of the Act.
Each of the counts alleged by Chris was accompanied by a derivative loss of
consortium count filed by Tara.
Pekin Memorial moved to dismiss under section 2–615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 1998)), arguing that (1) the Act does
not mandate disclosure of test results to law enforcement officers; and (2)
there is no time frame for disclosure established by the Act. The trial court
granted the hospital’s motion and plaintiffs now appeal.
ANALYSIS
The judicial role in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent
and give it effect. Midstate Siding & Window Company, Inc. v. Rogers,
309 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 722 N.E.2d 1156, 1157-58 (1999). In so doing, a court
should consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language in the
overall context of the reason and necessity for the statute and its stated
purpose. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 282
Ill. App. 3d 672, 676, 669 N.E.2d 628, 630-31 (1996). The
construction of a statute is a question of law which, like a trial court’s
decision to grant a section 2–615 motion to dismiss, we review de
novo. Ciccone v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d
738, 740, 731 N.E.2d 312, 315 (2000)(motion to dismiss); TTX Co. v.
Whitley, 313 Ill. App. 3d 536, 542, 729 N.E.2d 844, 849 (2000)(statutory
construction).
The purpose of the Act is to protect the public health “by facilitating
informed, voluntary and confidential use of tests designed to reveal HIV
infection.” 410 ILCS 305/2(3) (West 1998). The Act indicates that the
confidentiality requirement was needed because many members of the public are
deterred from seeking HIV testing by concern that their test results will be
disclosed without their consent. 410 ILCS 305/2(2) (West 1998). The Act
therefore provides that individuals tested for HIV may remain anonymous by
executing a written informed consent which dissociates individual identity from
requests for testing and from test results. 410 ILCS 305/6 (West 1998).
The written consent of an individual, however, is not required when that
individual may have exposed a law enforcement officer, acting in the line of
duty, to the HIV virus. 410 ILCS 305/7(c) (West 1998). Section 9, which controls
disclosure under the Act, reflects this difference in consent requirements by
providing:
“No person may disclose or be compelled to disclose the
identity of any person *** or the results of *** a test *** except to the
following persons:
* * *
(i) Any law enforcement officer *** involved in the line of duty
in [an incident] *** that may transmit HIV.” (Emphasis added.) 410 ILCS
305/9(i) (West 1998).
To compel compliance, the Act affords a right of action to any person
aggrieved by a violation of its provisions. 410 ILCS 305/13 (West 1998).
Plaintiffs contend that section 9(i) creates a right of action for a law
enforcement officer who is denied access to a suspect’s test results. We
disagree. It is apparent that the goal of the Act is to protect the
confidentiality of HIV test results so that the public will not be deterred from
engaging in testing. The consent requirement and disclosure provision further
this goal. Although the Act provides an exception to the disclosure provision
for law enforcement officers who may have been infected with the HIV virus by a
suspect, this does not change the nature of the Act.
Plaintiffs seek to transform the Act into a mechanism that mandates a breach
of confidentiality in certain circumstances. Their interpretation, however, is
belied by the statutory language. The operative word of the disclosure provision
is the term “may.” 410 ILCS 305/9(i) (West 1998). The provision does not require
that a law enforcement officer receive a suspect’s test result. It only
authorizes disclosure of the results. Consequently, plaintiffs’ interpretation
of the Act is thwarted not only by the professed statutory purpose, but also by
its plain language.
We now turn to plaintiffs? claims of intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. In Majca v. Beekil, 183 Ill. 2d 407, 701 N.E.2d 1084
(1998), the court held that, without proof of actual exposure to HIV, a common
law claim for fear of contacting AIDS is too speculative to be legally
cognizable. Majca, 183 Ill. 2d at 420, 701 N.E.2d at 1090. Plaintiffs
acknowledge this barrier to their cause and premise their emotional distress
claims upon the alleged statutory violation discussed above. Having found that
plaintiffs have no right of action under the Act, their emotional distress
claims must also fail.
Because all of Christopher’s claims are without merit, Tara’s claims for loss
of consortium, which are founded upon Christopher’s, are equally untenable.
In sum, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs? complaint pursuant to
section 2–615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 1998)) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell
County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SLATER, P.J., concurring.