Copeland v. MidMichigan Reg’l Med. Ctr. (Summary)

RELEASE FORMS

Copeland v. MidMichigan Reg’l Med. Ctr., Docket No. 314880 (Mich. Ct. App. June 5, 2014)

The Court of Appeals of Michigan ruled that a release form signed by a physician as part of his application for appointment and clinical privileges barred his claim against a hospital for defamation. The court also ruled against the physician on his claims for disability discrimination and breach of contract.

The dispute between the hospital and physician arose after an anonymous individual at the hospital alleged that a neurosurgeon was “slurring his speech and acting erratically” during surgery. The hospital issued a precautionary suspension and required the physician to participate in a substance abuse assessment program. He was found not to have an impairment. The neurosurgeon sued the hospital for breach of contract, defamation, and discrimination under the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Act. In addition, he sued the anonymous informant for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship.

The trial court concluded that the neurosurgeon’s defamation and tortious interference claims were barred by a release agreement he had signed as part of his application for clinical privileges. This release agreement extended immunity to the hospital for all claims related to summary suspensions or matters of professional competence. Although these claims were unsuccessful, the neurosurgeon was able to compel the hospital to disclose the informant’s identity during discovery. The trial court ruled that Michigan’s peer review statute did not protect the informant’s identity, as it was considered background information and was not part of the peer review deliberations.

The court’s analysis of the neurosurgeon’s disability discrimination claim was slightly more complicated. The neurosurgeon had argued that the hospital discriminated against him because he suffered from hepatitis C. To win on his claim of discrimination, the neurosurgeon needed to prove that his disability was not related to his ability to use privileges at the hospital. The trial court ruled that hepatitis C was related to his ability to use privileges, as the condition had forced him to take time off from work in the past. The appellate court disagreed, ruling the hospital clearly did not regard the neurosurgeon as disabled, since it had reinstated him with full medical privileges despite his hepatitis C-related leave of absence. The appellate court concluded that the hospital had suspended the physician on the basis of perceived substance abuse, which is not a disability under the Persons with Disabilities Act.

Lastly, the court ruled that the neurosurgeon’s remaining breach of contract claim was barred by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act.