Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
September 6, 2007 Session

JOHN P. KONVALINKA v. CHATTANOOGA-HAMILTON COUNTY
HOSPITAL AUTHORITY

Appeal by permission from the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section
Chancery Court for Hamilton County
No. 05-1155 W. Frank Brown, III, Chancellor

No. E2006-00064-SC-R11-CV – Filed February 13, 2008

This appeal involves a civil contempt proceeding originating in the Court of Appeals. The
intermediate appellate court granted an interlocutory appeal to address a discovery dispute in a
lawsuit between a physician and a public hospital regarding the physician’s staff privileges. In its
order granting the interlocutory appeal, the court stayed “all proceedings below” while the appeal
was pending. Despite the stay order, one of the physician’s lawyers, being represented by the other,
filed suit in his own name in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County seeking access to the records
involved in the discovery dispute, as well as other records, under Tennessee’s public records statutes.
The hospital filed a motion with the intermediate appellate court requesting that the attorneys be held
in contempt for willfully disobeying its stay order. The intermediate appellate court found that the
attorneys had willfully violated the stay order and, therefore, that they were in direct civil contempt.
The court also ordered the attorneys to pay the hospital’s attorney’s fees relating to the contempt
proceeding. We granted the attorneys’ application for permission to appeal to determine whether
the Court of Appeals properly held the attorneys in contempt. The intermediate appellate court’s
stay order can reasonably be interpreted to apply only to the pending legal and administrative
proceedings between the physician and the hospital. Therefore, the record does not support the
Court of Appeals’ finding that the attorneys willfully violated its stay order when they filed the
separate public records suit against the hospital.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed

WILL IAM C. KOCH , JR ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILL IAM M. BARKER , C.J.,
JAN ICE M. HOLDER , CORNEL IA A. CLARK , and GARY R. WADE , JJ., joined.

William T. Ramsey, Nashville, Tennessee, Jennifer H. Lawrence and Mathew D. Brownfield,
Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, John P. Konvalinka.

Fred H. Moore, Joseph R. White, and James H. Payne, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee,
Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, d/b/a Erlanger Hospital.

OPINION

Dr. Alexander A. Stratienko and Dr. Van Stephen Monroe are cardiologists with medical
1
staff privileges at Erlanger Hospital in Chattanooga. On September 16, 2004, they were involved
in an altercation in the break room of the hospital’s cardiac catheterization laboratory. Based on a
report that Dr. Stratienko had “hit, pushed or shoved” Dr. Monroe, the Chattanooga-Hamilton
County Hospital Authority, the owner and operator of Erlanger Hospital, summarily suspended Dr.
Stratienko’s staff privileges.

Dr. Stratienko retained Chattanooga lawyers, John P. Konvalinka and Jennifer H. Lawrence,
to contest the suspension of his staff privileges. On September 20, 2004, the attorneys filed suit in
the Circuit Court for Hamilton County against the Hospital Authority and others. The suit requested
2
the trial court to enjoin the suspension of Dr. Stratienko’s privileges. The circuit court issued an
ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting the Hospital Authority and the hospital from
suspending Dr. Stratienko’s staff privileges pending a hearing. Several days later, the hospital’s
Credentials Committee and its Medical Executive Committee reviewed the matter and decided to
suspend Dr. Stratienko’s privileges. In a letter dated September 27, 2004, the Hospital Authority
informed Dr. Stratienko that his staff privileges would be suspended, that he would be required to
apologize to Dr. Monroe, and that he would be required to be evaluated by the Tennessee Medical
Foundation’s Physicians Health Program. The letter also informed Dr. Stratienko of his
administrative appeal rights and that the suspension would be held in abeyance pending the
resolution of the temporary restraining order.

The Hospital Authority later filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and
to assess monetary damages against Dr. Stratienko. The circuit court, however, declined to rule on
the motion until Dr. Stratienko had an opportunity to conduct discovery. During the discovery
process, Dr. Stratienko requested the Hospital Authority to provide him, among other things, with
information concerning Dr. Monroe’s credentials. The Hospital Authority declined to produce the
requested information on the ground that it was protected from disclosure by the Tennessee Peer
3
Review Law of 1967. Dr. Stratienko filed a motion to compel the production of these records. The
circuit court denied the motion but granted Dr. Stratienko permission to pursue an interlocutory

A t o n e t im e , b o th D r . S tra tie n k o a n d D r . M o n ro e w e re a f f i l ia te d w i th th e C h a t ta n o o g a H e a r t In s ti tu te .
H ow e v e r , D r . S tra tie n k o le f t th e C h a tta n o o g a H e a r t In s t i tu te ra th e r a c r im o n io u s ly in 1 9 9 8 . H e a n d D r . M o n ro e a re n o t
o n g o o d te rm s p e r so n a lly o r p r o fe ss io n a lly . D r . S tra tie n k o , w h o c la im s to b e th e o n ly p h y s ic ia n in th e C h a t ta n o o g a a re a
p e r fo rm in g c a ro t id s te n tin g p ro c ed u re s , o b je c te d to D r . M o n ro e ’s ap p o in tm e n t to th e h o sp i ta l’ s com m i t te e fo r
d e te rm in in g th e c re d en t ia lin g fo r c a ro t id s te n tin g .

In a d d i t io n to c h a l le n g in g th e su s p e n s io n o f h is s ta f f p r iv i le g e s , D r . S tra tie n k o a lso to o k issu e w i th th e m a n n e r
in w h ic h t h e h o s p i ta l sc h ed u le d c a ll co v e ra g e fo r c a rd io lo g is ts , th e H o sp i ta l A u th o r i ty ’ s a l le g ed su b s id iz a t io n o f th e
C h a t tan o o g a H e a r t In s ti tu te an d o th e r c a rd io lo g is ts , an d th e c r ed en t ia l in g p ro c e s s fo r D r . M o n ro e . S e v e r a l o f D r .
S t ra t ien k o ’s a l leg a t io n s t ra ck ed e a r l ie r a l leg a t io n s m ad e b y th e U n i ted S ta te s D ep a r tm en t o f Ju s t ice ag a in s t th e h o sp i ta l .
T h e H o sp i ta l A u th o r i ty in fo rm e d th e tr ia l c o u r t th a t m a n y o f th e re co rd s so u g h t b y D r . S tra tie n k o w e re in th e c u sto d y
o f th e sp ec ia l co u n se l it h ad h ired to d e fe n d ag a in s t th e D ep a r tm en t o f Ju s tice ’ s c la im s .

T en n . C o d e A n n . § 6 3 -6 -2 1 9 (20 0 4 ) .

-2-

appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. On May 17, 2005, the Court of Appeals filed an order
granting permission to appeal. The order stated that “[a]ll proceedings below, including the
administrative hearing currently scheduled for June 2, 2005 are stayed pending resolution of this
[i]nterlocutory [a]ppeal.” 4

On October 14, 2005, while the stay pending appeal was still in effect, Mr. Konvalinka sent
a letter to the Hospital Authority requesting access to a wide variety of hospital records under the
5
6
federal Freedom of Information Act and Tennessee’s public records statutes. In addition to the
documents pertaining directly to the suspension of Dr. Stratienko’s privileges, the information Mr.
Konvalinka requested included documents that he had requested the Hospital Authority to produce
7
on two occasions in 2003 before the suspension of Dr. Stratienko’s privileges. Mr. Konvalinka also
demanded “all documents containing, referring or related to all peripheral vascular credentialing
requirements in effect from the date of Dr. Monroe’s initiation of the credentialing process to the
present.” The Hospital Authority did not respond to Mr. Konvalinka’s letter.

On November 16, 2005, Mr. Konvalinka, represented by Ms. Lawrence, filed a suit in his
own name in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County seeking an order requiring the Hospital
Authority to provide the records sought in his October 14, 2005 letter. On November 29, 2005, the
chancery court held a hearing to give the Hospital Authority an opportunity to show cause why it
should not be compelled to produce the records requested by Mr. Konvalinka. The Hospital
Authority argued, among other things, that it should not be required to produce the requested records
because both Mr. Konvalinka’s October 14, 2005 letter and his lawsuit violated the Court of
Appeals’ May 17, 2005 order staying “all proceedings below” pending the resolution of Dr.
Stratienko’s interlocutory appeal. The Hospital Authority also informed the chancery court that it
had prepared, but had not yet filed, a petition to hold Mr. Konvalinka in contempt of the Court of
Appeals’ May 17, 2005 order. The threat of a possible contempt citation did not deter Mr.
Konvalinka.

T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls e v e n tu a l ly d e te rm in e d th a t th e c irc u i t c o u r t h a d m is in te rp r e te d th e T e n n e s se e P e e r
R ev iew L aw . I t r em an d e d th e c a s e w i th d i re c t io n s to th e c ir cu i t co u r t to o rd e r th e H o sp i ta l A u th o r ity to p ro v id e D r .
S tra tie n k o w i th c o p ie s o f a ll th e re q u e s te d d o c um e n ts th a t w e re g e n e ra te d in th e re g u la r c o u r se o f its b u s in e s s o r th a t
w e re o th e rw ise av a i lab le f rom o r ig in a l so u rc e s . S tra t ie n ko v . C h a t ta n o o g a -H am i l to n C o u n ty H o sp . A u th . , N o . E 2 0 0 5 –
0 1 0 4 3 -C O A -R 9 -C V , 2 0 0 6 W L 5 5 0 4 6 0 , a t * 6 (T en n . C t . A p p . M a r . 8 , 2 0 0 6 ) , p e rm . a p p . g ra n te d (T en n . S e p t . 2 5 , 20 0 6 ) .
W h i le th is C o u r t la te r a f f irm e d th e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls w i th re g a rd to th e re co rd s g en e ra te d in th e n o rm a l co u r se o f th e
H o s p ita l A u th o r i ty ’ s b u s in e s s , w e d isa g r ee d w i th th e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls’ in te rp r e ta tio n o f th e sc o p e o f th e T e n n e s se e P e e r
R e v iew L aw a n d h e ld th a t th e H o sp i ta l A u th o r i ty c o u ld n o t b e re q u ire d to p ro d u c e in fo rm a tio n , d o cum e n ts , o r re co rd s
o th e rw ise a v a i la b le f rom o r ig in a l so u rc es . W e h e ld in s te ad th a t th is in fo rm a tio n m a y b e o b ta in e d d ire c t ly f rom th e
o r ig in a l so u rc e s u n le ss i t is o th e rw ise p r iv i leg ed . S tra t ie n ko v . C h a t ta n o o g a -H am i l to n C o u n ty H o sp . A u th . , 2 2 6 S .W .3 d
2 8 0 , 2 8 7 (T en n . 2 0 0 7 ) .

5 U .S .C .A . § 5 5 2 (W e s t 20 0 7 ) .

T en n . C o d e A n n . §§ 10 -7 -5 0 3 to -50 7 (19 9 9 & Su p p . 20 0 7 ) .

M r . K o n v a lin k a a sse r te d th a t h e h ad c l ie n ts o th e r th a n D r . S t ra tie n k o w h o w e re in te re ste d in th e in fo rm a tio n
h e w a s se ek in g .

-3-

The chancery court filed its memorandum opinion and order on December 7, 2005. Noting
that the May 17, 2005 stay order had been entered by the Court of Appeals, the chancery court
declined to interpret or change the order and stated instead that Mr. Konvalinka could seek
interpretation and clarification of the order from the Court of Appeals. It also directed the Hospital
Authority to produce two of the nineteen categories of records sought by Mr. Konvalinka because
they were not directly relevant to Dr. Stratienko’s lawsuit against the Hospital Authority. The
chancery court declined to order the Hospital Authority to release the remaining records, stating:

Because all other requests relate, or could relate to the
Stratienko case, the court is going to deny those requests. First, this
court looks not only to the language but also the spirit of the Court of
Appeals’ stay order. Second, the Petitioner should be able to receive
these documents through the discovery mechanisms available
pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in the Stratienko
case.

Mr. Konvalinka filed a timely notice of appeal from the chancery court’s order.

On December 19, 2005, the Hospital Authority filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to
have both Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence held in contempt. While conceding that Mr.
Konvalinka’s petition for access to public records was a “separate cause of action,” the Hospital
Authority insisted that Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence had willfully failed and refused to comply
with and had blatantly disregarded the Court of Appeals’ May 17, 2005 stay order by seeking access
to records relevant to the dispute between Dr. Stratienko and the Hospital Authority under the public
records statutes. The Court of Appeals eventually decided to hear and adjudicate the contempt
matter contemporaneously with Mr. Konvalinka’s appeal from the chancery court’s December 7,
2005 order denying most of his public records requests.

On July 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals heard oral arguments regarding Mr. Konvalinka’s
appeal from the chancery court’s denial of most of his public records requests. In an opinion filed
on September 11, 2006, the court first determined that the documents Mr. Konvalinka had requested
in both his 2003 letters and his October 14, 2005 letter were not covered by its May 17, 2005 stay
order and, therefore, that the chancery court had properly ordered the Hospital Authority to release
these two of the specific categories of records. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp.
Auth., No. E2006-00064-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2596781, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2006).
The court also concluded that the chancery court had not erred by denying Mr. Konvalinka’s request
for attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeals then turned its attention to the Hospital Authority’s contempt petition.
Because there had been no evidentiary hearing on the contempt petition, the court based its decision
solely on the record of the proceedings in the chancery court relating to Mr. Konvalinka’s petition
seeking public records. The Court of Appeals held:

Given that the 2005 documents contained requests that were
directly covered by our stay in the Stratienko case, we must conclude

-4-

that the Petition for Access to Public Records was nothing less than
an attempt to obtain through the chancery court action documents that
unquestionably could not be obtained at that time in the Stratienko
litigation due to this Court’s stay order. While our stay was in effect,
clearly Konvalinka and Lawrence engaged in a deliberate attempt to
do indirectly what they were prohibited from doing directly as
Stratienko’s attorneys. As the Chancery Court found, they made no
8
pretense of its being otherwise. Therefore, we find that Konvalinka
9
and Lawrence are in direct civil contempt of this Court’s stay order.

Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 2006 WL 2596781, at *8. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the chancery court with directions to hold a hearing and
then award the Hospital Authority its reasonable attorney’s fees associated with the drafting, filing,
and arguing of its contempt motion. We granted Mr. Konvalinka’s and Ms. Lawrence’s application
for permission to appeal.

II.

The power to punish for contempt has long been regarded as essential to the protection and
existence of the courts and the proper administration of justice. Winfree v. State, 175 Tenn. 427,
431, 135 S.W.2d 454, 455 (1940); State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 331 (1868). At
common law, the contempt power was broad and undefined. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33,
43-47 (1941). Concerned about the potential abuse of this power, the Tennessee General Assembly,
like its counterparts in other states, enacted statutes to define and limit the courts’ power to punish
for contempt. Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d at 397. As a result, the courts’ contempt power is now
purely statutory. Scott v. State, 109 Tenn. 390, 394-95, 71 S.W. 824, 825 (1902); State v. Galloway,
45 Tenn. at 328-31; State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d
602, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Derryberry v. Derryberry, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. (Higgins) 401, 402
(1918).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-103 (1994) currently provides that “[f]or the effectual exercise of
its powers, every court is vested with the power to punish for contempt, as provided for in this

T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls is re fe r r in g to th e ch an c e ry co u r t ’s o b se rv a t io n th a t “ [o ] f ten in fo o tb a l l , i f a team is
g o in g to a t tem p t an en d ru n , th e y h a v e th e fu l lb a c k f a k e a ru n u p th e m id d le w h i le th e ta ilb a ck g o e s a ro u n d th e e n d .
T h e re is li t tle o r n o d isg u ise / fa k e in th e c a se a t b a r .”

W e p re sum e th a t th e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls ’ c h a ra c te r iz a tio n o f M r . K o n v a l in k a ’s a n d M s . L aw re n c e ’s c o n d u c t
a s d i re c t c iv i l co n tem p t w a s in ad v e r te n t . D i re c t c o n tem p t is l im i ted to c o n d u c t c om m i t ted in th e p re se n c e o f th e co u r t .
B la c k v . B lo u n t , 9 3 8 S .W .2 d 3 9 4 , 3 9 8 (T en n . 1 9 9 6 ) ; S ta te v . M a d d u x , 5 7 1 S .W .2 d 8 1 9 , 8 2 1 (T e n n . 1 9 7 8 ) . T h e f i l in g
o f th e p e ti t io n u n d e r T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 1 0 -7 -5 0 5 (a ) se ek in g a c ce ss to p u b l ic re co rd s d id n o t o c cu r in th e p re se n ce o f
th e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls an d , th e re fo re , co u ld n o t h av e b e en d i re c t co n tem p t . In l ig h t o f th e b a s is fo r o u r d e c is io n in th is
c ase , w e n e ed n o t a sc e r ta in th e le g a l e f fe c t th is m isc h a ra c te r iz a t io n m a y h a v e h a d o n th e o rd e r h o ld in g M r . K o n v a lin k a
an d M s . L aw re n c e in co n tem p t .

-5-

10
code.” To give effect to this power, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-9-101 to -108 (2000) further define
11
the scope of the contempt power and the punishment and remedies for contemptuous acts.
Of
particular relevance to this case, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) specifically empowers the courts
to use their contempt powers in circumstances involving “[t]he willful disobedience or resistance
of any officer of the such courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command of such courts.” This provision enables the courts to
maintain the integrity of their orders. Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 904 (Tenn. 1998); Thigpen
v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Sammons, 656 S.W.2d 862, 869
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-103’s broad grant of contempt power is not limited to trial courts.
Accordingly, Tennessee’s courts have held repeatedly that the appellate courts possess the power
to punish for contempt. Ramsey v. Mut. Supply Co., 221 Tenn. 437, 441, 427 S.W.2d 211, 212
(1968); Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 131-32, 213 S.W.2d 32, 35 (1948); State ex rel. Conner
v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220, 237-38, 154 S.W. 957, 962 (1913); State v. Anderson, 6 Tenn. Civ. App.
(Higgins) 1, 7-8 (1915).

III.

Civil contempt claims based upon an alleged disobedience of a court order have four
12
essential elements. First, the order alleged to have been violated must be “lawful.” Second, the
13
order alleged to have been violated must be clear, specific, and unambiguous.
Third, the person
alleged to have violated the order must have actually disobeyed or otherwise resisted the order.14
Fourth, the person’s violation of the order must be “willful.”15

The threshold issue in any contempt proceeding is whether the order alleged to have been
violated is “lawful.” A lawful order is one issued by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject

T h is s ta tu te c an b e t ra c ed b a ck to th e C o d e o f T en n e sse e § 4 1 0 0 (R e tu rn J . M e ig s & W i l liam F . C o o p e r e d s . ,
E .G . E a s tm an & C o . 1 8 5 8 ) (“C o d e o f 1 8 5 8 ” ) .

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § § 2 9 -9 -1 0 1 to – 1 0 6 c an b e t ra ce d b a c k to th e C o d e o f 1 8 5 8 § § 4 1 0 6 – 4 1 1 2 . T e n n . C o d e
A n n . § 2 9 -9 – 1 0 7 is d e r iv e d f rom th e C o d e o f 1 8 5 8 § 1 7 2 7 . T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -9 – 1 0 8 is o f m o r e re c en t v in ta g e .

T en n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -9 -1 0 2 (3 ) .

D o e v . B d . o f P ro f ’ l R e sp o n s ib i l ity , 1 0 4 S .W .3 d 4 6 5 , 4 7 1 (T en n . 2 0 0 3 ) (h o ld in g th a t a p e rso n c an n o t b e h e ld
in c o n tem p t u n le ss h e o r sh e v io la te s a “ sp e c i f ic o rd e r” ) ; L o n g v . M cA ll is te r-L o n g , 2 2 1 S .W .3 d 1 , 1 4 (T e n n . C t . A p p .
2 0 0 6 ) (h o ld in g th a t th e o rd e r a l leg ed to h a v e b e en v io la ted m u s t b e “ c le a r an d un am b ig u o u s ” ) .

T en n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -9 -1 0 2 (3 ) .

T en n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -2 -1 0 2 (3 ) .

-6-

16
matter of the case and the parties. Vanvabry v. Staton,
88 Tenn. 334, 351-52, 12 S.W. 786, 791
17
(1890);
Churchwell v. Callens, 36 Tenn. App. 119, 131, 252 S.W.2d 131, 136-37 (1952). An order
is not rendered void or unlawful simply because it is erroneous or subject to reversal on appeal.
Vanvabry v. Staton, 88 Tenn. at 351, 12 S.W. at 791; Churchwell v. Callens, 36 Tenn. App. at 131,
252 S.W.2d at 137. Erroneous orders must be followed until they are reversed. Blair v. Nelson, 67
Tenn. (8 Baxt.) 1, 5 (1874). However, an order entered without either subject matter jurisdiction or
jurisdiction over the parties is void and cannot provide the basis for a finding of contempt. Brown
v. Brown, 198 Tenn. 600, 610, 281 S.W.2d 492, 497 (1955); Howell v. Thompson, 130 Tenn. 311,
323-24, 170 S.W. 253, 256 (1914). Naturally, the determination of whether a particular order is
lawful is a question of law.

The second issue involves the clarity of the order alleged to have been violated. A person
may not be held in civil contempt for violating an order unless the order expressly and precisely
spells out the details of compliance in a way that will enable reasonable persons to know exactly
what actions are required or forbidden. Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 473 F.2d 244, 247 (2d
Cir. 1972); Hall v. Nelson, 651 S.E.2d 72, 75 (Ga. 2007); Marquis v. Marquis, 931 A.2d 1164, 1171
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-
34 (Nev. 1986); Petrosinelli v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 643 S.E.2d 151,
154-55 (Va. 2007). The order must, therefore, be clear, specific, and unambiguous. See Doe v. Bd.
of Prof’l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d at 471; Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d at 14.18

Vague or ambiguous orders that are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation
cannot support a finding of civil contempt. City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005);
Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127, 137
(Mass. 1997); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d at 45. Orders need not be “full of superfluous terms and
specifications adequate to counter any flight of fancy a contemner may imagine in order to declare

T h e T e n n e s se e R e p o r ts a n d W e s t P u b l ish in g C om p a n y ’ s S o u th W e s te rn R e p o r te r r e p o r t th is c a se u s in g th r e e
d if fe re n t n am e s . T h e s ty le o f th e in i t ia l o p in io n co n ta in ed in th e T en n e s se e R ep o r t s is V a n v a b ry v . S ta to n , w h i le th e
s ty le o f th e in i t ia l o p in io n rep o r ted in th e S o u th W e s te rn R ep o r te r is In re V a n v a v e r . T h e s ty le o f th e o p in io n o n p e t i t io n
to re h ea r c o n ta in ed in th e T en n e s se e R ep o r t s is S ta te e x re l. v . S ta to n , w h i le th e s ty le o f th e o p in io n o n p e ti t io n to r eh e a r
in th e S o u th W e s te rn R ep o r te r is In re V a n v a v e r . W e h av e e lec ted to u se th e s ty le in th e T en n e s se e R ep o r t s b ec au se
i t w a s th e o f f ic ia l rep o r te r w h en th e o p in io n w a s f i led .

In an o p in io n re sp o n d in g to a p e t i tio n fo r re h e a r in g , th e C o u r t e x p la in ed th a t its g en e ra l re fe re n c e to
“ ju r isd ic t io n ” in i ts o r ig in a l o p in io n in c lu d ed b o th su b je c t m a t te r an d p e rso n a l ju r isd ic t io n . S ta te e x re l. v . S ta to n , 8 8
T en n . 35 3 , 35 4 , 12 S .W . 10 2 6 , 10 2 6 (18 9 0 ) .

O th e r co u r ts h av e ap p l ied th is s tan d a rd in co n tem p t p ro c e ed in g s . S e e , e .g . , In re E . I . D uP o n t D e N em o u r s
& C o . – B en la te L i t ig . , 9 9 F .3 d 3 6 3 , 3 7 0 (1 1 th C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) (c le a r , d e f in i te , an d u n am b ig u o u s ) ; G ra c e v . C tr . fo r A u to
S a fe ty , 7 2 F .3 d 1 2 3 6 , 1 2 4 1 (6 th C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) (d e f in i te a n d sp e c i f ic ) ; A rk . D e p ’ t o f H e a lth & H um a n S e rv s . v . B r i le y , 2 3 7
S .W .3 d 7 , 1 1 (A rk . 2 0 0 6 ) (d e f in i te a n d c le a r ) ; B la yd e s v . B la y d e s , 4 4 6 A .2 d 8 2 5 , 8 2 7 (C o n n . 1 9 8 2 ) (c le a r an d
u n eq u iv o c a l ) ; R o le k v . Iow a D is t . C t . fo r P o lk C o u n ty , 5 5 4 N .W .2 d 5 4 4 , 5 4 7 ( Iow a 1 9 9 6 ) (c le a r a n d d e f in i te ) ; M a rq u is
v . M a rq u is , 9 3 1 A .2 d a t 1 1 7 1 (d e f in i te , c e r ta in , an d sp e c i f ic ) ; C o s te llo v . B d . o f A p p e a ls o f L ex in g to n , 8 7 6 N .E .2 d 4 0 3 ,
4 0 4 (M a ss . 2 0 0 7 ) (c le a r an d u n eq u iv o c a l ) ; K in g v . K in g , 67 1 N .Y .S .2d 12 1 , 12 2 (A p p . D iv . 19 9 8 ) (c le a r an d ex p l ic i t) ;
E x p a r te S la v in , 4 1 2 S .W .2 d 4 3 , 4 4 (T ex . 1 9 6 7 ) (c le a r , sp e c i f ic , an d u n am b ig u o u s ) ; G re en e v . F in n , 1 5 3 P .3 d 9 4 5 , 9 5 1
(W y o . 2 0 0 7 ) (c le a r , sp e c i f ic , an d u n am b ig u o u s ) .

-7-

it vague.” Ex parte Blasingame, 748 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1988) (quoting Ex parte McManus, 589
S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App. 1979). They must, however, leave no reasonable basis for doubt
regarding their meaning. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local No. 1291 v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n,
389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967); Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Orders alleged to have been violated should be construed using an objective standard that
takes into account both the language of the order and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
the order, including the audience to whom the order is addressed. United States v. Bernardine, 237
F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Young, 107 F.3d 903, 907-08 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Ambiguities in an order alleged to have been violated should be interpreted in favor of the person
facing the contempt charge. Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d 543, 551 (6th Cir.
2006); Levin v. Tiber Holding Corp., 277 F.3d 243, 251 (2d Cir. 2002); Town of Virgil v. Ford, 585
N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 1992); Greene v. Finn, 153 P.3d at 951. Determining whether an
order is sufficiently free from ambiguity to be enforced in a contempt proceeding is a legal inquiry
that is subject to de novo review. Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394
(9th Cir. 1991); In re Leah S., 935 A.2d 1021, 1027 (Conn. 2007); City of Wisconsin Dells v. Dells
Fireworks, Inc., 539 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).19

The third issue focuses on whether the party facing the civil contempt charge actually
violated the order. This issue is a factual one to be decided by the court without a jury. See Pass
v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 620, 184 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1944); Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 786 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992). The quantum of proof needed to find that a person has actually violated a court
order is a preponderance of the evidence. Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d at 474.
Thus, decisions regarding whether a person actually violated a court order should be reviewed in
accordance with the standards in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

The fourth issue focuses on the willfulness of the person alleged to have violated the order.
The word “willfully” has been characterized as a word of many meanings whose construction
depends on the context in which it appears. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943); United
States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1994). Most obviously, it differentiates between
deliberate and unintended conduct. State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Group
Trust, 209 S.W.3d at 612. However, in criminal law, “willfully” connotes a culpable state of mind.
In the criminal context, a willful act is one undertaken for a bad purpose. Bryan v. United States,
524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998); State v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)
(upholding an instruction stating that “[a]n act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally
and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids”).

T e n n e sse e ’ s co u r ts h av e n o t y e t d i r e c t ly ad d re sse d th is sp e c if ic q u e st io n . H ow e v e r , th e y h a v e lo n g
re co g n iz ed th a t o rd e rs an d ju d gm en ts sh o u ld b e co n s t ru ed l ik e o th e r w r i t ten in s t rum en ts , S ta te v . P h i l l ip s , 1 3 8 S .W .3 d
2 2 4 , 2 2 9 (T en n . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) ; B ra n c h v . B ra n c h , 3 5 T e n n . A p p . 5 5 2 , 5 5 5 – 5 6 , 2 4 9 S .W .2 d 5 8 1 , 5 8 2 – 8 3 (1 9 5 2 ) , an d
th a t th e in te rp re ta tio n o f w r i t te n in s trum e n ts in v o lv e s q u e s t io n s o f law th a t a re re v iew e d d e n o v o w i th o u t a p re sum p t io n
o f c o r r e c tn e ss . B a r n e s v . B a rn e s , 1 9 3 S .W .3 d 4 9 5 , 4 9 8 (T en n . 2 0 0 6 ) ; S ta te e x re l. P o p e v . U .S . F ire In s . C o . , 1 4 5
S .W .3 d 52 9 , 53 3 (T en n . 20 0 4 ) . A c co rd ing ly , th e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s h a s o b s e rv ed th a t th e p rop e r in te rp r e ta t io n o f a
ju d gm en t is a q u e s t io n o f law . E l -Am in v . C am p b e l l, 9 7 3 S .W .2 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 4 (T en n . C t . A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) .

-8-

In the context of a civil contempt proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-102(3), acting
willfully does not require the same standard of culpability that is required in the criminal context.
State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d at 612. Rather,
willful conduct

consists of acts or failures to act that are intentional or voluntary
rather than accidental or inadvertant. Conduct is ‘willful’ if it is the
product of free will rather than coercion. Thus, a person acts
‘willfully’ if he or she is a free agent, knows what he or she is doing,
and intends to do what he or she is doing.

State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d at 612 (citations
omitted). Thus, acting contrary to a known duty may constitute willfulness for the purpose of a civil
contempt proceeding. United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116, 1127 (7th Cir. 1982); City of Dubuque
v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Dubuque County, 725 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Iowa 2006); Utah Farm Prod. Credit
20
Ass’n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1988).
Determining whether the violation of a court
order was willful is a factual issue that is uniquely within the province of the finder-of-fact who will
be able to view the witnesses and assess their credibility. Thus, findings regarding “willfulness”
21
should be reviewed in accordance with the Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) standards.

A c t in g co n t ra ry to a k n ow n d u ty is a c om m o n c h a ra c te r is t ic o f w i l lfu l co n d u c t in o th e r c o n tex ts . U n i te d
S ta te s v . P om p o n io , 4 2 9 U .S . 1 0 , 1 2 (1 9 7 6 ) ( f i l in g tax re tu rn s ) ; P e o p le v . H a g e n , 9 6 7 P .2 d 5 6 3 , 5 6 7 (C a l. 1 9 9 8 ) ( f i l in g
tax re tu rn s ) ; L a n dw e r v . S c ite x Am . C o rp . , 6 0 6 N .E .2 d 4 8 5 , 4 8 9 ( I ll . A p p . C t . 19 9 2 ) (r e fu s in g a c c e s s to pu b l ic r e co rd s ) ;
A t t’y G r ie va n c e C om m ’n o f M d . v . M in in so h n , 8 4 6 A .2 d 3 5 3 , 3 6 9 (M d . 2 0 0 4 ) (a t to rn ey d isc ip l in e ) ; S u b u rb a n H o sp . ,
In c . v . M d . H ea l th R e s . P la n n in g C om m ’n , 7 2 6 A .2 d 8 0 7 , 8 1 4 -1 5 (M d . C t . S p e c . A p p . 19 9 9 ) , v a ca te d a s m o o t 7 7 2 A .2 d
1 2 3 9 , 1 2 4 0 (M d . 2 0 0 1 ) (o p en m e e t in g law s ) .

W e h a v e n o te d th a t th e th i rd a n d fo u r th issu e s in a c iv i l c o n tem p t p ro c e e d in g – w h e th e r th e p e r so n a cc u se d
o f co n tem p t a c tu a l ly v io la te d th e o r d e r a n d w h e th e r th e v io la tio n w a s w i l lfu l – a re fa c tu a l issu e s . A c c o rd in g ly , in c a se s
in v o lv in g in d ire c t co n tem p t , th e p a r t ie s sh o u ld o rd in a r i ly b e a ffo rd e d a h e a r in g u n le ss th e fa c ts a re n o t in d isp u te o r th e
a lle g ed co n tem n e r d e s ire s to o f fe r n o d e fe n se . I t is g e n e ra lly th e p re ro g a tiv e o f th e c o u r t issu in g an o rd e r to d e te rm in e
w h e th e r a p a r ty is in co n tem p t o f th a t o rd e r . U n i te d S ta te s v . S h ip p , 2 0 3 U .S . 5 6 3 , 5 7 3 (1 9 0 6 ) ; S ta te v . G ra y , 4 6 S .W .3 d
7 4 9 , 7 5 0 (T en n . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) . H ow ev e r , th e ju r isd ic t io n o f th e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls , lik e th e ju r isd ic t io n o f th is C o u r t ,
is ap p e l la te o n ly , D u n c a n v . D u n c a n , 67 2 S .W .2 d 76 5 , 76 7 (T en n . 19 8 4 ) ; T en n . C o d e A n n . § 1 6 -4 -1 0 8 ( a ) (1 ) (1 9 9 4 ) ,
an d w e h av e p re v io u s ly a ck n ow led g ed th a t a p p e l la te c o u r ts a re p o o r ly eq u ip p ed to h an d le ev id en t ia ry h e a r in g s . S e e
D o e v . B d . o f P ro f ’ l R e sp o n s ib i l ity , 1 0 4 S .W .3 d a t 4 7 4 . S e e a lso S ie r ra v . S ie r ra , 5 0 5 S o .2 d 4 3 2 , 4 3 4 (F la . 1 9 8 7 )
(a p p e l la te c o u r ts a re n o t eq u ip p e d to c o n d u c t e v id e n tia ry h e a r in g s a n d , th e re fo re , c o u ld a p p o in t a c om m iss io n e r to ta k e
ev id en c e an d r e p o r t b a ck to co u r t) ; B iv in s v . B iv in s , 7 0 9 S .W .2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 6 (T e x . A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) (a n a p p e l la te co u r t h a s
n e i th e r th e p e rso n n e l n o r th e fa c i l it ies to co n d u c t ev id en t ia ry h e a r in g s in co n tem p t m a t te r ) ; S ta te ex re l. W a lk e r v .
G ia rd in a , 2 9 4 S .E .2 d 9 0 0 , 9 0 8 (W . V a . 1 9 8 2 ) ( tra n s fe r r in g c r im in a l c o n tem p t p r o c e ed in g to a sp e c ia lly – a p p o in te d
c i rc u i t ju d g e ) . T h e re fo re , sh o u ld a co n tem p t h e a r in g b e re q u i re d in a m a t te r b e fo re an ap p e l la te co u r t , th e co u r t sh o u ld
m ak e a r r an g em en ts fo r th e re c e ip t o f e v id en c e . S e e D o e v . B d . o f P ro f ’ l R e sp o n s ib i l ity , 1 0 4 S .W .3 d a t 4 7 4 (a p p ro v in g
th e u s e o f a sp e c ia l m a s te r in c o n tem p t p ro c e ed in g s f iled in th is C o u r t s tem m in g f rom a v io la t io n o f th e Su p r em e C o u r t
ru l e ) . W h en th e a l leg ed ly co n tem p tu o u s a c t in v o lv e s a f il in g in a tr ia l c o u r t, a s i t do e s in th is c a s e , th e ap p e l la te co u r t
sh o u ld rem a n d th e c ase to th e tr ia l co u r t w i th a re q u es t to co n d u c t a h e a r in g a n d m a k e f in d in g s o f fa c t re g a rd in g th e
co n tem p tu o u s c o n d u c t .

-9-

After determining that a person has willfully violated a lawful and sufficiently clear and
precise order, the court may, in its discretion, decide to hold the person in civil contempt. See
Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 37, 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (1964). The court’s
decision is entitled to great weight. Hooks v. Hooks, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. (Higgins) 507, 508 (1918).
Accordingly, decisions to hold a person in civil contempt are reviewed using the abuse of discretion
standard of review. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 583 (Tenn. 1993); Moody v. Hutchison, 159
22
S.W.3d 15, 25-26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). This review-constraining standard does not permit
reviewing courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the court whose decision is being
reviewed. Williams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn. 2006); Eldridge v.
Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001).

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the framework of the applicable
legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the factors customarily used to guide that
discretionary decision. State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007). Discretionary decisions
must take the applicable law and relevant facts into account. Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652,
661 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, reviewing courts will set aside a discretionary decision only when the court
that made the decision applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its
decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an
injustice to the complaining party. Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., 134 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Tenn. 2004);
Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003).

IV.

No issue has been raised on this appeal regarding the power of the Court of Appeals to
23
exercise contempt power or the lawfulness of the May 17, 2005 stay order.
Thus, the pivotal
question is whether the May 17, 2005 order clearly, specifically, and unambiguously prohibits the
parties in Stratienko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority and their lawyers from
filing a petition under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a) to gain access to public records belonging to
the Hospital Authority. Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence insist that the stay order did not clearly
prohibit the filing of a separate petition for access to public records. The Hospital Authority argues
that the stay order prevents the filing of the separate action and that, in any event, the filing of the
action violates the spirit of the stay order. Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence have the better
argument.

The May 17, 2005 order stayed “[a]ll proceedings below, including the administrative
hearing currently scheduled for June 2, 2005.” Thus, we must decide whether the inclusion of the
phrase “all proceedings below” is broad enough to include separate proceedings under Tenn. Code

J o h n so n v . Jo h n H a n c o ck F u n d s , 2 1 7 S .W .3 d 4 1 4 , 4 2 5 (T en n . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) .

T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a ls , h av in g g ra n ted D r . S t ra t i e n k o ’ s T e n n . R . A p p . P . 9 ap p l ica t io n fo r p e rm iss io n to
a p p e a l , c le a r ly h a d ju r isd ic tio n o v e r th e su b je c t m a tte r o f th e a p p e a l a n d th e p a r tie s . M r . K o n v a l in k a an d M s . L aw re n c e ,
a s D r . S tra tie n k o ’s a t to rn e y s o f re co rd , w e re b o th o f f ic e r s o f th e c o u r t a n d p e rso n s fo r th e p u rp o se o f T e n n . C o d e A n n .
§ 29 -9 -1 0 2 (3 ) .

-10-

Ann. § 10-7-505(a) to obtain public records. We hold that it does not for two reasons – one textual
and the other based on the central importance of providing access to public records.

Orders, like other written instruments, should be enforced according to their plain meaning.
See Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975).
Thus, courts called upon to interpret orders should construe the language in the order in light of its
usual, natural, and ordinary meaning. See Staubach Retail Servs. – Southeast, LLC v. H.G. Hill
Realty Co., 160 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tenn. 2005); Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse
Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 889-90 (Tenn. 2002). If the language in an order is clear, then the literal
meaning of the language in the order controls. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 195 S.W.3d 609, 611
(Tenn. 2006); Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 342 (Tenn. 2005). Litigants are
entitled to rely on the reasonable interpretation of orders, and the use of the “plain and ordinary
meaning” standard to interpret orders assures that litigants will be treated fairly. See Turman v.
Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Campen v. Featherstone, 564 S.E.2d 616, 619
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Phillips, 138 S.W.3d at 229-30.

Although somewhat antiquated, the phrases “proceedings below,” “court below,” and other
similar phrases are still commonly used by lawyers and judges. The adjective “below” limits the
meaning of these phrases to the lower court and the proceedings in the lower court. See A Dictionary
of Modern Legal Usage 103; see also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 129 (3d ed. 1969); Black’s Law
Dictionary 164 (8th ed. 2004); 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 335 (3d rev. 1914). The “court below”
is the lower court through which the case initially passed. Holliday & Wyon Co. v. O’Donnell, 90
N.E. 24, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1909); see also Going v. Schnell, 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 741, 932, 1880
Ohio Misc. LEXIS 32, at *5 (Ohio Dist. Ct. June 1880) (noting that the court below is the tribunal
that decided the controversy in the first instance). Thus, the phrase “proceedings below” refers to
the proceedings in the lower court from which an appeal has been taken.

Based on the customary meaning of “proceedings below,” we have determined that the Court
of Appeals’ May 17, 2005 order, by its clear terms, applies only to the proceedings pending in the
Circuit Court for Hamilton County in Stratienko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital
Authority and the administrative proceedings involving Dr. Stratienko’s medical staff privileges that
had been scheduled on June 2, 2005. The stay order did not clearly and unambiguously apply to
separate proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a) to obtain public records being held by
the Hospital Authority. Thus, Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence could reasonably have believed
that the stay order did not prevent them from filing their own petition under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-
505(a) for access to public records.

Because the May 17, 2005 order did not clearly and unambiguously prohibit petitions
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a), it cannot provide the basis for holding Mr. Konvalinka
and Ms. Lawrence in civil contempt for filing their petition seeking access to public records. The
language of the order prevents a finding of willful disobedience on the part of either Mr. Konvalinka
or Ms. Lawrence because they could have believed reasonably that the order did not extend to
separate actions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision
to hold Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence in civil contempt must be reversed because it is
inconsistent with the applicable legal standards and because it lacks evidentiary support.

-11-

Our decision to reverse the judgment of civil contempt is based, as it must be, upon the
language of the May 17, 2005 stay order. We are mindful, however, that both the trial court and
Court of Appeals were troubled by Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence’s apparent “end run” around
the spirit of the stay order. While this case does not present us with the opportunity to define the
parameters of the public records request statutes, it is evident that when the public’s access to public
records is at issue, the courts should take great care to draft their orders with precision to avoid
unnecessarily or inadvertently impeding access to the public records.

Providing access to public records promotes governmental accountability by enabling
citizens to keep track of what the government is up to. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish,
541 U.S. 157, 171-72 (2004); Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87
S.W.3d 67, 74-75 (Tenn. 2002). Recognizing the importance of providing the public access to
governmental records, the Tennessee General Assembly has enacted statutes that clearly favor the
disclosure of public records. Tennessean v. Elec. Power Bd., 979 S.W.2d 297, 305 (Tenn. 1998);
Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). These statutes contain a
presumption that the records listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-301(6) (Supp. 2007) and Tenn. Code
Ann. § 10-7-503 are to be open to the public, State v. Cawood, 134 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Tenn. 2004),
and they direct the courts to construe the statutes broadly to assure the “fullest possible access” to
public records. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(d). Thus, unless it is clear that a record or class of
records is legally exempt from disclosure, the requested record must be produced. Memphis Publ’g
Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994).

It may very well be that the General Assembly neither intended nor anticipated that the public
records statutes they enacted would be used by persons litigating with government entities to obtain
24
records that might not be as readily available through the rules of discovery.
Swift v. Campbell,
159 S.W.3d at 576. However, at present, neither the discovery rules nor the public records statutes
expressly limit or prevent persons who are in litigation with a government entity or who are
considering litigation with a government entity from filing petitions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-
505(a) seeking access to public records relevant to the litigation. A growing number of courts,
construing public records statutes similar to ours, have decided that persons should not be denied
access to public records solely because they are involved, or may be involved, in litigation with a
governmental entity.25

R eg a rd in g th e F ed e ra l F re ed om o f In fo rm a t io n A c t , th e U n i ted S ta te s S u p rem e C o u r t h a s s ta ted ex p l ic i t ly
th a t, a l th o u g h th e A c t w a s n o t in te n d ed to b e u se d a s a d isc o v e ry to o l , o n e ’ s s ta tu s a s a li t ig a n t n e i th e r d im in ish e s n o r
en h a n c e s t h e r ig h t to p u b l ic in fo rm a t io n . N LR B v . R o b b in s T ire & R u b b e r C o . , 4 3 7 U .S . 2 1 4 , 2 4 2 (1 9 7 8 ) . T h e
co n t ro l l in g q u e s t io n is n o t w h o re q u e s ts th e in fo rm a t io n b u t w h e th e r th e in fo rm a t io n o u g h t to b e p u b l ic . U .S . D e p ’ t o f
Ju s tice v . R ep o r te r ’ s C om m . fo r F ree d om o f th e P re s s , 48 9 U .S . 74 9 , 77 1 -72 (19 8 9 ) .

S e e , e .g . , L e u c a d ia , In c . v . A p p l ie d E x tru s io n T e c h s . , In c . , 9 9 8 F .2 d 1 5 7 , 1 6 7 -6 8 (3 d C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ; J a c k so n v .
F irs t F e d . S a v . o f A rk . , 7 0 9 F . S u p p . 8 8 7 , 8 8 9 (E .D . A rk . 1 9 8 9 ) ; B o lm v . C u s to d ia n o f R e c o rd s o f th e T u c s o n P o l ic e
D ep ’ t, 9 6 9 P .2 d 2 0 0 , 2 0 4 -0 5 (A r iz . C t . A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) ; K e n tn e r v . In d . P u b . Em p lo y e rs ’ P la n , In c . , 8 5 2 N .E .2 d 5 6 5 , 5 7 5
( In d . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) ; K y . L o t te ry C o rp . v . S tew a r t , 4 1 S .W .3 d 8 6 0 , 86 3 -6 4 (K y . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) ; T a y lo r v . L a n s in g B d .
o f W a te r & L ig h t , 7 2 5 N .W .2 d 8 4 , 8 7 -8 8 (M ich . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) ; N .J . B u i ld e r s A s s ’ n v . N .J . C o u n c i l o n A f fo rd a b le
H o u s . , 9 1 5 A .2 d 2 3 , 3 2 (N .J . S u p e r . C t . A p p . D iv . 2 0 0 7 ) ; M . F a rbm a n & S o n s , In c . v . N .Y . C i ty H e a lth & H o sp s . C o rp . ,
(c o n t in u ed . . . )

-12-

We have already concluded that Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence should not have been
held in civil contempt because the plain language of the May 17, 2005 order staying “all proceedings
below” was not broad enough to apply to separate actions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a)
seeking access to public records. Therefore, this appeal does not provide an appropriate vehicle to
determine whether persons who are in litigation with a governmental entity can be prevented from
using the public records statutes to obtain information relevant to the litigation. The resolution of
that important issue must await another day.

We reverse the judgment finding Mr. Konvalinka and Ms. Lawrence in civil contempt for
violating the May 17, 2005 stay order and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with directions
to dismiss the petition for contempt filed by the Hospital Authority with prejudice. We tax the costs
to the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority for which execution, if necessary, may
issue.

______________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUSTICE

( . . .c o n tin u e d )
4 6 4 N .E .2 d 4 3 7 , 4 3 8 -3 9 (N .Y . 1 9 8 4 ) ; C a v e y v . W a lra th , 59 8 N .W .2 d 24 0 , 24 3 n .4 (W is . C t . A p p . 19 9 9 ) .

-13-