Kunajukr v. Lawrence & Mem. Hosp., Inc. (Summary)

HCQIA IMMUNITY

Kunajukr v. Lawrence & Mem. Hosp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-1813(JCH) (D. Conn. Jan. 12, 2009)

The United States District Court for Connecticut (“district court”) granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of a hospital who denied a doctor reappointment to its medical staff due to concerns about his practice.  The district court found that the hospital’s professional review activities, including investigations, deliberations, and recommendations that preceded and supported the decision, qualified for HCQIA immunity.

The court also rejected the doctor’s contention that the Board did not conduct a reasonable fact-gathering process, finding that the Hospital’s process complied with HCQIA, was fair to the physicians and was taken in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the known facts.

The district court also granted the hospitals motion for summary judgment on the physician’s breach of contract claim based on the employment contract that gave the hospital the right not to renew the doctor’s contract.

The district court also granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on several other claims, including defamation and breach of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.  The defamation claim was solely based on publication about the doctor in the National Practitioners Data Bank, but the district court found this this involved the initiation and carrying out of the peer review process, which entitled the hospital to immunity under the HCQIA.  As for the breach of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, the district court found that the hospital did not breach a contract with the doctor and was entitled to HCQIA immunity from actions challenging the peer review process.

The district court also granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on the doctor’s claim of discrimination on the basis of national origin, age, marital status, and ancestry, in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, finding that even if the doctor was qualified to perform his job, he presented no evidence of employment discrimination based on age or marital status.  The doctor relied on the hospital’s reference to his poor English speaking skills as a basis for race and national origin discrimination, but the reference occurred years before his termination or denial of privileges.

Finally, the district court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that nothing pertaining to the doctor’s termination rose to the level of outrageous conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency.