Plaintiff was admitted to Rush for alcohol abuse
treatment on January 13, 1995. During his treatment Plaintiff contacted his
insurance agency, Brennan and Stuart (Brennan), about the possibility of filing
a disability claim. Brennan, in turn, contacted Royal Insurance which sent
Plaintiff a preliminary report concerning his potential claim. Plaintiff later
decided not to file a claim and so notified Royal Insurance. Plaintiff was
discharged from Rush approximately 6 weeks after his admission.

In April of 1995, Rush received a copy of
Plaintiff’s medical records release authorization from Royal Insurance. Rush
released the records. Contained in the records released to Royal Insurance was a
notation that Plaintiff stated the onset of his alcohol dependence took place
eight months prior to his admission. In other words, Plaintiff allegedly
admitted to having a problem with alcohol before he applied for the Royal
Insurance policy. After reviewing the records, Royal Insurance determined that
Plaintiff had misrepresented his condition of health when he applied for the
disability policy. Specifically, Plaintiff responded “No” to the following
question: “Has any person proposed for coverage ever: sought advice or treatment
for or been arrested for or been addicted to the use of alcohol or drugs?”.
Given the new turn of events, Royal Insurance canceled Plaintiff’s policy and
refunded his premiums.

Plaintiff filed suit against Rush and Royal
Insurance. He claimed that Rush (1) breached its physician/ client relationship
with him, (2) invaded his privacy and (3) negligently inflicted emotional
distress upon him. Rush did not answer the counts against it, but instead filed
a motion for judgement on the pleadings, alleging that it released Plaintiff’s
records pursuant to a valid authorization. As part of his answer to the motion,
Plaintiff included the affidavit of his attorney who stated that, during a
meeting with the medical director for Rush, Dr. Paul Feldman, Feldman admitted
that Plaintiff’s records should not have been released to Royal Insurance. The
trial court granted Rush’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff later
voluntarily dismissed his claims against Royal Insurance, and he now appeals the
trial court’s issuance of judgment on the pleadings to Rush.

ANALYSIS

According to the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, “[a]ny party may seasonably move for judgment on the pleadings.” 735
ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 1998). When considering such a motion, the court is to
discern whether there is any issue of material fact presented by the pleadings,
and if not, which party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Daymon
v. Hardin County General Hospital, 210 Ill. App. 3d 927, 569 N.E.2d 316
(1991). The only matters to be considered in ruling on the motion are the
allegations of the pleadings. In re Marriage of O’Brien, 247 Ill. App.
3d 745, 617 N.E.2d 873 (1993). Copies of written instruments attached to a
pleading as an exhibit are considered to be a part of the pleading. 735 ILCS
5/2-606 (West 1998). If the pleadings raise an issue of material fact, evidence
must be taken to resolve the issue and judgment may not be entered on the
pleadings. In re Estate of Davis, 225 Ill. App. 3d 998, 589 N.E.2d 154
(1992). We review a trial court’s issuance of a judgment on the pleadings de
novo. New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App.
3d 701, 696 N.E.2d 22 (1998).

Plaintiff essentially maintains that the trial
court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings to Rush because it improperly
determined that the authorization executed by the parties was valid. In
particular, Plaintiff argues that issues of fact exist as to whether the
authorization complied with Federal Regulations. The parties do not cite, nor
have we ourselves discovered, any authority interpreting the relevant provisions
of the regulations. This, therefore, is an issue of first impression.

Under Illinois law, medical records such as
those at issue in this case may be disclosed only if the patient gives written
authorization for such a disclosure and that authorization is executed in
compliance with the applicable Federal Regulations. 20 ILCS 301/30-5(bb)(2)(A)
(West 1998). The applicable Federal Regulations require the written
authorization to include (1) the specific name or general designation of the
program or person permitted to make the disclosure; (2) the name or title or the
individual or the name of the organization to which disclosure is to be made;
(3) the name of the patient; (4) the purpose of the disclosure; (5) how much and
what kind of information is to be disclosed; (6) the signature of the patient;
(7) the date the consent is signed; (8) a statement that the consent is subject
to revocation; and (9) the date, event or condition upon which the consent will
expire. 42 C.F.R. subpt. C, ?2.31 (1993).

Plaintiff contests whether the first requirement
of section 2.31 was satisfied by the authorization in this case. The relevant
provision of the authorization refers to the individuals and programs entitled
to make disclosures as “any physician, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic,
health care facility [or] other medical or medically related facility.” The
authorization does not include the specific name of the disclosing program or
individual. We must, therefore, determine if the authorization meets the
“general designation” requirement.

The term “designation” is not defined in the
Federal Regulations. See 42 C.F.R. subpt. B, ?2.11 (1993). Undefined terms of a
statute should be given their ordinary and popularly understood meaning.
Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 695
N.E.2d 481 (1998). “A distinguishing name” is the common definition of the word
“designation.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 612 (1986).
Considering the relevant terminology of the authorization, we believe that it is
at best imprecise and far too generic to be considered a designation as required
by the regulations. Because it is apparent that the trial court relied on the
authorization when it granted Rush’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, we
reverse and remand.

We note that our resolution of this issue
involves solely the interpretation of the plain language of the authorization
and is thus an issue of law and not a factual issue as argued by Plaintiff.
Coles-Moultrie Electric Cooperative v. City of Sullivan, 304 Ill. App.
3d 153, 709 N.E.2d 249 (1999). Moreover, our determination on this issue is
dispositive of the appeal. Accordingly, we need not and do not reach the
parties’ remaining arguments.

The judgment of the circuit court of Will County
is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this order.

Reversed and remanded.

HOLDRIDGE and HOMER, JJ.,
concur.