Taylor v. Jewish Hosp. & St. Mary’s Healthcare, Inc. (Summary)

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Taylor v. Jewish Hosp. & St. Mary’s Healthcare, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-00361-CRS (W.D. Ky. June 11, 2014)

A federal district court in Kentucky reached different conclusions with respect to the liability of two hospitals for the acts of their emergency physicians. The court ruled that one hospital could be liable for the acts of an emergency physician because he had an agency relationship with the hospital. However, the court found that an emergency physician at the second hospital was not its agent, so the second hospital could not be liable for his actions. The court also ruled that neither hospital violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”).

A patient presented to the emergency department of the first hospital with severe abdominal pain and was diagnosed with pneumonia. After being tested and prescribed an antibiotic, the patient was discharged. He returned a few days later, complaining of shortness of breath and a sharp pain in his chest. He received an x-ray and a new prescription, and was once again sent home. When the patient still didn’t feel better, he went to a second hospital complaining of the same symptoms. After ordering a chest x-ray, a second-year resident diagnosed the patient with atypical pneumonia, prescribed another antibiotic, and sent him home. A few days later, the patient was found collapsed on the floor, and he was rushed to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. An autopsy showed that he died of a pulmonary thromboembolism.

The patient’s mother alleged, in separate claims, that both hospitals were negligent in providing her son medical care. The first hospital sought summary judgment on this claim, arguing that the independently contracted physicians were not employees, and therefore not agents. The court found that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether the hospital exercised a high level of control over the physicians in a way that might implicate them as agents. Among other things, the court found that the first hospital’s ability to prohibit an emergency physician from providing services, and its incentive compensation plan with the group that employed the emergency physician, suggested a high level of control. This led to the court’s denial of the hospital’s request for summary judgment so that further determination could be made by a jury.

The court did grant summary judgment to the second hospital on the same claim, however, holding that the patient’s signed consent form stating his awareness that the physicians are not hospital employees is sufficient to show that the resident was not an agent of the hospital.

The plaintiff alleged that both hospitals violated EMTALA by failing to provide sufficient testing or care to the patient. However, the court granted summary judgments to dismiss both claims, ruling that, while additional testing may have been advisable, the health care facilities could not be deemed to have had actual knowledge of the emergency medical condition other than pneumonia. Because there was no actual knowledge of the emergency medical condition, the necessary elements for an EMTALA claim could not be established.