Zurga v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp. – April 2007 (Case)

Case 1:04-cv-03634-RMB-AMD Document 47 Filed 04/24/2007 Page 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

[Docket Nos. 33 and 34]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

LAUREN ZURGA, et al.
Plaintiffs,

v.
BURDETTE TOMLIN MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 04-3634 (RMB)

OPINION

Appearances:
Eugene D. McGurk, Jr., Esquire
Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross & Mundy, Esqs.
116 White Horse Pike
Haddon Heights, New Jersey 08035
(856) 854-1556
Attorney for Plaintiff Lauren Zurga
Robert Emil Paarz, Esquire
The Paarz Law Firm, LLC
Linwood Greene
210 New Road, Suite 17
Linwood, New Jersey 08221
(609) 601-8600
Attorney for Plaintiff Nicholas Zurga
Timothy M. Crammer, Esquire
David J. Bishop, Esquire
Crammer Bishop, PC
508 New Jersey Avenue, Suite B3
Absecon, New Jersey 08201
(609) 677-6996

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Attorneys for Defendant Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital

Jay J. Blumberg, Esquire
Blumberg and Lindner, LLC
45 South Broad Street
P.O. Box 68
Woodbury, New Jersey 08096
(856)848-7472
Attorney for Defendant Raymond Cascarino, D.O.
Richard A. Grossman, Esquire
Grossman & Heavey
1608 Highway 88 West, Suite 200
Brick, New Jersey 08724
(732) 206-0200
Attorney for Defendant Manish K. Singh, M.D.
BUMB, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court upon motions for summary
judgment filed by Defendants Manish K. Singh, M.D., and Burdette
Tomlin Memorial Hospital. Plaintiffs Lauren Zurga and Nicholas
Zurga oppose these motions.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are briefly as follows. On August
11, 2002, Plaintiff Lauren Zurga and her husband Nicholas Zurga
were in Avalon, New Jersey. That morning, at approximately 7:30
a.m., Ms. Zurga was brought to the emergency room of Defendant
Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital (“BTMH”) with symptoms of a
possible stroke. The emergency room physician who cared for Ms.
Zurga, Defendant Raymond Cascarino, D.O. (“Cascarino”), suspected
that Ms. Zurga had a stroke.
Defendant Cascarino ordered a CT scan of Ms. Zurga’s head to
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determine whether there was any intracranial bleeding. The CT
scan showed that Ms. Zurga did not have any intracranial
bleeding. Because there was no bleeding, the administration of a
clot busting medication, tPA, and whether or not to give it,
became an issue.
The medical consensus is that thrombolytich agents such as
tPA should not be administered to stroke patients if more than
three hours have elapsed since the onset of symptoms.
Accordingly, assuming that Ms. Zurga’s onset of symptoms occurred
at 7:30 a.m., a fact hotly disputed, the last opportunity to
administer thrombolytich agents to Ms. Zurga would have been at
10:30 a.m. After Defendant Cascarino received reports of the CT
Scan, he telephoned Defendant Manish Singh, M.D. (“Singh”), the
“on-call” neurologist at BTMH. Pursuant to the hospital’s
policies, Defendant Singh was required to respond to emergency
room calls within thirty minutes.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding whether there is a

The moving party always bears the initial burden of
1
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless
of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at
trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.
3

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disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence
in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable
favorable inference to that party; in other words, “the nonmoving
party’s evidence ‘is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.’” Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). The threshold inquiry is
whether there are “any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-30
(3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is whether or not the administration
of tPA could have been given before 10:30 a.m. The answer to
this question depends upon the resolution of conflicting and
contradictory testimony. First, there is contradictory testimony
regarding the telephone conversations between Defendants
Cascarino and Singh. Although Defendant Singh alleges that he
was more than an hour away from the hospital, and would not have
been able, upon any circumstances, to arrive at the hospital
before 10:30 a.m., assuming the onset of symptoms began at 7:30
a.m., the evidence in the record contradicts that. For example,

2005).

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Defendant Cascarino testified in his deposition that Defendant
Singh later admitted to him that he was not an hour away from the
hospital but was, in fact, in Cape May Courthouse where the
hospital is located. Defendant Singh claims that even if he had
arrived at the hospital before 10:30 a.m. “he would have had to
[have] taken the time to review the chart and records, confer
with Dr. Cascarino, examine the patient and attempt to determine
if Lauren Zurga indeed had a stroke, in the face of symptoms
which did not meet any of the criteria for diagnosing stroke.”
[Def. Brief at 8]. Of course, these are facts – all in dispute –
that should be resolved by a jury.
Defendant BTMH contends that summary judgment should be
granted in its favor because it advised Defendant Singh of its
thirty minute policy. However, the record is replete with
evidence that Defendants Singh and BTMH were in disagreement on
the hospital’s thirty minute policy. Indeed, the record before
this Court is sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant Singh had
made it known to the hospital that he was not going to be bound
by the thirty minute rule. (See Pl’s. Exhibit F, at pages 65,
68, 244, 274.) In light of this evidence, Defendant BTMH is not
entitled to summary judgment by producing evidence that it
advised Defendant Singh of the thirty minute policy.
Accordingly, because many material facts in this case are in
dispute, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be

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denied, and an appropriate Order will be issued.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

Dated: April 24, 2007